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ABSTRACT 
 
 Theories about political campaign communication have been based primarily on an 
understanding of the two-party system. Consequently, the rhetoric of third party presidential 
candidates has been seen as ineffective or unimportant because it violates the norms of political 
discourse. I maintain that this leads to a critical misunderstanding and under-appreciation for 
third party campaign rhetoric, since scholars too often ignore the situational barriers and 
perceived strategic constraints that these candidates routinely encounter. In the first two chapters 
of this project, I identify the purposes of third party campaigns and argue that the rhetorical style 
of serious minor party candidates is fundamentally different than the style of traditional 
incumbents and challengers. Functioning as agitators for change, third party presidential 
candidates use a rhetorical style that is polarizing, populist, rich in markers of authenticity, and 
aimed at producing public spectacle. In three additional chapters, I argue that the constraints, 
purposes, and rhetorical style that make third party candidates distinct from their major party 
counterparts means that even the most significant rhetorical moments of their campaign – the 
announcement statement, nomination acceptance speech, and concession – will violate the 
traditional norms of each genre. These differences suggest the existence of norms that are unique 
to third party discourse. As such, variants for each genre as they pertain to minor party 
candidates are described in detail, and applied to several case studies.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In his history of the study of presidential rhetoric Martin Medhurst attributed Theodore 
Otto Windt, Jr. with being the first “to [publically] recognize and articulate a specific interest in 
the presidency and in presidential rhetoric as a specialization within the larger world of rhetorical 
studies.”1 Windt’s observation came at a fascinating time. Political scientists were characterizing 
the modern presidency, starting with Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, as an office of 
rhetorical leadership.2 This “rhetorical presidency” involved “leadership of popular opinion” that 
used “popular or mass rhetoric” to “‘go over the heads’ of Congress to the people at large in 
support of legislation and other initiatives.”3 At the forefront of what Medhurst called a 
“renaissance” in rhetorical studies of presidential communication,4 Windt defined presidential 
rhetoric as a “discipline . . . concerned with the study of presidential public persuasion as it 
affects the ability of a President to exercise the powers of the office.”5  
Fleshing out the details of this “field of study,” Windt suggested that presidential rhetoric 
consists of four kinds of research. First, he argued, some scholars study presidential discourse by 
analyzing single speeches. Studies of this kind either produce criticism that is “intrinsic,” in that 
it illuminates “how a particular speech worked on intended audiences,” or “extrinsic” by using 
specific speeches to enrich our “knowledge of how a particular President used his persuasive 
powers to get done what he wanted done or for the development of theories about presidential 
rhetoric.”6 A second approach, Windt maintained, is the study of “rhetorical movements to build 
constituencies, to get legislation passed, [or] to defend against continuing opposition on basic 
issues.”7 This broader study of presidential rhetoric entails a dwelling “on the 
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chronological/rhetorical progression of a political idea or policy, or on the various uses of 
arguments a President employs in pressing a single theme.”8 Movement studies of presidential 
rhetoric, Windt remarked, “provide a valuable historical and political framework within which to 
analyze how presidents use rhetoric with other instruments of power to pursue policy and 
political goals.”9 The third kind of research that Windt identified was a category of 
miscellaneous studies, including those concerned with “textual accuracy, speech preparation” 
and among other things “the ethics of using speech-writers and consultants.” Windt also 
identified a fourth approach to presidential rhetoric that he labeled “genre studies” which 
concentrate “on comparisons of what different Presidents have said on similar occasions, on 
similar themes, or what they have said to similar audiences.”10 The last category is the subject of 
this study. 
A genre-based approach to presidential discourse was underdeveloped as late as the mid-
1980s, with most research focusing mainly on presidential apologia and crisis rhetoric. To say 
that things changed quickly is an understatement. “It was perhaps merely coincidental,” 
Medhurst remarked, that a rush of important books and essays started being published “at the 
same moment that Windt was proclaiming the existence of a recognized subfield called 
presidential rhetoric.”11 Research on the genres of presidential discourse in the years that 
followed has developed the form and function of a canon of speeches delivered by America’s top 
leader. The most attention has been given to the inaugural address,12 followed by presidential 
apologia,13 war rhetoric,14 the national eulogy,15 the State of the Union address,16 farewell 
address,17 and to a lesser degree other “emerging genres.”18 To this canon, scholars have added 
and meticulously studied several genres of presidential campaign rhetoric including the 
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announcement speech,19 nomination acceptance speech,20 as well as victory and concession 
speeches.21  
Although the genre-based approach to presidential discourse has evolved remarkably 
over the last three decades there is still much to be done. In particular, one significant 
shortcoming is that analysis of the genres of campaign rhetoric has focused predominately on 
candidates who have emerged from the two-party system. In other words, communication 
scholars have not only given minimal attention to third party presidential campaigns in general, 
but they have almost entirely ignored how the genres of campaign discourse differ for minor 
party presidential candidates. However, I contend throughout this dissertation that third party 
performance of campaign speech genres reveals a rhetorical style that is misunderstood and 
underappreciated. Ultimately, with this study I aim to fill a crucial gap in the existing literature in 
presidential rhetoric by answering three important questions: First, how does the general 
campaign style – or the kinds of common rhetorical strategies used by candidates in speeches, 
advertisements, websites, etc. – for third party presidential candidates differ from the styles 
typically used by hopefuls from the two-party system? Second, if there is a campaign style 
unique to third party presidential candidates then how does it shape the common genres of their 
campaign discourse, in both form and function? Third, how do the genres of third party 
presidential campaign discourse differ, if at all, among the various types of third parties that have 
been described by political scientists and other scholars?  
In this chapter, I articulate the theoretical underpinnings and methodological framework 
of this study. First, I provide a review of the literature concerning third party presidential 
campaign discourse, from communication studies and other disciplines, to highlight the need for 
this research. Second, I explain three reasons for why third party discourse has been neglected by 
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presidential rhetoric scholars, and then offer a justification for a study of minor party rhetorical 
style and speech genres. Third, I define the approach to genre criticism that will inform my entire 
study. Fourth, through an analysis of the constraints that third party presidential candidates 
routinely encounter, I demonstrate that the function and form of their campaign discourse are 
different than the same kinds of discourse produced by two-party candidates. Fifth, I describe in 
detail my methods for each stage of this research project, from gathering rhetoric to contextual 
analysis, to theory building, and finally to uncovering rhetorical patterns. In closing, I preview 
the chapters. 
Literature Review 
 In general, communication scholars have given minimal attention to third party 
presidential campaigns. For instance, the long-running series edited by Robert Denton offering 
“A Communication Perspective” of each presidential election since 1992 has discussed third 
party challengers only as a way of explaining the results for the Republican and Democratic 
candidates. The edition dedicated to the 1992 presidential election offered occasional analysis of 
Ross Perot’s advertising,22 participation in debates,23 and appearances on several television talk 
shows.24 However, no mention was made of Andre Marrou, the other minor party candidate who 
was on the ballot in all 50 states and received around 290,000 votes that year, or any of the other 
third party challengers. The edition on the 1996 presidential election made far fewer references 
to Perot, and not a single mention of the campaigns of Green Party nominee Ralph Nader and 
Libertarian nominee Harry Browne, who along with Perot captured almost ten percent of the 
popular vote.25 Likewise, the edition covering the 2000 election made only a handful of quick 
references to the campaigns of Nader and Reform Party nominee Patrick Buchanan, and no 
mention of Libertarian Harry Browne, although their campaigns took over three and a half 
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percent of the popular vote in an extremely close election.26 The absence of any significant 
discussion of third party campaign rhetoric characterized Denton’s edition on the 2004 election 
as well.27 The tendency to ignore third party presidential campaigns is not unique to Denton’s 
series. Several other respected books about presidential campaign communication have also 
made only brief references to the rhetoric of minor party candidates.28  
 Although attention to third party presidential campaign discourse has been minimal, some 
communication scholars have examined the rhetoric of certain outsider candidates. For the most 
part, these studies have focused on the controversial discourse of a few widely-known third party 
candidates who campaigned for the presidency in the twentieth century. Eugene V. Debs, for 
example, piqued the interest of Bernard Brommel, who wrote a rhetorical history of Debs’ 
pacifist speeches.29 More notably, James Darsey wrote of Debs’ prophetic discourse, and argued 
that he gave himself to a life of suffering with a language of commitment and duty that made him 
“one of the most durable and generous legends in American thought.”30   
 George Wallace’s presidential campaign as the American Independent Party’s nominee 
has been the subject of the largest number of studies by rhetoric scholars. Lawrence Rosenfeld, 
for example, profiled Wallace and compared his rhetoric to that of Patrick Henry because “both 
men . . . enlisted emotionally charged god and devil-terms to stoke up a mechanical passion.”31 
According to Rosenfeld, Wallace routinely demonized “bureaucrats, pseudo-intellectuals, 
college professors, guideline writers, anarchists, federal judges, the news media, militants, the 
national parties, rioters, Communists, students”32 and many others. Wallace captivated Southern 
audiences by engaging in “burlesque routines,” Rosenfeld noted, where he would “confound his 
tormentors and amuse those television viewers who snickered in sympathy for the pixie who was 
faced with smart-aleck arrogance of a suspect college generation.”33 Similar findings led Richard 
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Raum and James Measell to describe Wallace’s rhetoric as exemplifying a “genre of 
polarization.”34 Ultimately, Lloyd Rohler argued, Wallace was successful in part because of the 
scene of the 1960s in that he was a self-avowed conservative populist who spoke to the fears of 
those who felt “powerless and that decisions affecting their lives were being made by people far 
removed from them and their experiences.”35 Despite having no real platform or organized party 
to put a program into operation, Rohler maintained, Wallace aroused discontent that has been 
used by conservatives ever since.36 In summary, as J. Michael Hogan concluded, George 
Wallace was effective as a third party candidate because he ran at a time of widespread 
alienation when frustrated working class white Americans could easily identify with his 
emotional, cathartic rhetoric that aimed to “[purge] feelings of anxiety . . . by creating 
scapegoats.”37  
 The tendency of third party presidential candidates to resort to scapegoating has also been 
found in the campaign rhetoric of Independent John Anderson who ran against Jimmy Carter and 
Ronald Reagan in 1980. According to Barry Brummett, Anderson frequently claimed that 
America was being destroyed by factionalism and the pursuit of special interests, for which he 
blamed the Republican and Democratic parties. “Anderson not only scapegoated the competing 
parties,” Brummett noted, “but offered a vote for him as a chance for the country to achieve 
redemption.”38 Brummett concluded that Anderson’s strategy of using the two-party system as a 
scapegoat for America’s shortcomings had an inherent risk. “By entering a political arena which 
was traditionally governed by the two party system,” Brummett suggested, “Anderson may not 
have been able to escape the appearance of factional combat himself.”39 
 Ross Perot’s rhetoric has also been examined by several communication scholars. Perot’s 
first campaign came at a time of escalating voter cynicism toward traditional politics, but 
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researchers have attributed his large share of the popular vote in 1992 to his unconventional 
rhetorical style. Perot, many have noted, temporarily circumvented the traditional gatekeepers in 
the media by discussing his campaign on various television talk shows.40 Perot was humorous in 
his public appearances,41 and more importantly he used simple language that the average 
American could understand.42 Perot’s unconventional style, though, ultimately hurt his 
campaign. As Mari Boor Tonn and Valerie Endress argued, “although Perot’s unorthodox 
approach to politics catapulted him into consideration and prompted his inclusion in the 
presidential debates, those same traits disqualified him in the eyes of many Americans.”43 In 
particular, Perot’s shocking withdrawal from the race in July 1992 and reentry in October,44 
along with his surprising choice of James Stockdale as his running mate, doomed his campaign 
and caused voters to question his competence.45 Moreover, Perot’s preference for unmediated 
communication, John Zaller and Mark Hunt maintained, led to voters taking him less seriously as 
he dodged the traditional news media in the final months of the race.46 Perot’s “everyman style” 
of speaking, too, eventually backfired and looked unprofessional in certain contexts, such as his 
televised NAFTA debate with Al Gore.47 
Green Party nominee Ralph Nader’s rhetorical style has also intrigued at least one 
rhetoric scholar. Christine Harold characterized Nader’s rhetoric in 2000 as being similar to the 
rhetoric of Ross Perot, George Wallace, Theodore Roosevelt and Eugene V. Debs, because it 
characterized the government as being corrupt and broken. Nader’s rhetoric, Harold, suggested, 
“is filled with allusions to an electoral process that is contaminated by ‘monied interests.’”48 By 
characterizing his own campaign as pure, Harold suggested, Nader adopted a very specific 
version of authenticity and thus opened himself to an attack that he was the real contaminating 
force in the election. In short, Democrats “effectively cast the Green Party candidate as the 
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‘spoiler,’ as a contaminating element in an otherwise well-ordered political system,”49 due to his 
mission to eat into Democratic support and his disruption of the democratic process by 
encouraging online vote-swaps. When attacked for his own “impurity,” Nader denied the claims 
of Democrats and stood behind principle. Ultimately, Harold argued, “instead of ardently (and 
vainly) protecting a pure, unadulterated space from which to launch their attacks on a corrupt 
system, the Greens might have had more success by embracing their role as a viral corrupting 
agent . . . actively forcing a reconfiguration of the American political system.”50 
Considering that so few works have offered a detailed analysis of third party presidential 
campaigns, it is unsurprising that communication scholars have neglected to analyze the genres 
of discourse for these outsider candidates. All too often, the significant genres of campaign 
rhetoric have been mentioned only briefly in analyses of the discourse of minor party 
challengers. In his study of Eugene V. Debs’ pacifist speechmaking, for instance, Brommel 
barely mentioned the Socialist Party nominee’s acceptance speech in 1920.51 In his examination 
of nomination acceptance speeches from the 1996 campaign, Ray Dearin briefly discussed Ross 
Perot’s acceptance of the Reform Party’s nomination and argued that his emphasis on a 
traditional Republican version of the American Dream was problematic for the Dole campaign.52 
Even when scholars have discussed a third party candidate’s performance of key genres of 
campaign rhetoric, the criticism has assumed that the generic norms for third party candidates are 
the same as for mainstream candidates. In an essay concerning candidate concession speeches in 
the 1992 presidential election, for instance, Paul Corcoran sarcastically suggested that Perot 
“[abided] by the rules, complete with a ballroom victory party.”53 Arguing that Perot’s speech 
violated all of the basic features of a concession, Corcoran called it “a classic of its genre . . . in 
every respect but form, style, and content.”54 Evaluations like Corcoran’s are to be expected, 
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though, when works detailing the recurring forms of political campaign communication fail to 
acknowledge the important differences between major party and third party campaigns.55 
In summary, the existing literature concerning the communication practices of third party 
presidential campaigns has a number of shortcomings. First, the tendency has been to mention 
third party campaigns only when describing the context of the race, or when explaining the 
outcome for the Democratic or Republican nominees. Only a few third party candidates are 
mentioned at all. Second, existing studies of third party presidential campaign rhetoric have 
tended to focus on single case studies of notable candidates or their political movements, and 
have therefore failed to describe rhetorical practices common to minor party challengers. Finally, 
the handful of journal articles examining genres of presidential campaign discourse have 
assumed that the form and function of the major kinds of speeches are the same for both 
mainstream and third party candidates.  
Reasons for the Neglect of Third Parties in Communication Scholarship 
 At this point, there is an obvious question that needs to be answered: Why have third 
party presidential candidates been generally neglected in the field of presidential rhetoric? There 
are three main reasons. First, opinion leaders in the public sphere have long perceived third party 
candidates as odd, quirky, and at times just plain absurd. Aside from the few minor party 
candidates who occasionally receive serious public attention in presidential races, most are 
lumped into a category called “the other candidates.” The “other” candidates are portrayed 
frequently as “a little flakey”56 and proof to many journalists that “Anybody can run for 
President, and anybody does.”57  
 Election after election, the only press coverage that most minor party candidates receive 
characterizes them as the freak show in the electoral circus. For instance, among the “other” 
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campaigns profiled by Time in the 1952 race were: the America First Party, which nominated 
General Douglas MacArthur without his permission and encouraged him to maintain “a dignified 
silence”; the Greenback Party, whose nominee admitted to running simply because as a grocer 
his customers thought it was neat; and the Washington Peace Party led by Ellen Jensen, 
described as a “50 year-old Miami grandmother and astrologist who claims to be in close 
communion with George Washington.”58 In 1956, newspapers also profiled the regular losing 
candidates of the Prohibition Party and the Communist Party, but highlighted as well Poor Man’s 
Party nominee Henry Krajewski who was a pig farmer “promising free beer and lower income 
taxes.”59 Among the other candidates of 1960, America First Party nominee Lar Daly was 
described as the “perennial Presidential candidate who campaigns in an Uncle Sam suit” and 
whose legal demands for equal access to the news media was the reason for Congress suspending 
“equal time” provisions for third parties.60 Moreover, write-in candidate Gabriel Green was 
characterized as claiming “he’s seen seventy-five flying saucers and has talked with space 
people,” and that his relationship with spacemen “will help me, not necessarily at the precinct 
level, but by supplying me with information.”61 In 1968, it was noted that third party candidates 
joining George Wallace included “a beagle, comedians, a ‘love candidate’ who campaigns in the 
nude and a Jewish mother who endorses sex education in the schools ‘as long as it’s boring.’”62 
This kind of press coverage of third party campaigns is relatively common.63 Clearly, then, third 
party presidential candidates are stigmatized for failing to uphold the perceived ideals of 
democracy, and their campaigns are frequently seen as lacking the seriousness required for 
critical analysis.  
A second reason for the neglect of third party presidential candidates by communication 
scholars is the reality that they have not won a presidential election since 1860. As William 
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Henry Chamberlain wrote in The Wall Street Journal just before the 1948 campaign, “Our 
political history since the Civil War is thickly strewed with the bones of third parties, some of 
which started out under favorable auspices . . . [and some] of these parties achieved voting 
success on a state and even a national level.” However, he noted, “no one of these third parties 
reached the point of electing a President or even of sending enough representatives to Congress 
to hold the balance of power between the major parties.”64 Indeed, since Lincoln only eight 
minor party presidential candidates have received over five percent of the popular vote, and the 
ceiling remains the 27.4 percent given to popular former president Theodore Roosevelt, who 
headed the Progressive Party in 1912. Moreover, only six candidates since Lincoln have received 
electoral votes, but none of those campaigns were even close to winning the election. Therefore, 
it is somewhat understandable that political communication scholars have written little on a 
group of quadrennial underdogs who have not won a presidential election for over 150 years. 
 A third reason why minor party presidential campaigns are neglected in the field of 
presidential rhetoric is that contextual factors, rather than candidate strategy, are usually used to 
explain their successes. In short, there is a prevalent belief that third parties become popular 
when the electorate is alienated from the two major parties usually because some specific issue 
or after a major crisis. According to political scientists, this happens mostly when major parties 
resemble one another too closely, inviting liberal or conservative minor party candidates to cater 
to voters on the extreme ends of the political spectrum.65  As Steven Rosenstone, Roy Behr, and 
Edward Lazarus suggested, “Because the cost of exit is high and the likelihood of achieving 
desired goals through third party activity is low, severe deterioration of the major parties must 
take place before significant third party activity occurs.”66 Political scientist Daniel Mazmanian, 
for instance, listed a number of cumulative conditions that lead to strong third party campaigns. 
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He noted that these conditions included “severe national conflict over a few very important 
issues, a period of ‘crisis politics’; division of the electorate on one or more of these issues into 
at least one intense and estranged minority and a broad majority; rejection or avoidance of the 
position of the minority by both major parties, causing alienation of the minority; and a politician 
or political group willing to exploit the situation by initiating a new party.”67 For Mazmanian and 
many others, discontent in the electorate always precedes a successful third party campaign. In 
other words, as Jeffrey Koch noted, most studies focusing on “political attitudes associated with 
the rise of third party movements are those that can be placed under the general rubric of 
political cynicism.”68  This is, by far, the dominant explanation for why many voters find third 
parties so appealing.69 
 The cynicism and alienation among voters that many political scientists identify as the 
main cause behind the rise of third parties is attributed to a range of crises. Ronald Rapoport and 
Walter Stone summarized these crises as dealing with economic disparity, unpopular major-party 
candidates, and “significant issues that both major parties ignore or on which they take 
unpopular stands.”70 Other scholars have isolated times of war and economic depression as 
leading causes for the rise of serious third parties.71 Mazmanian even went as far to say that 
serious minor parties before 1974 emerged as a result of eight forms of conflict, regarding issues 
of egalitarianism, new territories and slavery, Reconstruction, agrarian protest, corporate 
regulation and government responsiveness, the Great Depression, and discontent about Civil 
Rights and the Vietnam War.72 In short, these many explanations of how contentious social and 
political environments give rise to third parties deemphasizes candidates’ agency in energizing 
the electorate.  
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 In light of these explanations for why communication scholars have likely neglected third 
party campaign rhetoric, another question arises: Is this neglect justified? The answer is that 
common justifications for this neglect are inadequate. Contrary to the perception that third 
parties have been routine losers in presidential elections, they have impacted the outcome of 
multiple races. Mazmanian noted, “The final outcome of the three-party contests of 1848, 1856, 
1860, 1892, 1912, and 1968 might have been changed by eliminating the third parties, for the 
victors won by pluralities.”73 Many other elections could be added to the list. According to one 
writer for The Wall Street Journal reflecting on the prospects of third parties in 1964:  
The Liberal Party of New York, the most potent of the third-party groups [in 1960] in 
terms of voting strength, gave John F. Kennedy 406,176 votes; it ran no Presidential 
candidate of its own, throwing party support to the Democratic ticket. President Kennedy 
carried New York by 383,666 votes. In Illinois, which the Democratic ticket carried by a 
paper-thin margin of 8,850 votes, 10,575 voters cast ballots for third-party nominees. Had 
New York’s Liberals decided to sit out the election or vote for their own candidate, and 
had the GOP in Illinois been able to capture some 9,000 third-party votes, a switch of 72 
electoral votes from the Democratic column to the Republican column would have 
occurred – and Richard Nixon would have been elected.”74  
In more recent memory, Ralph Nader may have helped elect Republican George W. Bush in 
2000. Political scientist John Berg, for example, argued, “There is little room for doubt that 
Nader’s presence in the campaign changed the outcome of the election. Whatever the actual vote 
in Florida may have been, the official results gave Bush 2,912,790, Gore 2,919,253, and Nader 
97,488 in the Sunshine State.”75  
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Spoilers and near spoilers alike have had a serious influence on American policy as well. 
Many historians agree that Theodore Roosevelt’s candidacy as a Progressive in 1912 led to 
progressive reforms during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Others suggest that George 
Wallace’s campaign in 1968 as the nominee of the American Independent Party influenced the 
debate on civil rights and led conservative politicians to start catering to the “silent majority” of 
disgruntled white voters. Political commentator and author Douglas Schoen argued further, “In 
1980, John Anderson scored only 6 percent of the vote, but his third-party run raised the profile 
of such critical national issues as fiscal restraint, environmentalism, Social Security reform, and 
energy independence.”76 Summarizing the significance of third party spoilers throughout history, 
Rapoport and Stone suggested, “Although such candidates are rare, they are hardly irrelevant, 
and their importance in the life and history of our politics means we must try to understand 
them.”77  
 Moreover, another important reason for examining third party candidate communication 
is that their rhetoric, at least to some degree, is clearly tied to their success. One question that 
arises when examining polling data measuring voter alienation and dissatisfaction since the 
1960s is why third party candidates sometimes do extraordinarily well during periods marked by 
low levels of alienation, and flop during periods marked by high levels of alienation.78 According 
to political scientists, 2008 should have been a record year for third parties, but their support was 
dismal. Mazmanian, for example, argued that even with a context ripe for third party politics, 
there must be “an individual or group of political entrepreneurs [who] then mobilizes the 
minority behind a third party.”79 The rhetorical skill of third party candidates is the difference 
maker. Jeffrey Koch argued, “It is reasonable to suspect . . . that third party candidates, acting as 
outsiders and severe critics of the political process and contemporary leaders, serve to increase 
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their supporters’ political skepticism.” Koch added that this “casts doubt on the importance of 
political cynicism as a determinant of third party candidate support.”80 In other words, Koch later 
argued, “Most models of third party support in America assume causality flows from political 
cynicism to candidate support. It is necessary to consider, however, that support for a third party 
candidate may lead individuals to assign the political orientations and positions of the candidate 
they prefer to themselves.”81 Third parties, then, perform a mentoring function in politics by 
“[providing] their supporters with explanations and solutions for contemporary political issues 
and social maladies.”82 Their rhetoric serves to polarize the electorate, and to make those 
susceptible to feelings of alienation lash out against the two-party system by supporting their 
third party campaign.  
Justification  
 Study of the rhetorical style of third party presidential candidates, and its presence in the 
significant genres of their campaign discourse is important for three reasons. First, as I have 
already illustrated, communication scholars have largely neglected third party presidential 
campaigns. Studies of this rhetoric have tended to focus on just a handful of campaigns from the 
twentieth century. Little to no attention has been given to the rhetoric of recent candidates who 
have represented the Libertarian Party, the Populist Party, the Prohibition Party, Reform Party, 
and others. By failing to account for the different rhetorical practices in America’s presidential 
election, the field of presidential studies is helping “socialize students into the practice of 
citizenship according to the reigning paradigm, which holds the two-party system to be 
unbeatable (if not altogether desirable) and guarantees that a third-party ballot is a ballot 
wasted.”83 Closer analysis of this discourse, then, will help expand the field of presidential 
studies by acknowledging the importance of the communication practices of alternative 
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candidates and, in identifying similar rhetorical patterns among these campaigns, perhaps shed 
light on why third party candidates communicate differently.    
Second, this project is important because there are good reasons to believe that the genres 
of campaign rhetoric for third party candidates will be different from major party genres. For 
more than 150 years minor party presidential candidates have always lost elections. Why would 
they behave similarly to those who have a chance of electoral success? As I demonstrate in the 
next section, third party candidates face an array of rhetorical constraints that force them to 
recognize that winning is extremely unlikely, and to adopt different goals and strategies. 
Understanding these different constraints and purposes is crucial to understanding minor party 
rhetoric.  
Finally, such study is worthy for it expands the possibilities of genre criticism within the 
field of communication studies. As Martin Medhurst maintained in the keynote address at the 
Seventh Biennial Public Address Conference in 2000, scholars like Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson have “demonstrated the efficacy” of genre criticism but many genres 
have been “virtually untouched by our critical hands.”84 Although Medhurst suggested that 
scholars should explore the genres of the sermon, eulogy, lecture, essay, editorial, and the public 
letter, I argue that many genres commonly analyzed by presidential rhetoric scholars are treated 
too simplistically. As I argue in later chapters, studies of the campaign announcement, 
nomination acceptance speech, and concession discourse tend to be overly deductive, and 
assume that the generic functions and norms for each speech are similar for all political 
candidates. However, not all presidential candidates have the same constraints and goals, for 
instance, and thus the way that they approach certain genres is clearly different. By articulating 
these differences for third party candidates, my study makes genre theory more useful to critics 
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interested in political campaign rhetoric by acknowledging important variants of genres, thus 
enhancing the explanatory and evaluative power of this kind of genre theory. 
Genre Theory and the Need for a New Approach to Third Party Presidential Campaign Discourse 
 In my effort to explicate the special nature of the campaign style of third party 
presidential candidates and how it surfaces in the major genres of their discourse, I adopt a very 
specific notion of what constitutes a genre. In particular, I use a strict situational approach to 
genre theory that acknowledges the importance of perceived strategic constraints. Thus, before 
discussing the style of third party candidates and how it is manifested in genres of campaign 
discourse, it is crucial to understand the situational approach to genre criticism and the many 
constraints that third party candidates face when running for president.  
The Situational Approach to Genre Criticism 
In the most basic sense, genre criticism deals with the categorization of discourse with “a 
recurrent form and uses the form to compare one rhetorical act” to another.85 One approach to 
genre criticism, what rhetoric scholar Robert Rowland called the interpretive/heuristic approach, 
“treats genre as a comparative method for revealing the character of a given work.”86 Edwin 
Black’s treatment of the “Coatesville Address” as a “morality play” is a good example of this 
metaphorical classification.87 The interpretive/heuristic approach uses genre as a comparative 
tool to illuminate something about a specific text. Although the approach may sometimes be 
useful in understanding a specific work, Rowland argued, “its value for explaining or evaluating 
the character of a broad class of works is problematic” because the category has no empirical 
existence.88 
A second kind of genre criticism, what Rowland labeled the ontological/empirical 
approach, treats genres as tied to a recurring situation.89 Black, for example, argued that genre 
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criticism presumes that “there is a limited number of situations in which” rhetors will find 
themselves, that “there is a limited number of ways in which a rhetor can and will respond 
rhetorically to any given situational type,” and that the recurrence of situations and rhetorical 
responses will constrain which forms are acceptable in the future.90 In other words, for genre 
theorists using the ontological/empirical approach, recurring aspects of the rhetorical situation 
function as the glue for rhetorical genres. When Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson described a genre as “a group of acts unified by a constellation of forms that recurs in 
each of its members,”91 they argued that the formal characteristics of a genre depend on “external 
factors, including human needs and exposure to antecedent rhetorical forms.”92 “When a generic 
claim is made,” they maintained, “the critic is . . . arguing that a group of discourses has a 
synthetic core in which certain significant rhetorical elements, e.g., a system of belief, lines of 
argument, stylistic choices, and the perception of the situation, are fused into an indivisible 
whole.”93 This notion of genre allows “the critic to generalize beyond the individual event which 
is constrained by time and place to affinities and traditions across time.”94 Rowland argued that 
while this approach is valuable, it is also problematic because it tends to produce theories tied to 
just a handful of recurring occasions, and the case studies it produces often reveal little of 
interest because the term “situation” is sometimes used too loosely.95  
 Building off Campbell and Jamieson’s early work, Rowland developed a revised 
situational approach, contending that rhetorical genres are “created out of the interaction of three 
related forces that together play the role of exigence and constraint.”96 These forces “create 
perceived strategic constraints which limit the options open to the rhetor and lead to substantive 
and stylistic similarities that define the genre or category.”97 First, every exigence entails a “felt 
need in response to some sort of recurring problem.”98 At the beginning of every political 
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campaign, for instance, candidates feel compelled to announce their candidacy before hitting the 
trail. Second, constraints consist, among other things, of “limiting purposes in confronting those 
needs.”99 An announcement speech requires that candidates identify their reasons for running, 
distinguish themselves from other candidates, and cite specific policy positions that describe 
what they represent. The third factor is “societal limitations on appropriate rhetorical responses,” 
or in other words the “general assumptions of the culture.”100 For an announcement speech, then, 
a candidate would have to cater to the social mores, history, and generic expectations of their 
audience. If a speech lacks one of these constraints, Rowland argued, then it need not follow the 
formal characteristics of a genre and should not be grouped into that category of discourse.     
 Although generic classification can be useful to rhetorical critics, there are problems that 
commonly occur in the identification or creation of genres, and a revised situational approach 
can avoid those pitfalls. First, as Campbell and Jamieson noted, some scholars have the tendency 
to adopt a deductive approach to genre criticism by assuming “that a genre already exists and is 
known and defined.”101 Second, Miller contended, some discourses are called genres even 
though, upon closer inspection, “there may fail to be significant substantive or formal similarities 
at the lower levels of the hierarchy.”102 In other words, discourses are all too often grouped into a 
genre while “there may be inadequate consideration of all the elements in recurrent rhetorical 
situations.”103 A revised situational approach to genre avoids these problems by focusing on 
stable genres that are characterized by the three situational forces that Rowland outlined, 
“without significant variation in a set of works.”104 This avoids overgeneralization about a 
category of rhetorical works, and maximizes the explanatory and evaluative dimensions of 
theory.  
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 When viewed from a situational perspective, it is immediately obvious that third party 
rhetoric will not necessarily look like the rhetoric of the major parties. Third party candidates 
would produce rhetoric similar to the major parties only if they faced similar situations and 
shared the same purposes. However, this clearly is not the case. 
Situational Constraints for Third Party Candidates 
 Third parties in America have been historically marginalized. As historian Clinton 
Rossiter suggested, Americans “live under a persistent, obdurate, one might almost say 
tyrannical, two-party system. We have the Republicans and we have the Democrats, and we 
have almost no one else.”105 The two major parties have had a “tenacious stranglehold over the 
presidency”106 due to numerous “multifaceted barriers that prevent third parties in this country 
from competing fairly in the democratic process.”107 “The hurdles are so prevalent,” former 
Green Party candidate Ralph Nader complained, “that leaders of oligarchic regimes in foreign 
countries might blush.”108 These barriers compose the major situational constraints that shape 
third party candidate rhetoric. Overall, there are several kinds of structural and cultural barriers 
that third party candidates routinely encounter. 
Political socialization and attitudes about America’s party system.  One of the most 
significant barriers that third party presidential candidates face is a political culture in which 
voters have been socialized to stick to the two-party system. Political socialization is “the 
process through which people acquire their political ideas and opinions.”109 Political 
socialization starts in the family when children gain their political knowledge and beliefs from 
their parents, and usually swear allegiance to the party that was preferred by their household.110 
Consequently, Smallwood concluded, “the fact that so many children adopted their parents’ party 
allegiance played a significant role in strengthening the two major parties.”111 
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A significant reason why political socialization is so disastrous for third party candidates 
is that once voters align themselves with a certain party they exhibit an attachment that is usually 
unshakable. While party attachment appears to be on the decline in recent years,112 the pool of 
“truly uncommitted voters” is fairly small. John Zaller and Mark Hunt explained, “In 1988, for 
example, 90 percent of self-described Republicans voted for the Republican candidate, while 85 
percent of self-described Democrats voted for the Democrat. Since these figures include voters 
who describe themselves as being ‘closer’ to one of the parties, they refer to 93 percent of the 
electorate.”113 Surely, these trends have fluctuated in recent years,114 and party identification is 
not the only factor that voters consider in making political decisions, but the dominant political 
culture obviously puts third party candidates at a disadvantage. Ultimately, third party expert 
David Gillespie concluded, the political socialization process “(1) signals to each new generation 
that multiparty deviations from national two-party patterns are ‘unAmerican’ and (2) normally 
engenders either loyalty for the GOP or Democrats or a nonpartisan disposition.”115 
The “winner takes all” electoral system.  Another disadvantage for third party 
presidential candidates is the way that most states divvy up their electoral votes. This “single-
member district/plurality system,” also known as the “winner-take-all” approach, means that 
candidates who win a majority in most states get all of the state’s electoral votes.116 An 
alternative, called the Congressional District Method, splits electoral votes based on which 
candidates win a plurality in the congressional districts of a state. This is a better alternative for 
third-party candidates, but to date only Maine and Nebraska have adopted this approach. The 
problem with the “winner-take-all” electoral system is that a third party candidate could finish in 
second place in most states and still not receive a single electoral vote. Something similar 
happened to Progressive Party candidate Robert LaFollette in 1924; despite polling nearly 5 
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million votes for 16.6 percent of the popular vote and placing second in all eleven Western and 
Southern states, he won only the 13 electoral votes from his home state of Wisconsin.117 Perot 
suffered the same fate in 1992, receiving no electoral votes at all despite receiving 18.9 percent 
of the popular vote. Only candidates who focus on a particular region – such as Strom Thurmond 
in 1948 and George Wallace in 1968 – are usually able to receive electoral votes, but never 
enough to be close to winning. Consequently, Smallwood lamented, “they fail to gain any 
political rewards because they do not receive the highest number of total votes.”118  
Ballot laws. Another barrier for third party campaigns is the restrictive ballot access laws 
in many states caused by the adoption of the secret Australian ballot. The Australian ballot, 
which has been used in the United States since the late nineteenth century, lists all parties’ 
candidates on a single ballot. Previously, all parties distributed their own ballots and third parties 
were able to work in tandem with major parties by creating “fusion tickets” where they would 
endorse the same candidates. As political scientist Lisa Disch suggested, “Although it was a 
controversial strategy, fusion enabled nineteenth-century third parties to survive as parties – to 
have a place on the ballot, to influence electoral outcomes, to put dissenting views into the public 
arena – even though they could not have beaten out either of the two dominant parties.”119  
Since the Australian ballot reform, third party presidential candidates have struggled to 
make it onto the presidential ballot in most states. The United States Supreme Court in Williams 
v. Rhodes (1968) rejected some of the restrictions that states commonly used against third party 
candidates, but they still allowed for certain restrictions that serve a “compelling state interest.” 
However, the court’s goal of allowing states to make the electoral process comprehensible to 
voters has meant that third party candidates must navigate complex state laws in order to be 
added to the ballot. As Smallwood summarized, the “reality that faces third-party . . . presidential 
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candidates is that they must digest not one Waldorf salad, but fifty-one quite separate and distinct 
salads in the form of the different ballot access laws that are generated by the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia.”120  
The differences in state ballot access laws are astonishing. Calling these diverse 
regulations “a crazy quilt of criteria,” Smallwood noted that petition signature requirements for 
ballot access in most states vary significantly.121 Some states require that third party campaigns 
collect signatures amounting to between one and five percent of the registered voters in the state, 
or one to five percent of the total votes cast in the previous general election. Frustrated by this 
challenge, former Green Party candidate Ralph Nader complained after the 2000 election that 
“each state has . . . its own arcane set of grossly complicated procedures for getting on the 
ballot.”122 “Mind you,” he added, “bipartisan-controlled state assemblies created all these 
incredible obstacles.”123 Because challenging ballot access laws requires doing so on a case-by-
case basis, third-party candidates must raise enough money for a lengthy and costly legal 
challenge, and thus risk sacrificing resources meant for establishing a strong national campaign. 
For instance, Gillespie noted, John Anderson made all fifty-one ballots in 1980, but “spent more 
than half of the $7.3 million his campaign collected between March and September on petition 
drives and legal fees. Meanwhile, the Democratic and Republican campaigns allocated their 
much larger resources to campaign tactics for reaching voters before election day.”124  
Poor finances.  Third party presidential candidates tend to be remarkably underfunded as 
well. Theoretically, minor parties are supposed to benefit from the Federal Election Campaign 
Act (FECA), but its design puts those outside the two party system at an extreme 
disadvantage.125 The FECA encourages serious candidates within a major party to pursue 
matching funds in primaries and caucuses, as well as for the general election campaign, but 
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defines a party as one which has previous received over 25 percent or more of the total number 
of popular votes. Minor parties may receive funding, too, but only if they have received at least 5 
percent or more of the vote in the previous election. As if that hurdle were not enough, new 
parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote cannot be reimbursed for their costs until 
after the election. “Given these requirements,” Rosenstone and his colleagues wrote, “only 10 of 
the 148 minor party candidates that have emerged since 1840 [and before 1996] would have 
qualified for retroactive public funding.”126 Without equal access to public money, third party 
candidates who cannot fund their own campaigns are at an extreme disadvantage.  
Poor funding is problematic especially because the cost of running a presidential 
campaign is increasing so quickly that few third party candidates, outside of billionaires 
committed to funding their own campaigns, can be competitive. The cost of running for president 
has increased from the $100,000 spent by Lincoln’s campaign in 1860, to the $1.1 million spent 
by Garfield in 1880, to Nixon’s spending of more than $61.4 million in 1972.127 In more recent 
years, George W. Bush’s campaign spent more than $190 million to beat Al Gore in 2000, and 
over $350 million to get the president reelected in 2004. More astonishing is that it took Barack 
Obama more than $775 million to win in 2008. As political commentator Douglas Schoen 
concluded, “Realistically, a candidate [now] needs $100 million just to reach the starting gate. 
It’s the world’s most expensive horse race.”128 Furthermore, even the most successful third party 
candidates cannot compete in this expensive race. Rosenstone and colleagues noted, for instance, 
that “Former President Theodore Roosevelt, the best financed third party candidate on record, 
spent only 60 percent of the average major party total in 1912; George Wallace spent 39 percent 
and John Anderson only 49 percent when they ran.”129 
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Poor media coverage. Another challenge for third party candidates is getting fair press 
coverage of their campaigns. Although the Communications Act of 1934 guaranteed all political 
parties equal access to the mass media, it was eventually suspended for minor parties after the 
1960 election. Minor party candidates have only been occasionally covered ever since. In 
analyzing the 1992 election, for example, Zaller and Hunt concluded that while the press 
discussed Ross Perot’s candidacy with some frequency, the other third party candidates – from 
the Peace and Freedom Party, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Libertarian Party – were 
ignored altogether.130 The media’s failure to cover most third party candidates is due to the 
perception that they have no chance of winning and thus are not newsworthy. This is the basic 
rule of media coverage of campaigns, Zaller and Hunt noted: “the press tends to cover candidates 
in multicandidate races in proportion to how well it expects them to do.”131 This means that few 
third party tickets get significant media coverage unless they are headed by a prominent 
candidate, or benefit from the aftermath of a major political crisis. 
Several historic examples indicate that third parties are usually ignored by the media. 
Sharing his experience from the 2000 campaign, Nader suggested that third party candidates 
should “count on receiving almost no media coverage” unless they “speak in eight-second sound 
bites.”132 James Stovall also maintained, through the example of George Wallace’s 1968 
campaign, that even strong third party candidates do not receive anywhere close to the amount of 
press coverage of the two-party candidates.133 Quoting the research of Doris Graber, Stovall 
argued that George Wallace not only received less media coverage in his campaign than the 
major party candidates, but the coverage also emphasized his distinctiveness. Stovall argued that 
this trend continued in the coverage of the 1980 presidential campaign in which Independent 
John Anderson threatened the two-party system. In Stovall’s words, “The amount of coverage 
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and treatment that John Anderson received parallels the coverage and treatment given to 
previous third-party candidates. The amount of news about Anderson and the treatment news 
stories about Anderson received fell considerably short of that given to Carter and Reagan.”134  
Clearly, the lack of media coverage of third party presidential campaigns is devastating. 
Zaller and Hunt argued, “Candidates who are ignored by the press never get off the ground. 
Among candidates who do receive attention, the favorability or unfavorability of the press 
coverage they receive is vitally important.”135 When third party candidates do not receive 
significant media attention, they are unable to deliver their message to potential voters, and 
consequently, are unable to build a group of supporters large enough to financially sustain a 
campaign. In turn, without the ability to take one’s message to enough voters to build the 
organization that brings major financing, third party candidates cannot afford much advertising 
for their campaigns, and therefore are perceived as insignificant candidates. Thus as Daniel 
Mazmanian concluded, “Media exposure is no guarantee of victory, but its absence surely spells 
doom.”136  
Exclusion in presidential debates.  Even if third party presidential candidates manage to 
raise enough money to stay somewhat competitive throughout the race, make it on many state 
ballots, and are considered strong enough to be covered by the media, there is no guarantee that 
they will be invited to debate with the Republican and Democratic candidates in front of a 
national audience. Presidential debates allow candidates to reach millions of potential voters, and 
according to Ralph Nader convincing the gatekeepers of these events to include third party 
candidates “still remains the biggest barrier of all.”137  
With the exception of Ross Perot and John Anderson, third party candidates have been 
excluded from debates since the Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960. Independent John Anderson’s 
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omission in 1980 illuminated some of the unique problems that outsider candidates face. When 
the general election season opened, Anderson was a stunning “first choice Presidential candidate 
of approximately 15-20 percent of the nation’s prospective voters.”138 This was likely due to the 
fact that “the vast majority of the public seemed disturbed with the two traditional choices [and] 
an exceptionally high percentage of voters were undecided.”139 Declaring the legitimacy of 
Anderson’s campaign, the League of Women Voters, the organization sponsoring the debates, 
announced that the Independent candidate would participate in debates with Reagan and Carter. 
As Friedenberg argued, however, “the League dramatically reduced the likelihood for 
meaningful debates between the two major candidates” because the Carter campaign, threatened 
by Anderson’s rise, refused to participate.140 When Anderson’s support in later polls weakened, 
the League attempted to save the debates and uninvited him from later events. 
Ultimately, the 1980 election highlighted the problems with the management of 
presidential debates. In particular, the criteria for whom to invite has always been fairly arbitrary. 
Although the management of the debates was passed over to the Commission on Presidential 
Debates in 1988, the formula for deciding who could participate has not been consistent from 
one election to the next. In 1996, for example, the Commission decided whom to invite to the 
debate by relying on what some pundits called “ridiculous polling of political scientists and 
political reporters for their suggestions on which candidates should be admitted.”141 When this 
proved unpopular, the Commission decided in 2000 that for candidates to qualify they needed to 
“average 15 percent backing in five public opinion polls sponsored jointly by the major 
television networks and newspapers shortly before the first debate.”142 In another decision that 
proved devastating to smaller third parties, starting in 2000 the Commission required that 
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candidates “must be on the ballot in enough states to achieve the 270 Electoral College votes 
needed to win.”143  
The “wasted ballot” belief.  As long as all of the above constraints exist, voters are more 
easily convinced that a vote for third party candidates is a wasted ballot. After all, loyalty to the 
two-party system tends to get stronger as Election Day gets closer.144 Time and again, third party 
candidates have received somewhat respectable poll numbers only to see their support plummet 
when citizens vote. Many scholars claim that this happened to John Anderson in 1980, Ross 
Perot in 1992, and Ralph Nader in 2000.145 Unsurprisingly, the argument about a third party vote 
being a wasted ballot is made repeatedly by mainstream candidates with constant access to media 
coverage. On the disadvantage this poses for minor party candidates, Hazlett summarized, 
“Although it is difficult to provide direct evidence that this charge causes a decline in minor 
party voting, it seems obvious that it contributed to and reinforces the belief that minor parties 
cannot win at polls.”146  
Altogether, the structural and cultural barriers that third party presidential candidates 
routinely encounter demand that they be realistic about their dismal chances of winning an 
election. The constraints that these candidates face means that they often have goals other than 
electoral victory. For example, the underlying purpose of some third party campaigns is to gain 
attention for a particular policy or issue. In other cases, a third party may be focused on 
influencing a major party. Third campaigns fulfill other purposes as well. With different strategic 
constraints and different purposes, then, the function and form for most minor party candidates’ 
rhetoric should be substantially different than the rhetoric of the two-party candidates in the same 
race. In the rest of this project I examine how a distinct third party style responds to these 
   29 
recurring constraints, aims to accomplish objectives other than winning, and changes the 
important genres of campaign discourse.   
Methodology 
 In examining the common rhetorical practices that third party presidential candidates use 
to overcome the structural and cultural barriers they face in their campaigns, and how those 
practices are manifested in important genres of campaign rhetoric, I analyze the discourse of 
minor party presidential candidates in every presidential election from 1948 to 2008. My project 
focuses on the post-war period for several reasons. First, America’s minor parties in the 
nineteenth century were nothing like those in the twentieth century. For instance, Rosenstone and 
his colleagues noted, “Most nineteenth-century third parties functioned as complete political 
organizations. They were broad-based coalitions; often their supporters’ only common bond was 
opposition to a particular party, policy, or candidate. They held contentious nominating 
conventions, entered state and local races, and recruited experienced candidates.”147 Moreover, 
nineteenth century third parties were not as candidate-focused as contemporary minor parties. 
Government scholar Donald J. Green wrote, for instance, “During the 19th century, issues were 
the driving force behind significant third parties. Candidates for president were secondary and 
were selected at nominating conventions from a list of qualified individuals. In the 20th century, 
however, charismatic personalities were party founders. Issues mattered, but the entities would 
not have come into existence without political dynamos such as Teddy Roosevelt, George 
Wallace, Ross Perot, and Ralph Nader.”148 Furthermore, the nineteenth century has been called 
“a golden age for third parties”149 because it “brought occasional ruptures and discontinuities in 
the national two-party system”150 that were not experienced after 1948. More importantly, 
reforms beginning around the turn of the twentieth century led to the contemporary constraints 
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for third parties that I discussed earlier. Disch noted, for instance, that the dominant parties 
exploited electoral reform to gain the upper hand on one another. In adopting the Australian 
ballot, using direct primaries to decide nominations, and enacting voter registration and ballot 
access requirements, the two major parties “joined forces to shut third parties out of the electoral 
arena.”151   
  I also concentrate on third party campaigns beginning in 1948 because the post-war 
political process underwent “fundamental changes in how candidates . . . have been selected” 
and how they rely on advanced technology to campaign.152 Since World War II, the rise of 
electronic media and the fall of party-driven elections has led to a “new style” of campaigning 
that is more candidate-centered, engineered by consultants, driven by scientific research, more 
influenced by special interests, focused on the mass media in general, and better tailored to 
specific voter segments.153 As Rosenstone and colleagues summarized, thanks to technological 
innovations in the second half of the 19th century, “Independent-minded politicians who were 
once unwilling to embark on third party campaigns without the help of an already existing 
locally based party can now take the plunge more readily.”154 In short, third party candidates 
since 1948 belong to what it frequently considered the age of the modern political campaign. 
 Although the scope of this project is limited to third party candidates running from 1948 
onward, I attempted to include all possible non-major party candidates who made it onto a ballot 
by Election Day. This means that throughout the project I will be treating minor party candidates 
the same as independent candidates.155 Nevertheless, while I examined campaign rhetoric of all 
kinds of third party candidates, the most serious candidates, including those from campaigns 
securing more than one percent of the popular vote, receive the most attention partly because 
their rhetoric was more available.  
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 The process of researching and analyzing the campaign rhetoric of these candidates came 
in several phases. First, I used the internet, news coverage, political biographies, and archival 
research to collect the campaign discourse of various third party candidates. This included 
announcements, nomination acceptance discourse, and concessions, but also other kinds of 
significant campaign rhetoric produced by the candidates. Much of this could be found in partial 
transcripts in major newspapers and in video footage available on the CSPAN online archives. 
Many materials, though, were collected during trips to candidate archives housed in a number of 
libraries throughout the Midwest and the South. This included the Eugene J. McCarthy Papers 
housed at the University of Minnesota, the congressional papers of John G. Schmitz at Wichita 
State University, the Henry Agard Wallace and Progressive Party papers at the University of 
Iowa, and the John Rarick Collection in the Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies at Southeast 
Louisiana University. Other special collections used for this project included the Libertarian 
Party Papers at the University of Virginia, the People’s Party Papers at the University of 
Missouri at St. Louis, the Prohibition Party materials housed in the Bentley Historical Library at 
the University of Michigan, the Strom Thurmond Papers from the Strom Thurmond Institute at 
Clemson University, and the Tom Anderson Papers in the American Heritage Center archives at 
the University of Wyoming. 
 Second, my analysis began inductively as I carefully analyzed the campaign rhetoric to 
identify patterns indicating common stylistic features among third party candidate rhetoric and 
their genres of discourse. In this stage I also conducted historical and contextual research in order 
to grasp the rhetorical situation for each candidate. As Lloyd Bitzer suggested, “A work of 
rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions 
ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it performs some task.”156 In simplest terms, 
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the rhetorical situation is “a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an 
actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, 
introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the 
significant modification of the exigence.”157 Thus, for each campaign I researched key aspects of 
the rhetorical situation, including the exigence, audience, and constraints that limited the 
effectiveness of their discourse.  
 Third, after identifying the underlying rhetorical patterns in the third party presidential 
campaign discourse I focused on how the rhetorical functions and constraints facing third party 
candidates create perceived strategic constraints and shaped identifiable rhetorical form. From 
this analysis, I constructed a set of theories explaining how third party candidates enact the major 
genres of presidential campaign rhetoric, and isolated a definable rhetorical style used by third 
party candidates in campaigns. As I will demonstrate, this third party style is different in 
substantive ways from the style of major party candidates. 
Plan of Study 
 Chapter Two of this dissertation, A Theory of Third Party Style, examines the overall 
rhetorical patterns in minor party campaign discourse. I closely examine the dominant theories of 
presidential campaign style, as well as the different kinds of third parties and their various goals. 
Additionally, I argue that because of the constraints they face, third party campaigns behave 
much like social movements and usually must depend on a campaign style based more in 
confrontation than anything else. Thus, I explain the formal characteristics that are ever present 
in most minor party campaign rhetoric, and show how it is different from the style of major 
parties. 
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 In Chapter Three, Presidential Campaign Announcements: A Third Party Variant, I 
examine the form and function of third party announcement statements. I describe the traditional 
form and function for announcement speeches, and explain how the different recurring 
constraints facing minor party candidates shape both function and form of their campaign 
rhetoric. I then discuss three case studies to exemplify the characteristics of minor party 
announcement speeches. 
 I use a similar approach in the next two chapters. Chapter Four, Unconventional: The 
Variant of Third Party Nomination Acceptance Addresses, focuses on nomination acceptance 
speeches. I explain the history and significance of nomination acceptance speeches in American 
politics, and compare the form and function of those addresses given by major party candidates 
with those from third parties. I then offer three case studies exemplifying the characteristics of 
minor party nomination acceptance speeches. Likewise, Chapter Five, Triumph in Defeat: The 
Genre of Third Party Presidential Concessions, starts with a description of the traditional form 
and function of concession speeches in presidential races, and explains how the speech changes 
for third party candidates. Three case studies exemplifying the characteristics of minor party 
concession speeches will then be offered.  
 Finally, in Chapter Six I draw conclusions based on the analysis of the genres of third 
party rhetoric. Additionally, I make recommendations for future research, and spell out the 
lessons that minor party candidates, as well as the media, can learn from this study. 
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Chapter 2 
A Theory of Third Party Style 
 
 Minor party presidential campaigns are neglected in communication scholarship due 
mostly to the belief that they are historically unsuccessful, extreme, and ignorant of the norms of 
effective campaign rhetoric. Many scholars assume that third party candidates share the same 
goals as candidates from the two major parties; that is, that they aim to run a campaign to 
maximize the chance that they will give an election night victory speech. Indeed, some third 
party candidates do claim they aim to win. With less than a month left in the 1968 election, 
George Wallace professed that he still had a chance, stating, “I knew we could win after I saw 
the tremendous crowds we were drawing everywhere.”158 Around the same time, the Prohibition 
Party candidate E. Harold Munn reminded the press, “The Prohibition party is not a temperance 
society. It is a political party with an objective – to win.”159 John Anderson, too, was optimistic 
about his chances of winning the 1980 race against Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter. Despite 
polls indicating that he would receive just around ten percent of the popular vote, Anderson said 
as he wrapped up his election, “This campaign is geared and dedicated to the idea that we can 
win, polls not withstanding.”160 Others have made similar statements,161 but in reality these 
candidates fully realize that it would take a miracle for them to be elected.  
 When pushed on the question, most third party presidential candidates confess that 
winning is nearly impossible, and not really their goal at all. E. Harold Munn, who argued in 
1968 that his party was built to win, stated in the midst of the 1964 election, “Of course, there’s 
no possibility of [winning].”162 Perennial candidate Gus Hall of the Communist Party echoed this 
pessimism, and in 1972 admitted, “We couldn’t be elected this year even if we were on the ballot 
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in 50 states.”163 Libertarian Ed Clark, who ran in 1980 and received the most number of votes 
ever for his party admitted, “It’s not probable that I will win.”164 Clark’s third party opponent 
that year, Barry Commoner of the Citizens Party, openly confessed, “I am not running to be 
elected. I wasn’t raised to be President. I was raised to be a doctor.”165 Similarly, Socialist 
Workers Party nominee James Harris in 1996 stressed, “Our campaign is not about winning 
votes or political office.”166 It is not that third party candidates would not appreciate winning. 
Most simply see losing as their reality. As Socialist Party nominee J. Quinn Brisben summarized 
in 1992, “One good thing about running as a socialist . . . you can prepare your concession 
speech months in advance.”167 The same goes for most, if not all, third party candidates.168 
If third party candidates do not campaign with a serious hope of winning, what is their 
purpose? More specifically, what goals shape their rhetoric? The failure to seriously consider this 
question is one reason why communication scholars have both neglected and misunderstood 
third party campaigns. As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the various constraints unique 
to third party challengers put them at a severe disadvantage, and force them – assuming that they 
are serious and realistic – to enter a race with goals and rhetorical strategies that are vastly 
different than those of the two-party candidates. In this chapter, I identify what I call “third party 
style” – a significant pattern typifying third party campaign discourse that stems largely from the 
recurring perceived situational constraints, and overall purposes, common to minor party 
presidential candidates.  
 Ultimately, I argue in this chapter that third party campaign rhetoric functions to agitate 
for change by disrupting the two-party system and forcing one of the two major parties to co-opt 
some of the controversial ideas of minor party movements. I contend that serious minor party 
candidates usually accomplish this goal with a rhetorical style characterized by polarization, 
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populism, displays of authenticity, and the use of public spectacle.  This argument develops in 
several sections. First, I describe the dominant theory of “campaign style” proposed by political 
communication scholars Judith Trent and Robert Friedenberg and demonstrate its inadequacy in 
explaining the nature of third party candidate discourse. Second, I define the various kinds of 
third parties, so as to illustrate the differences between serious campaigns designed to bring 
about change and those that are usually – and perhaps accurately – labeled as strange or 
idiosyncratic. Third, I describe the goals of serious third party candidates that shape their 
rhetoric. In so doing, I rely on the research of various political science and political 
communication scholars, but especially primary source evidence from various third party 
presidential campaigns from 1948 to 2008. Fourth, I suggest that third party campaigns function 
more like social movements than conventional political campaigns, and as such tend to require a 
balance between extreme rhetorical strategies designed to gain attention, and a sense of 
moderation necessary for them to be perceived as legitimate to a mainstream audience. Fifth, I 
describe the formal characteristics of “third party style,” and offer multiple examples from 
various campaigns. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the significance that a theory of third 
party style has for the analysis of the genres of third party campaign discourse.  
Campaign Style: Challengers and Incumbents 
 Although politicians campaign in various ways, political communication scholars Judith 
Trent and Robert Friedenberg claimed that challengers and incumbents have their own rhetorical 
styles.169 Ultimately, Trent and Friedenberg sought to provide “a more complete catalog of the 
communication strategies important to all who have sought and those who will seek elective 
office.”170 Those strategies, they concluded, formed certain patterns that they called “campaign 
style.” Defining what they meant by campaign style in general, the researchers argued that it 
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“can be seen as a blend of what candidates say – in speeches, news conferences, websites, talk 
show interviews, advertisements, brochures, and so on – as well as their nonverbal political acts 
or behavior, such as kissing babies, wearing funny hats, shaking hands at rallies, waving at 
crowds from the motorcade, and their facial expressions and gestures while answering a 
question.”171  
 Different campaign styles emerge, Trent and Friedenberg noted, because of the 
importance of imagery in political campaigns. The image of a candidate, they wrote, should “be 
considered in terms of the impressions voters have – what they believe to be true or untrue, 
desirable or undesirable about the candidates and the campaign.”172 It is the candidate’s 
obligation to “determine just what attributes voters believe are ideal for the office sought” and 
design campaign strategies “to attempt to illustrate that the candidate possesses these 
qualities.”173 Modern campaign style is heavily influenced by the mass media, in that radio, 
television, and the internet have “increased the number of campaign strategies available because 
candidates no longer [have] to be dependent on extensive national speaking tours to become well 
known to the public.”174 In other words, candidates now have more power than ever to take their 
message straight to voters. 
 Trent and Friedenberg identified three different kinds of campaign style. First, 
incumbency style is a combination of symbolic and pragmatic communication strategies 
“designed to make any candidate appear as both good enough for the office sought and 
possessing the office.”175 Those already holding political office may use various strategies, 
including use of symbolic trappings of their office to transmit their strength and importance, their 
legitimacy as a current leader, and their assumed competency.176 The pragmatic strategies of 
incumbency style also include creating pseudo events to attract and control media attention, 
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making appointments to state and federal jobs, appropriating federal funding, consulting with 
world leaders, manipulating domestic issues, emphasizing accomplishments, and using 
surrogates on the campaign trail.177 
 Second, challenger style is complicated by the need for candidates who use it in order to 
call for change to “simultaneously demonstrate their own capability in bringing about that 
change.”178 There are various strategies linked to challenger style. Candidates, for instance, 
usually attack the record of their opponents, take the offensive position on issues without 
offering concrete solutions, and call for change. They also emphasize optimism for the future 
rather than rely on “rhetoric of despair,” speak to traditional values rather than calling for value 
changes, and delegate personal or harsh attacks to someone else in order to avoid sounding too 
extreme.179  
 Finally, Trent and Friedenberg maintained, sometimes candidates use a hybrid style that 
incorporates features of both incumbency and challenger style. The authors noted, “It is not 
uncommon, for example, for challengers to assume the mantle of incumbency whenever and 
wherever possible.” As they further remarked, “Those who challenge must try to emphasize 
whatever accomplishments they have had in public life, appear to be acquainted with other 
leaders, and have a clear need to use whatever means available to them to gain the attention of 
the media.”180 
Although Trent and Friedenberg identified three dominant styles they were clear in 
noting that candidates might alternate between them throughout a campaign. “Candidates 
frequently combine strategies of one style with strategies of another,” they argued, “so that there 
are times during the course of one contest where an individual contender may assume a 
rhetorical posture normally associated with incumbency campaigning and at other times may 
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appear to be campaigning as a challenger.”181 This is due to the length of campaigns and the 
nature of media coverage at any given point in time. Thus campaign style is “the product of 
whatever candidates and their staffs believe is needed at a particular time within the context of 
their particular campaign.”182  
 The catalog of strategies that fall under each of the three campaign styles is useful in 
understanding the options available to political candidates. However, there are several reasons 
why the theory is inadequate for explaining the nature of third party campaign rhetoric. First, 
Trent and Friedenberg formulated their theory mostly with early political campaigns in mind. 
They relied primarily on examples from nineteenth and early-twentieth century campaigns.183 
Such campaigns came long before the major disparities in funding, media coverage, and ballot 
access that currently doom third party campaigns. Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that 
the authors would not have seen the patterns that modern third parties use to adapt to their unique 
constraints. Second, Trent and Friedenberg’s theory assumes that challengers and incumbents are 
fighting to win. After all, they suggest that both make strategic decisions to create an image of 
electability, and no other goals of entering an election are mentioned in their research.184 That is 
not the case for third party candidates. 
 The third reason why Trent and Friedenberg’s notion of campaign style does not fit most 
third party campaigns is that it emphasizes strategies other than extreme tactics and 
confrontation. Incumbency style, for instance, does not describe efforts by third party candidates 
because its strategies must project a respectable “front-runner” status that is incompatible with 
the image of an agitator.185 On its face, the challenger style could describe some strategies of 
third party candidates. After all, Trent and Friedenberg suggested that “the ability to criticize 
freely (and often in exaggerated terms) may well be one of the most important benefits the 
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challenger possesses.”186 However, the authors clarified that candidates will be unsuccessful if 
their strategies are too extreme. Successful challengers, they declared, “must reinforce majority 
values instead of attempting to forge new ones,” and should avoid appearing to be from a fringe 
group by representing the philosophical center.187 Moreover, Trent and Friedenberg argued, 
candidates should attack “but hold out the promise of a better tomorrow,” and thus “assume a 
‘rhetoric of optimism’ as opposed to a ‘rhetoric of despair.’”188 Thus, as they concluded, 
“successful candidates . . . do not themselves indulge in demagogic rhetoric,” and often leave 
such posturing to surrogate speakers and advocacy groups.189 Consequently, the style of 
discourse used by third party candidates cannot be explained with the conventional theory of 
campaign style. 
 Failing to consider the unique constraints and purposes of third party campaigns, and thus 
the reasons for their confrontational and unconventional rhetoric, the traditional theory of 
campaign style outlined by Trent, Friedenberg, and their colleagues needs revision. In the rest of 
this chapter, I define the different kinds of third parties, identify their goals, explain how they 
function like social movements in their need for balanced confrontational rhetoric, and describe 
the common elements of third party rhetorical style. 
Categories of Third Parties in U.S. History 
 Third parties have been categorized in several ways,190 but six categories emerge from 
political science literature. First, there are third parties that resemble major parties in endurance, 
organization, and tactics. These are what political scientist David Gillespie called “continuing 
doctrinal parties” and what historian Clinton Rossiter referred to as “true minor parties.” They 
sustain themselves sometimes for several decades, on occasion win local or even congressional 
office, and are sometimes steeped in ideologies that keep activists faithful.191 Rosenstone, Behr, 
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and Lazarus argued, for instance, that most third parties of the nineteenth century fit this 
description because they were “broad-based coalitions” that “held contentious nominating 
conventions, entered state and local races, and recruited experienced candidates.” Furthermore, 
Rosenstone and his colleagues noted, “Their existence depended on no single personality, and 
they survived long enough to build up party loyalty among their supporters.”192 Parties from the 
nineteenth century within this category include the Know-Nothing Party, Greenback Party, 
People’s Party, and Prohibition Party. Parties from the twentieth and twenty-first century that fit 
this description include the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, Green Party, Natural Law 
Party, and Libertarian Party.193  
 A second type of third party in presidential elections is the personality or candidate-
oriented minor party. These parties often form when charismatic leaders from the two-party 
system, for whatever reason, create their own political organizations and independent campaigns. 
Political scientist Paul Herrnson noted that candidate-oriented minor parties make “little effort to 
ally their campaigns with those of candidates for lower office and their organizations [are] 
dismantled after the election.”194 Included in this category would be the campaigns of Eugene 
McCarthy in 1976, John Anderson in 1980, and Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996.195  
 The third type of minor party in America is the short-lived party, which David Gillespie 
argued starts “either as a movement of economic protest or as a splinter from one of the major 
parties.”196 Short-lived parties are often regionally based, and exist to protest policy positions 
held by one or both of the major parties. They divide the electorate by offering a centrist or 
radical choice where none previously existed. Parties within this category rarely last, because 
their candidates often rejoin the two-party system once they have triggered party realignment. 
Examples of short-lived minor parties since the turn of the twentieth century include Roosevelt’s 
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Bull Moose Progressives of 1912, La Follette’s Progressives of 1924, Thurmond’s National 
States’ Rights Party of 1948, Henry Wallace’s Progressives of 1948, and George Wallace’s 
American Independent Party of 1968.197 
 Fourth, some minor parties are single-issue parties, because they spread awareness about 
something long neglected by the two-party system. Political scientist Earl Kruschke described 
these parties as using “the electoral process to gain a public forum for their philosophical 
viewpoints.”198 Many of these issues are salient for just a small segment of society. Single-issue 
parties in the twentieth and twenty-first century include the New York Right to Life Party, 
Prohibition Party, Vegetarian Party, and the pro-marijuana Grassroots Party. 
 Fifth, there are also “non-national significant other” parties. Gillespie described these 
parties as finding “an influential place for themselves in the politics of their state or community, 
some even becoming major party actors there. Some have sent nominees to Congress. But in 
their electoral base they remain confined, either by external circumstance or their own choice, to 
their originating boundaries.”199 Parties in this category from the early twentieth century onward 
include the Wisconsin Progressive Party, the Progressive Coalition of Vermont, and New York’s 
Liberal, Conservative, and Right to Life parties. Notably, many of these parties never offer their 
own presidential candidates, but on occasion some do.  
Finally, there are third parties which might be categorized as “non-national, insignificant 
other” parties. In most presidential elections since 1948, there have been at least a few candidates 
who make it onto a single state ballot and call themselves presidential candidates. Often times, 
they do not campaign, spend little to no money, have few supporters, garner a few thousand 
votes, and make a mockery of the democratic process. For these candidates, a presidential 
campaign is more of a hobby than an effort to influence public policy. Previous campaigns that 
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might be considered in this category include those of Poor Man’s Party nominee Henry 
Krajewski in 1952 and 1956, Universal Party nominee Kirby Hensley in 1964 and 1968, 
Universal Party nominee Gabriel Green in 1972, Down with Lawyers Party candidate Bill 
Gahres in 1980, and the Big Deal Party’s Gerald Baker in 1984. About these obscure minor party 
candidates, Los Angeles Times reporter Linda Matthews concluded, many “are put-ons, mere 
attempts to entertain or to cash in on the citizenry’s interest in the absurd.”200       
Purposes and Goals of Third Party Presidential Campaigns 
Some minor party candidates may believe that a miracle could tip the scales for their 
campaign, but most realize that the barriers they face will make winning impossible, and that 
they are instead fulfilling some alternative function. Indeed, third party candidates almost always 
see themselves as providing choice in elections dominated by the two-party system. Eugene V. 
Debs summarized this position, and has been quoted many times since, when he stated, “I’d 
rather vote for somebody I want and not get him . . . than vote for somebody I don’t want and get 
him.”201 Perennial Prohibition Party candidate Earl Dodge said something similar in explaining 
his refusal to stop running, despite always performing poorly, stating, “It’s important for people 
to have the right to vote for what they believe in.”202  
While it might be true that third party candidates seek to provide more options in an 
election, most serious nominees have a higher purpose: playing the role of the agitator for 
change. Summarizing the work of Harold Lasswell, Gillespie noted that there are two personality 
types among political figures: political agitators and political administrators. “Political 
administrators,” Gillespie wrote, “are pragmatic, goal-centered people who are most effective 
and personally gratified in positions of governmental leadership and influence.” Political 
administrators work within the system, abide by cultural norms, and seek compromise in face of 
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disagreement. On the other hand, “agitators are more rigid people who invest their psychic 
energies in a mission or a cause. They pitch their political appeals in emotion and exhortative 
language and they vituperate their adversaries as enemies of all that is good and right.”203 
According to Gillespie, because of “their consignment to the political periphery and the devotion 
of many of them to mission or cause, it would seem quite likely that third parties attract more 
than their share of political agitators.”204  
Gillespie was right in his assessment, but I argue that third party candidates are usually 
agitators not necessarily because of their psychological character, but because that is how 
successful minor parties function. To understand the purpose of agitation, one must comprehend 
how agenda setting is the most powerful accomplishment of third parties and their true measure 
of success. 
Agenda Setting and the “Success” of Third Parties 
As political agitators, serious third parties function to bring a few issues each election 
cycle to the electorate’s attention. Richard Hofstadter once summarized their existence by 
claiming, “Third parties are like bees; once they have stung, they die.” In simpler terms, political 
scientists Ronald Rapoport and Walter Stone explained, “Third parties instigate change by 
stimulating a response from the major parties.” In their words, “Change occurs because the 
successful third party presents the major parties with an opportunity to appeal to the third party’s 
constituency in subsequent elections.” Eventually, “One or both major parties changes its 
positions to bid for the third party’s constituency, and former third-party supporters migrate into 
the party that makes the successful bid.”205 Consequently, successful third parties have short 
lives. Gillespie noted, “The more popular an idea or issue put forth by a third party, the more 
likely it is that one of the major parties will take it for itself.”206 Thus, political historian John 
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Hicks argued, “it is not so much in the terms of victories won and candidates elected that the 
importance of third party movements should be assessed. What is of infinitely greater 
consequence is the final success of so many of the principles for which they have fought.”207 
Unsurprisingly, many third party candidates admit that setting the agenda for the two 
main parties, rather than winning, is their main purpose. Socialist candidate Frank Zeidler, for 
instance claimed in 1976, “Historically, the minority parties have always furnished the lead ideas 
and, when popular movements started going toward those ideas, the majority parties took them 
over.”208 Citizens Party candidate Sonia Johnson reported something similar in 1984, stating 
about third parties, “We are the ones who introduce new ideas, who take risks, who talk more 
about principle than power. We are the creative one.”209 Likewise, Libertarian David Bergland in 
1984 suggested, “One goal that is very realistic is that by the end of [the election year], the 
Libertarian appeal and our discussion of the issues will become a very important part of the 
political debate. When we reach that plateau, we will have won.”210 Earl Dodge of the 
Prohibition Party explained to an audience in the 1988 campaign, “When you bring forth ideas 
and those ideas grow, then the major parties pick them up. If I get a lot of votes, the major parties 
will look at what we stand for, and they’ll try to win those votes back. If that happens, it’s been a 
successful campaign.”211 Encapsulating his mission as the Natural Law Party candidate, John 
Hagelin stated “The purpose of my political party is not to become career politicians, but to bring 
new solutions to the problems we face as a country.”212 
Although it varies by type of third party to some degree, minor party candidates usually 
enter elections to influence the two-party system in respect to a few specific issues. They emerge 
on the national scene, Hazlett suggested, because “major parties, in order to ensure a constant 
level of majority support, will avoid those topics which may divide and or alienate segments of 
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the electorate that are essential for an election-winning majority.” In turn, “Minor parties, 
knowing that the amount of support that they will receive will likely be minimal, will meet an 
issue head-on.”213  Throughout history, issues that were pushed to the forefront by minor parties 
include women’s suffrage, prohibition, and abolition. Socialists in the early twentieth century 
pushed, with great success, the Democratic Party to advocate for “unemployment insurance, old 
age pensions, federal aid to education, labor union rights, and many social security measures.”214 
Many other examples from the second half of the twentieth century can be highlighted. Henry 
Wallace’s campaign in 1948 functioned to protest the Truman administration’s foreign policy 
and its neglect of the civil rights issue. Furthermore, George Wallace in 1968 appealed to voters 
with his opposition to civil rights legislation.  
Oftentimes the issues that third party candidates represent are not on the public’s radar. 
Mazmanian explained, “Third parties crystallize issues that might otherwise go unheeded or 
receive little attention during a campaign. If nothing else, they serve an educational function in 
drawing attention to neglected issues and proposing new and sometimes radical solutions.”215 In 
this sense, third parties function to agitate for change by raising awareness. Rosenstone and his 
colleagues suggested that the Socialist Party and other related groups fit this description by 
advocating for policies benefiting the working class.216 Communist candidate Gus Hall used the 
1972 campaign to stage a “massive assault” on poverty and racism.217 Eldridge Cleaver, the 
once-imprisoned Black Panther turned nominee for the Peace and Freedom Party in 1968, used 
his campaign to raise awareness of racism in America,218 as did Peace and Freedom Party 
nominee Ron Daniels in 1992 and New Alliance Party nominee Lenora Fulani in 1988 and 
1992.219 Sonia Johnson, who headed the Citizens Party ticket in 1984, used her campaign to 
educate the public about feminism, claiming, “To understand my presidential campaign . . . you 
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only have to understand one principle: To be born female in our society is to be born behind 
enemy lines.”220 Natural Law Party nominee John Hagelin used his campaigns in 1992, 1996, 
and 2000 to spread the message about the benefits of transcendental meditation and other 
unconventional scientific approaches to address society’s problems.221 When asked if he would 
welcome a major party taking his ideas, even if it killed his party, Hagelin responded, “If that 
were to happen, that would be a graceful way to die. For us, if the platform gets out…we will do 
well.”222  
Secondary Goals of Third Party Candidates  
 In pursuit of having their issue positions accepted by one or both of the two major parties, 
minor party candidates seek to accomplish several secondary goals. At best, some candidates 
hope to receive enough electoral votes to force a tie between the mainstream candidates, or even 
a three-way tie, and to give away their own votes in a high-stakes bargain. This would be highly 
unusual, and is almost the best-case scenario for minor party candidates. Political scientists 
Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and Rohde contended, “From 1828 through 1992 a single 
presidential candidate has gained a majority of the electoral vote. But even if a third-party or 
independent candidate did become eligible for election by the House, a legislative body 
dominated by Democrats and Republicans would be unlikely to turn to a [minor party 
candidate].”223 Despite the long odds, several candidates have made a House vote their aim, 
including Constitution Party nominee T. Coleman Andrews in 1956, George Wallace in 1968, 
and Independent Ross Perot in 1992.224 
 A second goal for many minor party candidates is to be an election spoiler. A spoiler 
reduces the support for one of the major parties, and in rare cases may tip the election by 
siphoning electoral votes. Political scientists suggest that third parties have succeeded in spoiling 
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elections numerous times. For example, the Liberty Party’s presence in the 1844 election is often 
identified as the reason for James Polk’s win over Henry Clay, and Martin Van Buren’s 
candidacy for the Free Soil Party in 1848 supposedly led to Zachary Taylor’s win over Democrat 
Lewis Cass.225 Additionally, the elections of 1860, 1892, 1912, 1992, and 2000, are others in 
which the outcome may have been altered had the leading minor party candidate not run.226 
Many candidates have cited this accomplishment as their goal. American Independent Party 
nominee Lester Maddox in 1976 argued that he could spoil the election for Jimmy Carter by 
winning the states of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee.227 Lenora Fulani, the black female 
candidate for the New Alliance Party who made it onto all 50 state ballots in 1988, claimed that 
she wanted to take enough black votes from the Democratic Party to defeat Michael Dukakis.228 
She declared that the move would, “send a very potent message to the Democrats that if they 
want our votes, they’re going to have to start working for ours like they are working for the 
white conservative vote.”229 More recently, Libertarian Bob Barr expressed a desire to tip the 
2008 election to Barack Obama by challenging John McCain’s support in a few southern states.   
 A third aim for minor parties is to reach certain benchmarks to qualify for matching 
federal funds. Those funds give third parties more legitimacy with the electorate, and a head start 
for the campaign in the next election cycle. Barry Commoner of the Citizens Party in 1980, much 
like many other candidates, sought 5 percent of the popular vote to receive matching funds.230 
The Green Party, under Ralph Nader in 2000, John Cobb in 2004, and Cynthia McKinney in 
2008, sought the 5 percent benchmark, too. For instance, McKinney argued, “5% of the vote 
makes the Green Party, not a minor party in the eyes of the federal government, but a major 
party.” She concluded, “And with that 5%, we can pull up another chair at the table of public 
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policy making. It only takes 5% of those who vote . . . and then we will have an official third 
party in this country, and public policy that truly reflects our values.”231 
 Fourth, many minor party candidates aim to create a sustainable political movement that 
can accomplish greater things in future elections. In other words, without hope of winning, they 
attempt to create a grassroots organization to build a stronger party for future cycles. Ben Spock 
of the People’s Party, for instance, claimed in 1972, “What we’re trying to do is to build an 
independent movement for the long run.”232 Elaborating on another occasion, after being asked 
why he runs without a chance of winning, Spock said, “we’re out to build a grassroots 
movement. Our national campaign is not to see how many votes we can get but to call attention 
to our local movements and inspire some to join us there.”233 American Party nominee John 
Schmitz, who was also in the mix in 1972, similarly described his goal as building a “permanent 
party.”234 Libertarian Ed Clark in 1980 expressed his hope that his campaign would be “building 
a new coalition. By that I mean that I want to carve out a whole new constituency of voters who 
will unite behind the Libertarian message of rolling back the coercive power of government in all 
areas.”235 Likewise, Libertarian nominee Ron Paul indicated that he was focused on the distant 
future, claiming “A significant political revolution takes time . . . We’ve reached millions of 
people . . . There’s more respect for the Libertarian message than ever before, so we’ve made 
great strides.”236 This future-oriented goal is common among third party candidates.237  
 Finally, sometimes third party candidates run for the sake of continuing to challenge 
electoral norms in America, to serve an example to future third party campaigns, and to make the 
path easier for those to come. The campaign that best exemplified this mission was probably 
Eugene McCarthy’s run as an Independent in 1976. In the months leading up to his 
announcement, McCarthy argued, “The concept of the Presidency and the concept of the 
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institutions of government have been distorted, and we have to re-examine the way candidates 
are selected and elected.”238 McCarthy used his stump speech throughout the campaign to argue 
that the two-party system needed to be overhauled because it was not fulfilling its function, 
imposed blind loyalty, and failed to hold either party accountable for its actions.239 Lenora 
Fulani, who ran as the nominee of the New Alliance Party in both 1988 and 1992, committed 
herself to a similar mission. Fulani wanted to highlight the need to reform the democratic process 
in the United States. “The major thrust of the campaign is on the issues of fair elections and 
democracy,” she stated, “and the degree to which we need more democracy in this county.”240 
For Fulani, this meant opening the presidential debates to parties representing different 
perspectives, making it easier for lower class Americans to vote, and stripping the Democrats 
and Republicans of their power to create election laws for their own benefit.241  
Third Party Campaigns as Social Movements 
 Considering the barriers they confront and their goals in confronting those barriers, 
America’s third parties since the beginning of the twentieth century have functioned less like the 
major political parties and more like social movements. Political scientist Andrew Busch saw the 
similarities between many serious third parties and social movements as especially striking. 
Both, he argued, tend to have “a broad base of support” and are “driven by a relatively small and 
committed hard core.” Both are “organized generally through an informal coalition of groups,” 
and are identifiable entities to outside observers,” but are “less institutionalized than a political 
party.” Both, he maintained, are “motivated by at least a rough ideology.” Additionally, both 
attempt “to promote change based upon [their] ideology through political action.”242 Even third 
parties led by strong personalities for just a few election cycles, Busch stated, “seem to occupy 
an awkward position in which they share virtually none of the defining characteristics of a 
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movement but attempt to fashion a pseudomovement in their own image.”243 In short, there are 
many structural and functional similarities between social movements and minor party 
campaigns.244 Most importantly, the communicative practices of both are similar in that they use 
many of the same strategies in confronting similar barriers.  
 The biggest challenge for social movements is gaining legitimacy. Social movements are 
perceived as out-groups, and are often “criticized for not handling conflicts and controversies 
through normal, proper channels and procedures, even when those channels and procedures are 
systematically denied them.”245 Social movements constantly battle for the attention of the news 
media, which tends to cover movements rarely, and usually only when they have done 
“something spectacular or stupid.”246 In response to this neglect, social movements create 
messages to maximize media coverage of their cause. Because social movements “must attract, 
maintain, and mold workers into an efficiently organized unit,” rhetoric scholar Herbert Simons 
argued, they create messages with their internal audience in mind. However, because they “must 
secure adoption of their product by the larger structure,” social movements must be constantly 
mindful of their external audience as well.247 As Simons concluded, “harassed from without, yet 
obligated to adapt to the external system, the leader of a social movement must constantly 
balance inherently conflicting demands on his position and on the movement he represents.”248 
 In order to gain legitimacy with both external and internal audiences, social movements 
use a combination of coactive and confrontational rhetorical strategies.249 Coactive strategies 
establish common ground with the external audience. They demonstrate that the social 
movement deserves legitimacy because it is willing to work within the norms of the public 
sphere. However, if used too often these kinds of strategies can fail to energize supporters by 
giving the appearance that the movement is working within the system.250 Confrontational 
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strategies emphasize dissimilarities and conflict with the external audience. Elaborating on this 
point, Stewart, Smith, and Denton explained that confrontational strategies challenge “the normal 
relational patterns of society while offering new ones.”251 Confrontation is often necessary 
because it raises awareness of the movement, and mobilizes supporters by dramatizing public 
affairs. However, confrontation can also be risky, Stewart, Smith, and Denton argued, because 
“Neither social movement members nor those in the larger society can accept harsh rhetoric and 
confrontation for long. Fatigue, fears of anarchy, and boredom inevitably set in.”252 Thus, a 
strong social movement communicates with a balance of adaptive and confrontational rhetorical 
strategies. 
 Third party campaigns face rhetorical requirements that are similar to the requirements of 
social movements. Because minor party presidential candidates are neglected by the news media, 
excluded from debates, underfunded, and are generally unknown or disrespected, they must 
produce rhetoric which appeals to both the internal and external audiences. Minor party 
candidates must use unconventional and confrontational rhetorical strategies to motivate their 
core of followers and attract media attention, while eventually appealing through coaptive 
strategies to mainstream voters whose support is necessary for the candidate to threaten the two-
party system. This is needed to successfully shape the issue agenda in a presidential race. 
To build a base of supporters, minor party candidates use confrontation and other 
unconventional rhetorical strategies by molding an image of authenticity. Used in this sense, 
authenticity is defined as being distinct from the mainstream, appearing to be true to one’s 
self.253 Bibby and Maisel argued, for instance, “Electoral success for minor party candidates in 
presidential elections relates more to individual candidate characteristics than to party 
organization.” The goal is to be perceived by voters as “a breath of fresh air” rather than a carbon 
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copy of every other politician.254 Creating authenticity is one way for outsider candidates to 
reach the masses. “The media may give it greater attention,” Simon et al. contended, “when the 
movement stays outside the framework of conventional politics” and therefore proves its 
authenticity.255  
Achieving an image of authenticity through confrontation and other unconventional 
rhetorical strategies is only useful for serious third party contenders if they avoid appearing like a 
buffoon, or going so far to threaten the democratic system itself. In other words, the appearance 
of legitimacy is still important for minor party nominees who eventually have a chance at 
gaining widespread public support, and they must maintain their legitimacy with a mainstream 
audience by adhering to at least some of the norms of political discourse. Discussing the 
importance of embracing an image of legitimacy, Rosenstone and his colleagues remarked, 
“When citizens view a minor party candidate as legitimate – that is, when the candidate has 
attributes that resemble those of most major party nominees – voters are more likely to choose 
the third party alternative.”256 Candidates who embrace an image of being radically different 
must, when the conditions change in their favor, perform many of the basic rituals associated 
with a presidential election. Concerning these expectations, Simons et al. wrote, “The 
campaigner is expected to affirm old shibboleths, to sing the anthem, eat hot dogs, and above all, 
to surround his campaign with glitter and pageantry.”257   
At what point would a third party presidential candidate have to pivot from the style of a 
provocateur to a serious challenger? This could happen in the rare case of the minor party 
candidate being invited to a presidential debate and receiving a surprising level of support in 
major polls. Regardless of the cause, third party candidates tend to become legitimate when they 
transition from being unimportant to the media to a viable contender worthy of serious news 
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coverage. At this point, the candidate faces scrutiny like never before. Political scientists John 
Zaller and Mark Hunt explained, “The following generalization appears to hold fairly well: The 
better a candidate’s prospects, the more critical the press is likely to be.”258 This is known as the 
boom-and-bust coverage of campaigns.  
Independent Ross Perot’s 1992 presidential campaign is an example of how the failure to 
pivot to a traditional challenger style can sink a third party ticket. In their study of Perot’s 
campaign, Tonn and Endress concluded, “In Perot’s case, these conflicting functions and 
expectations presented a formidable Catch-22: although Perot’s unorthodox approach to politics 
catapulted him into consideration and prompted his inclusion in the presidential debates, those 
same traits disqualified him in the eyes of many Americans.”259 Hanging onto an unconventional 
style late into the campaign, despite strong support for his ticket, Perot lost legitimacy by 
appearing prone to political missteps. Perot’s abrupt withdrawal from the race on July 27, 1992, 
was likely the key event that led supporters and opponents to question his character.260 Perot’s 
odd choice of Admiral James Stockdale as running mate, and Stockdale’s poor performance in a 
televised debate, further damaged Perot’s image.261 Eventually, many of Perot’s unconventional 
ideas throughout the campaign, such as the “electronic town hall meetings” across America, 
were ridiculed and cited as further evidence of his political ineptitude. Perot’s authenticity and 
provocative style worked against him in the final months of the campaign because his decisions 
“spurred reconsideration by many, including those flirting with a Perot presidency, of the 
inherent value of those conventional political processes that Perot had bypassed.”262  
The Characteristics of Third Party Style 
 Common rhetorical constraints and strategic purposes among third party candidates 
means that their discourse exhibits recurring patterns that set them apart from typical incumbents 
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and challengers. These patterns form what I call third party style, which is a collection of 
rhetorical strategies commonly used by minor party candidates to disrupt the political process, 
establish an image of authenticity, and build a base of passionate supporters. Third party style 
ceases to be useful when candidates gain legitimacy, at which point they must pivot to a 
traditional challenger style. To reach this point, though, third party candidates typically practice a 
form of rhetoric characterized by its polarization, populism, and demonstration of authenticity 
through deeds, words, and non-verbal behavior. Additionally, third party campaigns frequently 
communicate through the use of public spectacle.    
Polarization in Third Party Style 
 Above all, third party style is almost always defined by the use of scapegoating, or 
shifting blame for perceived shortcomings in society to another party or group of people, and this 
is achieved primarily through polarizing rhetoric. Richard Raum and James Measell argued that 
polarizing discourse consists of two separate strategy types. The first type, which they called 
concrete description devices, consists of god and devil terms, reductio ad absurdum, and 
exaggeration. God terms are used to portray the political movement as righteous, and devil terms 
to vilify the institution. Reductio ad absurdum belittles opponents by portraying them in 
humorous situations or predicaments. Exaggeration is over-stating to make certain situations 
seem less favorable than they are in reality. Together, concrete description devices are used “to 
portray people and events in such vivid, forceful language that the auditor is forced to respond. 
He cannot maintain neutrality, for the verbal images created by the speaker provide only for 
feelings of absolute attraction or absolute repulsion.”263 The second strategy type, what Raum 
and Measell called copula tactics, “represent distortions of reality and these distortions form the 
basis of judgments and arguments.”264 Copula tactics include artificial dichotomies, we/they 
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distinctions, monolithic opposition, motive disparagement, and self-assertion. Creating artificial 
dichotomies means that the rhetor argues that only two alternatives can be chosen to deal with a 
certain issue. We/they distinctions promote in-group solidarity and cast those in the out-group as 
undesirable. Describing the opposition as monolithic means that all who challenge the movement 
have despicable motives. In a related method, impugning the motives of this monolithic group 
means arguing that they are self-serving and care not for the interests of the people. Finally, self-
assertion is the tactic used to suggest that only the rhetor can bring about necessary societal 
change.  
 Polarization is routine in third party campaign discourse, whether the candidates are 
reformists or revolutionaries, and what Raum and Measell labeled concrete descriptive devices 
are frequently used to demonize the mainstream parties. Peace and Freedom Party nominee 
Eldridge Cleaver referred to his opponents in the dominant institution as “the pigs in the power 
structure” consisting of those “actively involved in the oppression of people . . . the avarice 
businessmen, the demagoguery politicians, and the racist police.”265 Similarly, Populist Bob 
Richards described incumbent politicians as the “tyrants who rule us.”266 In the 1976 campaign, 
Georgia governor Lester Maddox portrayed Jimmy Carter as tied to the special interests of drug 
dealers and pornographers, and aligned with “pointy-headed liberals.”267 In 1984 Lyndon 
LaRouche raised eyebrows by claiming in a 30-minute advertisement that Democrat Walter 
Mondale was an “agent of influence” of Soviet intelligence services.268 Gloria La Riva of the 
Party for Socialism and Liberation frequently called mainstream politicians “imperialists.” 
Conservatives like Michael Peroutka of the Constitution Party in 2004 have openly attacked 
those in favor of government intervention in healthcare, environmental protection, and social 
welfare as socialists.269 Moreover, Peroutka lamented, those hoping to drive God out of 
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government are on the same path of “the Chinese Soviet Communists, the Nazis, the Cambodian 
Communists and countless other petty, God-hating tyrants.”270 Constitution Party nominee 
Howard Phillips in 2000 offered a similarly extreme perspective of the two-party system in 
respect to abortion policy, declaring that both parties were guilty of putting unborn children 
under the “butcher’s knife” to be “sliced, diced, burned and beheaded.” They were murderers, he 
declared, because they authorized and subsidized “the slaughter of more than one-and-a-half 
million innocent children each year.”271  
 The use of concrete descriptive devices by third party candidates to polarize the 
electorate distinguishes them from the typical incumbents and challengers in the campaign 
because they are used somewhat consistently, publically, and unapologetically. The strategies are 
utilized in stump speeches as well as in the most significant genres of campaign discourse that 
are defined by norms of civility for major party candidates. There is usually no use of surrogates 
for these attacks, and the candidate embraces antagonistic language that violates societal 
expectations of civil discourse.    
Copula tactics are used to further dramatize the presidential election. Political opponents 
are often portrayed as being evil-doers who secretly plot to harm innocent Americans. As such, 
the we/they distinction in third party style tends to reflect paranoia, and occasionally resembles 
conspiracy rhetoric. For instance, American Independent Party nominee John Schmitz in 1972 
accused Richard Nixon of being un-American for allegedly supplying technology to the 
country’s enemies in Vietnam.272 Lyndon LaRouche in 1988 used a half-hour ad to accuse the 
government of lying about its ability to control the spreading of the AIDS virus, and in 1991 told 
reporters that George H. W. Bush is a “new Emperor Caligula of sorts” who conspired to extend 
his prison sentence for mail fraud.273 Green Party candidate Cynthia McKinney in 2008 accused 
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Republicans of stealing the 2000 election and running a racket that led to “war crimes, torture, 
[and] crimes against the peace.”274 Candidates on the far left perpetuate theories of sinister plots 
involving the wealthy hijacking democracy. Roger Calero of the Socialist Workers Party 
reported in 2008, for instance, that “Today the billionaire ruling families and their spokespeople 
in the U.S. are trumpeting the success of their many-year-long efforts to undermine our wages, 
job conditions, and living standards.”275 The agents of capitalism, according to this line of 
reasoning, repeatedly steal from the working class, and aim to create a semi-colonial world.  
 Short of demonizing their opponents and implicating them in vast conspiracies, many 
third party candidates use copula tactics to portray major party politicians as trapped into 
representing the financial interests of rich elitists. In a point repeated throughout her campaign, 
Lenora Fulani in 1992 told CNN that the country’s leadership is “controlled by political action 
committees.”276 Ralph Nader in his campaigns made a similar point, calling Washington a 
“corporate-occupied territory [where] every department [is] controlled by overwhelming 
presence of corporate lobbyists, corporate executives in high government positions, turning the 
government against its own people.”277 Mainstream politicians may have good intentions in 
serving, according to this argument, but they can do very little to challenge corporate control of 
politics. “The entire election process – from the primaries to polling day,” the Socialist Equality 
Party said on behalf of Bill van Auken in 2004, “is dominated by big money and the media, 
which put the various candidates through their paces and whip them into shape.”278 Of course, 
reformists from the two-party system occasionally portray Washington the same way, as Barack 
Obama did in 2008, but third party style almost always features this argument. As Harold argued, 
this form of polarization constructs the system as contaminated by “monied interests,” and has 
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been a distinguishing characteristic of third party discourse, including the campaign rhetoric of 
H. Ross Perot, George C. Wallace, Theodore Roosevelt, and Eugene V. Debs.279   
 In creating a monolithic opposition in the two-party system, third party candidates 
frequently portray Democrats and Republicans as political doppelgangers. They are called the 
two-party duopoly or dictatorship, and accused of leaving voters with the mere choice of 
deciding between the “lesser of two evils.” Describing how Ralph Nader in 2000 responded to 
accusations that he was a “wasted vote,” Christine Harold wrote  
Whereas the Democrats in this race wanted to conflate rhetorically a Nader vote with a 
Bush vote, Nader and his supporters persistently argued that Gore and Bush, because of 
their shared positions on the death penalty, their failure to offer a plan for universal health 
care, and their acceptance of huge donations from corporations, were essentially no 
different from one another, forcing voters to choose between the aforementioned ‘lesser 
of two evils.’280  
The system was so spoiled, Nader argued, that the two parties had “mutated into one two-headed 
monster, wearing different makeup.”281 Nader’s point is a common line of attack in third party 
discourse. For example, George Wallace repeatedly justified his campaign by declaring, “The 
two national parties are just tweedledee and tweedledum.”282 John Schmitz in 1972 piggy-backed 
off Wallace’s claim that there was not a dime’s worth of difference between Democrats and 
Republicans by arguing, “Well, now you can get eight cents of change on that. There isn’t two 
cents worth of difference.”283 In fact, parties on the left have often summarized the two party 
system as “Capitalist Party Number 1 and Capitalist Party Number 2,” and those on the far right 
have similarly attacked the institution for being “Socialist Party A and Socialist Party B.”284 
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More recently, Constitution Party nominee Michael Peroutka stated in 2004, “it’s just as wrong 
to vote for Gomorrah as it is to vote for the slightly more evil Sodom.”285 
 With all the talk of evil-doing and corruption, the polarizing rhetoric of third party 
discourse suggests that the future is dark unless voters side with the third party agitator. Without 
the revolution or reform guaranteed by a third party vote, more babies will be murdered, the 
environment will further deteriorate, the economy will collapse, and wars will be inevitable. 
Describing America as a police state, for instance, Libertarian candidate Neil Smith wrote in his 
campaign announcement, “At this point, instead of a brilliant, colorful future, it’s likelier to be a 
future resembling Beirut at the fiercest of the fighting there, or Dachau at the worst moment of 
the Holocaust.”286 Perhaps some candidates do not take their cynicism as far as Smith, but the 
implications of much third party rhetoric are quite similar. 
Populism in Third Party Campaign Rhetoric   
 The rhetoric of polarization, however, is not enough to move many potential voters. 
“What is essential for these arguments to be effective,” rhetoric scholar Lloyd Rohler argued, “is 
for the people who are the target audience to feel powerless and resentful toward an elite that is 
perceived as unresponsive to their needs.”287 Describing the two-party system as corrupt and 
evil, many third party candidates position themselves as the voice of the silent majority in 
America. The rhetoric of populism, rhetorician Michael J. Lee summarized, pits the “people” 
against a distrusted “elite” class, expresses disdain for traditional democratic deliberation, and 
provides a language available to almost any group claiming to speak for ordinary people.288 
Populism is clearly a form of polarization, but its substantive characteristics go beyond 
demonizing an opponent by specifying how the “we” should respond to the monolithic “they.” 
   61 
The rhetorical form of populist argument, Lee stated, consists of four interconnected 
themes. First, a “definable ‘people’ are portrayed as the heroic defenders of ‘traditional’ values.” 
These “people” might be defined by their race, class, religion, or other major identity markers. 
More importantly, the “people” share certain characteristics, in that they are “ordinary, simple, 
honest, hard-working, God-fearing, and patriotic Americans.”289 Second, populist discourse 
defines and labels an enemy. The enemy, as I mentioned in the previous section, could be 
accused of declaring class warfare, wrecking the environment for future generations, or 
threatening the church in public life. The enemy is usually characterized as coming from a 
different class, geography, or system of values, that does not represent the real “people.”290 
Third, populist discourse describes the “system” as having been ideal when it was conceived by 
the Founders, but its modern form as corrupt, exclusive, and in need of being reclaimed by the 
“people.” Finally, populist discourse proposes that restoration of the ideal state for the “people” 
can only come about with historic confrontation with the forces of oppression.291    
 George Wallace exemplified the populist rhetoric of outsider political candidates. Hogan, 
for instance, wrote that Wallace’s speeches exhibited crusade-like characteristics by justifying 
the negative emotions of his white followers, promising a better day for the “Great Middle 
Class,” and presenting himself as the great leader of the battle.292 Wallace defined his 
movement’s enemy as those who leached off hard-working Americans, or as he put it, “those 
who won’t work when they can find work . . . and the filthy rich.” Meanwhile, the “people” in 
this discourse were defined as “those who produce the wealth, and fight the wars, and pay the 
taxes that hold our country together.”293 The problem, as Wallace put it, was that the right of the 
people to determine public policy had been denied by parasitic bureaucrats in the Federal 
Government. And Wallace, in true populist style, was the natural leader of the movement 
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because he himself was the “common man.” To those in the South, Wallace preached, “I am the 
only candidate in the race who speaks both for you and to you.” Highlighting his status as the 
common man candidate, Wallace told others, “You won’t find any friends of mine at the country 
clubs or the black-tie dinners.”294  
 Other examples of populism in third party campaign discourse could also be cited. For 
instance, the rhetoric of candidates from the far left, from Ralph Nader to Gus Hall, is saturated 
with populist themes.295 The “people” in this rhetoric are those in the working class, while the 
enemies are the capitalists who eliminate jobs, and restrict access to food, education, and health 
care for the sake of profit. In this discourse, the “system” has been thoroughly corrupted by 
powerful corporate entities, thus requiring a class revolt. Harold found this to be true for Nader’s 
rhetoric in 2000, as he declared that “capitalist scavengers” had polluted democracy to make it a 
“rat race.” To make democracy “a rational public space unsullied by state corruption,” to 
represent the interests of working class Americans who had been short-changed, Nader argued 
that the “people” needed to rise up and protest.296 For Lenora Fulani of the New Alliance Party, 
the “people” she represented were marginalized blacks and other minorities who were victims of 
white lawmakers who catered to their elite supporters. Fulani felt that the system had squashed 
the democratic rights of voters, thus warranting a “radical restructuring” of America.297 On the 
far right, candidates like David Duke of the Populist Party in 1988 have mimicked Wallace’s 
brand of populism, defining the “people” as hard-working white Americans who have been 
turned into second-class citizens due to affirmative action and social welfare policy. Because the 
“system” in this kind of right-wing rhetoric is dominated by special interest groups such as the 
NAACP, only a radical revolution through support for a third party ticket will “wake up the 
leadership.”298  
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Displays of Authenticity in Third Party Style 
 Because third party presidential candidates describe the system as hopelessly corrupt and 
out of touch with the people, they must demonstrate that they are somehow clean and different 
from those they attack.299 As they ask the country to “Sweep the rascals out!” and to “Clean the 
House,” they must prove their own purity by conveying a sense of political authenticity. This 
authenticity, I contend, is proven in deeds, words, and in visual style.300 For many candidates, it 
is the surest way to appeal to the masses and generate the serious media attention that they 
desire. Showcasing his charm on dozens of unmediated talk shows, for example, Ross Perot 
motivated thousands of people to call his campaign headquarters and volunteer their services.301 
As his popularity grew, Zaller and Hunt argued, the message delivered to the “conventional press 
[was] that Perot was a candidate who merited serious attention.”302 The “boom” period of press 
coverage led to stories about Perot’s successful grassroots movement, his rising poll numbers, 
and how he might influence the race.303  
 Authenticity Through Deeds.  Taking strong positions on the flaws of the two-party 
system, minor party candidates often argue through deeds that they are free of the corruption that 
has polluted modern politics. As Harold summarized, candidates like Ralph Nader are marketed 
as the only candidates with integrity, a pure heart, and a willingness to walk their talk.304 Most 
common are commitments to reject the “monied interests” that are associated with campaigns. 
Ralph Nader in 1996 went as far to say that he would spend no money at all on his campaign in 
order to protest the dominance of big business in democracy. In an interview with CNN’s 
Bernard Shaw, for instance, Nader claimed, “I’m not going to raise or accept any money. I’m 
going to try to make a stand on a no-money campaign in order to punctuate the need for 
fundamental campaign finance reform.”305 On another occasion, Nader reported on C-SPAN’s 
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Washington Journal, “This is a no-money campaign. One of the things people complain about in 
politics is, money corrupts, money and politics nullifies their vote, money and politics leads 
politicians to break their promises when they get elected. Here’s a campaign with no money.”306  
In most instances, third party candidates commit to restricting corporate donations to 
their cause, claim to be very frugal with any public financing, or boast that they are spending 
only their own money on the campaign. In fact, Nader changed his tune in 2000 and began 
accepting limited financial assistance for his campaign in order to run pricey television 
advertisements. Nader boasted that his campaign was “citizen-run,” that he was operating on a 
shoe-string budget, and that he refused to accept any form of corporate sponsorship.307 Nader 
maintained this approach in 2008, telling Tim Russert on Meet the Press, “we will receive no 
money from commercial interests, no money from political action committees, only from 
individuals. And, and we are very frugal. They’ve labeled me Mr. Frugal, my, my associates. We 
know how to use it.”308  
Authenticity Through Words.  Explaining Ross Perot’s success in 1992, Tonn and 
Endress wrote that many voters “judged him by standards different from those applied to veteran 
politicians.” The difference, they suggested, was that “Perot’s spontaneity, plain talk, sense of 
humor, and go-getter attitude not only compensated for his generally ‘vague answers’ but 
eclipsed traditional leadership yardsticks such as overall presidential ethos, command of specific 
issues, and elective credentials.”309 In short, Perot attracted voters by conveying authenticity 
whenever he spoke. In regards to Ralph Nader, some have called this an “anti-style.”310 
Whenever it is combined with dynamism, this spoken style captivates audiences.311 Even those 
who hated George Wallace, for instance, praised his speaking. One audience member stated, 
“He’s simply more alive than all the others. You saw those people in the auditorium while he 
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was speaking – you saw their eyes. He made those people feel something real for once in their 
lives.” Concluding, the spectator noted, “You almost love him, even though you know what a 
little gremlin he actually is.”312 The secret to this plainspoken style, I argue, is that it 
communicates authenticity when it is humorous, folksy, and blunt. 
First, strong third party candidates demonstrate their authenticity through humor. Humor 
functions to increase the likability of candidates by building identification with the audience. 
Funny candidates show that they do not take themselves as seriously as the “elitists” they are 
challenging. For instance, Ross Perot, who was unafraid to poke fun at his large ears, was a 
master of self-deprecation and humorous jibes against his opponents, and was embraced by 
voters because he was such a “contrast to the common view of politicians as aloof or self-
important.”313 George Wallace was gifted in using entertaining humor to turn his audience 
against hecklers, who he treated as symbolic of his opposition. Protesters at his rallies were 
inundated with “a standard litany of put-downs,” emphasizing conservative culture’s disgust with 
those who embraced an alternative lifestyle.314 With his audience cheering, Wallace would tell 
protestors, “There are two four-letter words I bet you folks down there don’t know: ‘work’ and 
‘soap.’” He would purposefully refer to long haired men as “honey and sweetie,” and tell them 
“You need a good hair-cut. That’s all that’s wrong with you.”315 Candidates like Perot and 
Wallace succeeded in part because they entertained, spoke to the frustration of many Americans, 
and demonstrated their authenticity as regular people like their audience.  
Many third party candidates have not been as talented with humor as Wallace and Perot, 
but have also mastered the use of one-liners to loosen up with the press and produce a few good 
sound bites. Eugene McCarthy in 1976, for instance, was said to “scan the news the way a 
comedian searches for material,” and he supposedly “refined a stand-up repertoire” that he used 
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in interviews.316 John Schmitz, who accepted the nomination of the American Independent Party 
in 1972 after losing his position in the U.S. House of Representatives, was known to tell “more 
jokes than any candidate on the Presidential circuit,” and used dozens of one-liners whenever he 
spoke. He was probably most remembered for stating that unlike other conservatives, he “did not 
oppose President Nixon’s trip to Peking. Only his trip back.”317 Sometimes Schmitz would even 
carry his jokes in his pocket, and pull them out in dramatic fashion. One time he grabbed a card 
and read “Provide air cover for the Bay of Pigs,” correcting himself after a pause by saying, 
“Oops, sorry. That one must have been meant for Jack Kennedy.”318 In another memorable 
moment, while appearing on ABC’s “Issues and Answers” Schmitz declared, “You know what 
the Nixon family motto is? The Nixon family motto is ‘Be sincere whether you mean it or 
not.’”319 The consistent use of humor on the campaign trail has been used by many other minor 
party candidates,320 and its purpose is usually clear. Socialist J. Quinn Brisben in the 1992 race 
admitted, “I don’t mind the funny stuff,” when listing his qualifications for the presidency as his 
experience smuggling 3,000 condoms into the Soviet Union and writing an unpublished novel 
about midgets in the aircraft industry during World War II. However, like other third party 
candidates Brisben made his true intentions apparent to one reporter, asking, “please tell them 
something about my platform [as well].”321  
A second way that third party candidates communicate authenticity through their words is 
with folksy reasoning. Rather than “talking down” to the audience, many candidates use folksy 
reasoning as an exercise of practical wisdom and inductive reasoning. Ultimately, they 
demonstrate to the audience that they can relate to the way that they think about issues. About 
Ross Perot, for instance, Tonn and Endress argued that much of his rhetorical power came from 
his “couching of political issues in the metaphors of down-home, everyday life: sports, illness, 
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family relationships, and domestic chores like car repair, cooking, and housework.” With his 
earthy figures of speech, Perot “often implied that the challenges of everyday living cultivate 
commonsense critical reasoning skills that have become elusive to . . . career politicians.”322  
There are many examples from the twentieth century of minor party candidates excelling 
in the use of folksy reasoning. Perot was obviously one of the best. On 60 Minutes he “compared 
the federal deficit to ‘a crazy aunt you keep down in the basement. All the neighbors know she’s 
there, but nobody talks about her.’” On Larry King Live, Perot “compared the tax system to ‘an 
old inner tube that’s been patched by every special interest in the country.’”323 Perot’s down-
home style was supposedly so attractive to voters that White House staffers feared that he would 
trounce Al Gore in a televised debate about NAFTA by spitting out effective sound bites.324 
Years before Perot, George Wallace was the master of sounding like the common man. His 
illustrations were simple and his anecdotes plentiful. When speaking about law-and-order, 
Wallace “made his point with an equally hyperbolic, simplistic illustration,” Hogan argued. For 
example, Wallace once exclaimed to an audience, “And according to the decisions of the 
Supreme Court . . . if you go into the streets tonight and are attacked and a policeman knocks the 
person in the head, he’ll be let out of jail before you get to the hospital, and then they’ll go and 
try the policeman about it.”325 Folksy reasoning like that used by Perot, Wallace, and so many 
other candidates conveys authenticity, because the candidates identify with audiences by relating 
debates to real life experiences and thus proving that they are not a cookie cutter political type.  
 A third way that minor party candidates communicate authenticity through their words is 
by being frank in public appearances. Being frank consists of saying exactly what is on one’s 
mind, or purposefully rejecting temperate language. George Wallace’s humorous ridicule of 
hecklers during political rallies exhibited the frankness that energized his supporters. Max 
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Frankel of The New York Times quoted one Wallace supporter as saying, “We like his honesty; 
he isn’t a fence-hopper like the others.” Another supporter told Frankel, “He’s saying things that 
need to be said,” and one more claimed “He’s blunt . . . You’ll find a lot of strong feelings for 
him.”326 Libertarian Ron Paul gained the same reputation in 1988. Jim Barnett, an editor of 
Paul’s hometown newspaper, The Brazosport Facts, contended, “He was a very up-front guy, 
uncharacteristic of many politicians, and I think if people didn’t like him personally, at least they 
liked that straightforwardness.”327 Ross Perot was also notable for his frankness, making news 
for calling Gore a liar during the NAFTA debate and attacking the vice-president for not 
honoring the rules of turn-taking when speaking.328 Ralph Nader earned a similar reputation. His 
frank style, Harold argued, “communicated a truthful, transparent politics serving as an 
unmediated conduit for the will of the people.”329 Thus, speaking clearly about what one thinks 
is just another way that third party candidates often demonstrate their political authenticity. 
Authenticity Through Visual Style. As minor party candidates’ verbal style violates social 
norms, so too does their visual style. In extending Robert Hariman’s work on political style, 
Harold wrote of Ralph Nader, “If we take Hariman’s cue, and understand style as a necessary 
feature of political rhetoric, then it makes sense that Nader and his followers might utilize 
stylistic codes as tools for communication.” Concluding, Harold maintained, “It would also make 
sense that the media might observe the campaign for these markers.”330 Harold’s point holds true 
for most third party candidates. Although visual style is important to all political campaigns, the 
image preferred by the two party candidates – who seek to look “presidential” – is quite different 
from the image sought by third party candidates. In most cases, minor party candidates match 
their dress to the “common man” to whom they appeal, thus trying to prove their authenticity, 
and distinguish themselves from the prototypical politician.331  
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Whether intentional or not, third party presidential candidates stand out for their visual 
signs of authenticity. Ralph Nader was discussed as being frumpy and earnest for wearing 
wrinkled and over-sized suits on his slouched figure, symbolic of his maverick political style.332 
Gene McCarthy in 1976 became the subject of discussion for his “offhand style” and “the way he 
has let his hair grow into a silver-gray mane much like the one Lyndon Johnson wore after his 
return to the ranch.”333 Apathy Party nominee Jim Boren was described as being distinct for 
“Wearing a black shoestring tie, a gold chain, and a large gambler’s hat.”334 Bearded Socialist J. 
Quinn Brisben in 1992 was also noticed for wearing “a red string tie – red because that’s the 
color chosen in 1848 to represent the movement.”335 Another bearded candidate, Andre Marrou 
of the Libertarian Party made a big deal about the clean images of the presidential candidates 
debating in 1992. “Look at these candidates” he complained, “They’re all cleanshaven, with 
short haircuts, and red and blue striped ties.” Continuing, Marrou lamented, “They’re all wearing 
single-breasted suits. They’re all left-handed, did you notice that? They’re peas in a pod.”336  
Dependence on Public Spectacle 
 The desire for significant media coverage leads many minor party campaigns to stage 
public spectacles, or to make odd campaign choices, for the sake of appearing different. 
Although major party candidates occasionally use a similar strategy, as Barack Obama did when 
he decided to deliver his nomination acceptance speech in a Denver football stadium in 2008, 
third party candidates are different because their public spectacles are staged more frequently 
and aim to shock audiences. In some cases these actions are genuine efforts to protest the two-
party system, or to act consistently with one’s worldview. In other cases, these decisions are 
simple pandering to the drama-starved news media. The available kinds of public spectacles are 
limited only by imagination. Some of the more common strategies, though, involve public acts of 
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protest, running shocking advertisements, focusing electoral efforts on a small region to generate 
an unlikely success story, and proposing odd ideas.  
 Many public spectacles staged by minor party candidates have involved protest. Some 
have been passive forms of protest. Peace and Freedom Party candidate Dick Gregory in 1968 
embarked on two fasts for peace when he campaigned. He lost over 50 pounds in his first fast, 
while maintaining a “rigorous schedule of college concert one nighters” for the world to see.337 
After delivering his nomination acceptance speech, Prohibition Party candidate E. Harold Munn 
led picketers to a local tavern, and received the most media coverage in his campaign.338 In a 
more outrageous stunt by another Prohibition Party candidate, Gene Amondson in 2008 dressed 
as the Grim Reaper and protested drinking on Bourbon Street in New Orleans.339  
 Other forms of protest involving minor party candidates have been more disruptive. In 
some cases, candidates have appeared at presidential debates uninvited, and have protested their 
exclusion. In recent years, John Cobb of the Green Party and Michael Badnarik of the 
Libertarian Party received news coverage when they were arrested for appearing at a presidential 
debate in St. Louis in 2004, crossing a police barrier to deliver a message to the debate 
commission. Additionally, Monica Moorehead of the Workers World Party stormed a small third 
party debate in 1996 along with her running mate, “forcefully asserting herself as the only 
presidential candidate who is a Black woman and represents the working class.” When 
approached by security, Moorehead shouted “Let me speak! Let me speak!” leaving organizers 
to watch in shock. Moorehead’s campaign declared the civil disobedience to be a success, as the 
“media blockade had been broken-at least partially,” with the Associated Press and various radio 
and print journalists reporting on the incident.340  
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Shocking advertisements have also been used by minor party candidates to create public 
spectacles. In 1980, for example, Citizens Party nominee Barry Commoner attempted to turn 
heads by running a radio ad in which an actor shouted “Bullshit.” The ad was broadcast on more 
than 600 stations, and used the word to characterize the campaigns of Jimmy Carter, Ronald 
Reagan, and John Anderson.  Commoner’s aids described the ad as an attempt to do “something 
drastic” after six months of being ignored by the media. The strategy paid off. As one writer for 
Newsweek wrote, “The response was, well, overwhelming. Hundreds of offended listeners 
demanded to know why the expletive was not deleted.” More importantly, “Commoner was also 
besieged with interview requests.”341  
Sometimes, minor party candidates attempt to create a public spectacle by focusing most 
of their campaign efforts on a small geographical area in hopes of producing success. Libertarian 
Andre Marrou used the “Dixville Notch strategy” to raise awareness of his campaign by 
concentrating on the tiny New Hampshire town known as one of the first areas to declare its 
election results. The news media was at a loss when Marrou picked up more votes in Dixville 
Notch than any Democrat or Republican in 1992’s presidential primary. In response to his 
success, Marrou exclaimed, “I must have done 30 or 40 interviews today, certainly more than 
I’ve ever done before.” Boasting about the attention he received from the major television 
networks and top newspapers, Marrou expressed, “People are starting to recognize me and wave 
at me. We’ve got a good image, and we need to build on that.” Summarizing the significance of 
the victory, Marrou’s campaign coordinator Jim McClarin stated, “We accomplished the 
objective of this campaign which was to break in to the national media awareness.”342     
 Finally, many third party candidates propose odd policies that make them stand out from 
candidates from the two-party system. These policies tend to be extreme, bizarre, or simply 
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humorous, and serve as sound bites that get mentioned by the news media. Although they 
perpetuate the negative stereotypes of third parties, these policies are sometimes all that a 
candidate has in the early stages of the campaign to raise awareness of their existence. Many 
minor party presidential candidates, for example, have promised that their first order of business 
would be to substantially change the presidency. Socialist Labor Party candidate Julius Levin in 
1972 promised to abolish the presidency altogether.343 Socialist J. Quinn Brisben proposed 
instead that the president should be stripped of power and made a ceremonial figurehead.344 In 
1988, candidate Eugene McCarthy suggested that he would instead abolish the vice presidency to 
prevent unbalanced tickets.345 Natural Law Party nominee John Hagelin took a less extreme 
approach, and proposed mandatory electronic brain testing of all presidential candidates to make 
sure they had the intelligence, stability, and comprehension necessary for the job.346 
  There has been no shortage of unique policy proposals by third party campaigns. 
Presidential candidates have proposed novel ways of improving life for working class 
Americans. Ben Spock of the People’s Party in 1972 proposed a guaranteed income for all 
citizens, averaging $6,500 for a family of four, in order to combat poverty. They have suggested 
many unconventional ways to curb militarization, too. Spock, for example, advocated closing all 
of the country’s 3,000 military bases. Sonia Johnson of the Citizens’ Party proposed chopping 
the military budget in half. More oddly, Johnson announced that on her first day she would 
“announce a national emergency plan to eradicate the conquistador mentality from our culture.” 
On the second day, she concluded, she would sit “in a circle of nonpatriarchal women from every 
country, planning how to bring arms immediately and globally under female control.”347 
Candidates also propose far-fetched ideas to strengthen American democracy. Ross Perot 
suggested he would create an electronic town hall through which the president and Congress 
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would present bills to the public for feedback. During an appearance on Larry King Live, Perot 
explained, “With interactive television every other week, say, we could take one major issue, go 
to the American people, cover it in great detail, have them respond, and show by congressional 
district what the people want.”348 Furthermore, candidates often introduce unique ways to 
improve the economy as well. During his fifth campaign for the presidency, Lyndon LaRouche 
advocated a program to colonize Mars.349  
 As a general rule, candidates receiving the least amount of press coverage tend to propose 
the most radical solutions for what they perceive as society’s problems. Minor party candidates 
with a serious public following offer a handful of unique proposals that sound silly to some, but 
plausible to others. On the other hand, third party candidates running in a few states without 
much campaign organization often take the most ludicrous positions.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I argued that the dominant theory describing the campaign style of 
presidential candidates is a poor fit for understanding third party campaigns. Not only does this 
traditional notion of campaign style neglect the perceived rhetorical constraints of minor parties, 
but it also does not take into consideration that some political candidates do not run with the goal 
of winning. I demonstrated that because many minor party candidates are dedicated instead to 
agitating for change, the substantive characteristics of their rhetoric frequently violate societal 
expectations of political discourse. Third party style is heavily emotional, is polarizing and 
populist in nature, dependent on public spectacle, and contains displays of authenticity. 
 Third party style is very common, but it is not necessarily used throughout the entire 
campaign. As with any social movement using confrontation to raise awareness of its existence 
and cause, third party style must eventually be tempered and requires balance with strategies 
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better suited to mainstream audiences. If the news media begins to treat the campaign seriously, 
it is vital that the candidate pivots to communicative practices of a typical challenger. Failure to 
follow this general rule could explain why successful third party candidates of the past have 
rarely done as well as they anticipated on Election Day.  
In the rest of this project, I will demonstrate that elements of third party style are present 
in the various genres defining third party campaigns. The proceeding chapters will examine 
announcement rhetoric, nomination acceptance speeches, and concession discourse to show that 
third party style is continually present in the rhetoric of minor party candidates with only few 
exceptions.  
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Chapter 3 
Presidential Campaign Announcements: A Third Party Variant 
 
 Presidential announcement speeches formally emphasize for the first time in a campaign 
a candidate’s fit for the highest job in the land. Recognizing the similarities between many of 
these statements, Time’s Kenneth Baer and Jeff Nussbaum reported in the midst of the 2008 
primaries that announcements follow a “time-tested template.”350 That is, candidates describe 
their life story, depict how it represents the nation’s story, and explain how the next chapter of 
the nation’s narrative should develop. In this sense, announcements often describe how the 
candidate emerged from humble roots because of hard work, how the nation has solved major 
crises in the past by remaining faithful to certain principles, and how following those same 
principles can solve contemporary struggles. In other words, those announcing their candidacy 
are usually hopeful for the country’s future, and for their chances of winning the election.351 
  If these are the most basic guidelines for announcement speeches, then a quick glance at 
the announcements by third party candidates in the 2008 presidential election indicates that they 
clearly violated the norms of the genre. Most notably, candidates often conceded that they would 
not win while simultaneously announcing their campaigns and dedicated their speeches to 
attacking the two-party system rather than highlighting their own accomplishments. For instance, 
Libertarian Bob Barr stated that he was announcing his candidacy “not to win an election,” but to 
“let the American people know that they are going to have a choice.”352 Ralph Nader announced 
his campaign on Meet the Press, and mostly attacked Democrats and Republicans while 
defending his own right to run. And rather than argue that he could run a competitive campaign, 
Nader boasted that he would shun political consultants, and accept “no money from commercial 
interests, no money from political action committees, only from individuals.”353 The Party for 
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Socialism and Liberation also appeared extreme in announcing Gloria La Riva as its candidate, 
denigrating those in government as racist imperialists who serve corporate interests above all. 
Additionally, Green Party candidate Cynthia McKinney in 2008 accused Republicans of stealing 
the 2000 election and deceiving America in launching two wars, and also complained that both 
parties “eat out of the hands of corrupt lobbyists and feed at the same corporate trough.”354  
 The unconventional and extreme character of third party campaign announcements in 
2008 was not lost on the news media. Many remarked that Cynthia McKinney’s announcement 
demonstrated that she was a “quintessential activist” with a “fiery spirit” and “firebrand” style. 
McKinney was said to have “particularly harsh words for her former party,” having “blasted the 
ongoing war effort in Iraq and ripped into [both] Democrats and Republicans.”355 Bob Barr was 
described as displaying a grudge against John McCain after appearing bitter throughout his 
announcement. Washington Post journalist Dana Milbank described Barr as angry, as well as 
having “problems with subject-verb agreement throughout the speech,” “going on too long,” and 
delivering his remarks with a “flushed face and gyrating body.”356 Ralph Nader’s announcement 
was portrayed in press coverage as hyperbolic and egotistical. An editorial from The Boston 
Globe, for example, called Nader’s rationale for running both “familiar and unpersuasive” 
because it oversimplified the positions of the two major parties. Nader’s announcement was mere 
“rambling,” the Globe reported, and evidence that he derived “less joy from protecting his own 
legacy of consumer protection than from sending Democratic presidential candidates into fits.”357 
Another critic wrote that Nader’s “ill-conceived candidacy simply gives opponents the 
opportunity to see him – and his concerns – as the work of an addled mind.”358    
 The tendency for announcements by third party presidential candidates to violate societal 
expectations of campaign rhetoric is not unique to the 2008 election cycle. In this chapter, I 
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argue that these announcements are a variant of the announcement genre and are influenced by 
the third party rhetorical style warranted by the challenges that minor party candidates routinely 
face. That is, because of the recurring situational barriers and perceived strategic constraints for 
minor party presidential campaigns, the function and form of their candidates’ announcements 
are different than for candidates from the two major parties. I develop this argument in several 
sections. First, in order to understand the context and purpose for announcement rhetoric, I 
describe what Judith Trent called the “surfacing stage,” or pre-primary phase, of presidential 
campaigns. Second, I explain the function and outline the form of traditional campaign 
announcements. Third, after highlighting some basic reasons for why the generic norms for 
announcements by mainstream candidates would not fit for their minor party counterparts, I offer 
an alternative theory based on the analysis of over forty such statements by various third party 
nominees between 1948 and 2008. Fourth, I provide three case studies of third party 
announcements to demonstrate this unconventional and polarizing variant of the genre, including 
statements by Progressive Henry Wallace in 1948, Independent Eugene McCarthy in 1976, and 
Reform Party candidate Patrick Buchanan in 2000. Finally, I conclude by discussing the 
implications that these findings have for my overall study. 
The Surfacing Stage of Presidential Campaigns 
 Announcements occur during what Judith Trent called the “surfacing stage” of the 
presidential campaign.359 Surfacing, Trent suggested, is defined as “the series of predictable and 
specifically timed rhetorical transactions which serve consummatory and instrumental functions 
during the pre-primary phase of the campaign.”360 According to Trent, surfacing became 
standard in presidential campaigns in 1976 when fourteen presidential hopefuls traveled in early 
primary states two years prior to the election to convince voters that they were viable candidates. 
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“Since that time,” Trent argued, “and with very little deviation in either form or content, 
surfacing has played a major role in presidential politics and accounts for what has become 
known as the seasonless or permanent campaign.”361 The length of the surfacing period varies 
for each election, depending on “candidates’ perceptions of their national visibility and 
credibility, financial backing, and organizational strength.”362 However, surfacing clearly begins 
whenever potential candidates initially try to reach out to the electorate ahead of an approaching 
election. Certain rhetorical activities during this period include “building state organizations, 
speaking to many different kinds of public gatherings in an attempt to capture media attention, 
conducting public opinion polls to assess visibility or to determine potential issues for which 
stands will later have to be devised, putting together an organizational structure and campaign 
‘blueprint,’ raising money, and announcing to the media that they are, or could be, or might be, 
or are flattered to be considered a presidential contender.”363 
There are seven functions of the surfacing phase of presidential campaigns. First, 
candidates for the first time demonstrate their fitness for public office. Because the electorate 
instantly draws conclusions about how the candidate would behave as a president, presidential 
hopefuls attempt to craft an image of being “trustworthy, intelligent, or competent enough to do 
the job; compassionate; articulate; poised; and honorable.”364 Second, the surfacing stage 
functions to teach the electorate about the candidate’s general goals and important policy 
positions. In 2008, for instance, candidates stated positions on issues including reducing 
dependence on foreign oil, creating jobs, providing more affordable health care, addressing the 
budget deficit, and planning an eventual withdrawal from Iraq.365 
The third function of the surfacing stage is to develop voter expectations of a candidate’s 
administrative and personal style. Candidates, for example, can establish well-organized and 
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disciplined staffs to demonstrate the kind of administration they would form if elected, or they 
can establish a looser grassroots campaign to show how they would reject corporate interests and 
a hierarchal approach to governing. Moreover, in creating an image of their personal style, 
candidates can display the articulateness and charm of a polished leader, or the visual appearance 
and speech patterns of the “common man.” Fourth, surfacing also functions as an opportunity for 
the candidate to “set the rhetorical agenda for the campaign.” Meeting with constituents and 
discovering the issues that will potentially decide the election, candidates begin influencing 
media coverage with a chain of public appearances. “In national or statewide elections,” Trent 
and Friedenberg explained, “the media repeat a candidate’s statements and thus aid in translating 
the problems and positions into national or state issues.”366 Fifth, the surfacing stage functions to 
begin the process of selecting front-runners or “separating the serious contenders from the not so 
serious.”367 At this stage, candidates who obtain the greatest visibility tend to be perceived as 
being the most serious.  
Sixth, the surfacing stage functions to establish a relationship between the media and the 
candidate that lasts throughout the entire campaign. Although candidates need media coverage to 
gain legitimacy, serious candidates are needed almost as much by a news media expected to 
produce interesting coverage of the campaign. As such, Trent and Friedenberg argued, because 
“the media need information that only access to the candidate or immediate campaign staff can 
provide,” there tends to be an open-mindedness to learn about any serious candidate. Thus, 
candidates in the surfacing stage create relationships with journalists, and set the tone for how 
they will interact with the press later in the campaign.   
Finally, the surfacing stage functions to initiate the important political rituals of a 
campaign. Candidates for political office in the United States are expected to abide by certain 
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protocols. “For example,” Trent and Friedenberg elaborated, “a press conference is called, the 
candidate is surrounded by family and friends while announcing the decision to run for office, 
and then the candidate embarks immediately on a campaign swing through the district, state, and 
nation.” The rituals followed throughout the campaign begin with the announcement speech, and 
this sets the tone for how closely the candidate can be expected to abide by the norms of political 
campaigns.  
Traditional Campaign Announcements and the Third Party Variant 
 Voters’ preconceptions of what it means to seriously campaign require that candidates 
announce their intentions publically in some form of address.368 This requirement is not trivial, 
Trent argued, for “Candidates must announce early so that decision-makers have time to consider 
them; they must begin campaigning immediately after the announcement to demonstrate their 
commitment, sincerity, and ability to persevere during a long campaign.”369 Although 
communication scholars have not written as much about the announcement as they have about 
the other genres of presidential discourse, existing studies have suggested that the address fulfills 
certain functions and has basic formal characteristics.370 Within this section, I identify the form 
and function of traditional announcement speeches. Then, after suggesting several reasons for 
why this framework does not apply as neatly to similar addresses made by those from outside the 
two-party system, I identify a variant of the announcement for third parties. 
Traditional Campaign Announcements 
Candidates were once expected to give major public speeches to kick off their campaigns. 
Following this tradition, for example, Republican Senator Phil Gramm in 1995 declared his 
candidacy at Texas A&M, where he was once a Professor of Economics, surrounded by cadets 
and flags. In the same election, Senator Robert Dole returned home to Russell, Kansas to deliver 
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his announcement to a large audience and “a shower of balloons.” Al Gore began his campaign 
in 1999 when he “returned to his hometown of Carthage, Tennessee, was introduced by his 
daughter, and was surrounded by family, friends, and local community supporters in front of the 
Smith County courthouse.”371 Barack Obama began his presidential campaign in a similar 
manner in 2007, declaring his candidacy to an audience of thousands of supporters and hundreds 
of journalists in front of the Old State Capitol building in Springfield, Illinois where Abraham 
Lincoln once gave his “House Divided” speech. However, announcements no longer require 
such flair. “In recent years,” Trent and Friedenberg argued, “at the presidential level, public 
expectations for candidate announcements have changed to some degree.” Because the news 
media does not cover campaign announcements as closely as in previous elections, Trent and 
Friedenberg remarked, modern “candidates have often revealed their intentions gradually.”372  
Because the announcement is no longer a “full-fledged media spectacular,” there are 
many ways to offer the statement other than through a major speech. Candidates sometimes give 
multiple announcement speeches to generate greater attention from the media, while others have 
not in an effort to encourage the electorate to “draft” them for president. Long before the 1988 
campaign season, for example, Republican Pat Robertson informed the media that he was being 
asked to run, and later announced “in a three-hour production of trumpet fanfare and patriotic 
song” that he would run if “three million registered voters signed petitions” asking him to do 
so.373 In other cases, as with Gerald Ford and Jerry Brown in the 1976 campaign, candidates treat 
the announcement as a low-key “mini-media event.”374 In more recent years, candidates have 
announced their campaigns while appearing on a variety of television talk-shows. For instance, 
in the 2008 election cycle Republican Fred Thompson announced his candidacy on The Tonight 
Show with Jay Leno, Rudy Giuliani kicked-off his campaign on Larry King Live, and Mike 
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Huckabee did the same on Meet the Press. The internet, too, has been used for the 
announcement. Since Steve Forbes was the first to declare online,375 other prominent candidates, 
including Hillary Clinton, have utilized sites like YouTube to address voters with their intentions 
to run.376  
Despite the differences in presidential campaign announcements, the genre fulfills the 
same basic functions. Political communication scholars William Benoit, Jayne Henson, Sheri 
Whalen, and P. M. Pier argued, for instance, that announcements fulfill what Trent and 
Friedenberg identified as the seven functions of the surfacing stage. “Although the surfacing 
phase encompasses more than just the announcement speech,” the authors argued, “it is fair to 
say that these messages are the most prominent component of this element of presidential 
campaigns.”377 In this sense, the campaign announcement is used to mark the beginning of 
political ritual. Second, announcements “are a vehicle for indicating a candidate’s ‘fitness for 
office.’”378 As political consultant Dan Patlak wrote, the announcement is “an opportunity to 
make a positive first impression with the public.”379 Third, announcements function to articulate 
a candidate’s goals and positions on important political issues. Fourth, announcements are used 
to identify the main themes of the campaign. Fifth, they are used to display the candidate’s 
personal style. Patlak noted, for instance, that announcements should “impress upon the media 
and your base of supporters that you possess well-developed organizational and public speaking 
skills, giving your campaign credibility.”380 Sixth, announcements are used to convey that the 
candidate should be considered a serious contender in the race. As Patlak wrote, announcements 
“should send a clear message to the media and political insiders that you are serious about 
running a professional campaign. This will go a long way toward convincing these audiences 
that you are a viable candidate and help attract vital contributions and media attention.”381 A 
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seventh function of announcements is to influence the decisions of potential opponents.382 On 
this point, Patlak suggested that announcements “should serve notice to any potential primary or 
general election opponent that they may have to invest significant resources in defeating you and 
thus may discourage otherwise viable challengers, who may then choose to run for a different 
office.”383 
Sharing common functions, campaign announcements of major party candidates also tend 
to have similar substantive characteristics. Announcements obviously contain a statement 
expressing that the candidate intends to run for office.384 Secondly, announcements also contain 
a clear rationale for why the candidate is running.385 Candidates often explain how their own 
lives mirror the experiences of most Americans, thus giving them insights into the needs of the 
American people. They explain the greatest problems that the country faces, and how they are 
best able to represent the constituency in finding solutions. Third, announcements usually 
establish the themes of the campaign. Some candidates, Baer and Nussbaum argued, tend to 
weigh in on just about every issue and offer programmatic details. However, they suggested, 
most often candidates offer a thematic framework of what they intend to accomplish. In the 
process, they offer “no specifics on the major issues of the day” but instead identify the 
principles that will guide their actions. In 2008, for example, Republican Fred Thompson 
announced that his campaign would be about “security, prosperity, and the unity of our 
country.”386 President Bush in his 2000 announcement address claimed that he would be guided 
by conservative principles, including maintaining a small government, governing with 
compassion, and fostering communities of faith.387  
Fourth, candidates state that they can win.388 They do this by expressing that they are in 
the campaign for the long haul, and that they are “in it to win in.” The candidate, Trent and 
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Friedenberg suggested, “claims to be better able to manage the office, better able to represent the 
constituency, and of course better able to attract funds and wage an effective campaign than 
anyone else.”389  Fifth, in order to highlight their own strengths and how their party has the best 
plan to improve conditions in America, candidates tend to remain hopeful and avoid too many 
negative attacks on the opposing party. In analysis of the announcements from the 1992 
presidential campaign, Palazzolo and Theriault argued that “candidates focused more on 
challenging their own party to change than praising or blaming parties’ past performances.”390 
Palazzolo and Theriault discovered that candidates spoke of their own parties almost 50 percent 
more than they brought up the opposing party. Benoit, Henson, Whalen, and Pier made a similar 
point, suggesting that 75 announcement speeches delivered between 1960 and 2004 contained far 
fewer attacks on opponents than discussion of accomplishments of the candidates or their party. 
They concluded, “it seems likely that candidates are overwhelmingly positive . . . because they 
want to appear positive and upbeat to voters (and because voters dislike mudslinging).”391 
Third Party Campaign Announcements 
  The traditional characteristics of announcement speeches are incompatible with the 
rhetoric of third party candidates. Because their campaigns serve the purpose of raising 
awareness about certain issues rather than winning office, many of the functions of traditional 
announcements do not apply to third party candidates. Minor party candidates have no need to 
indicate their fitness for the presidency, nor to display an administrative style, since in most 
cases they have no intention of actually making it to the White House. Similarly, they have little 
need to argue that they should be considered a serious contender, because no third party 
presidential candidate has come close to winning in over 150 years.  
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 Some of the functions of traditional announcements, though, still relate to third party 
candidates, albeit in a slightly different way. First, as with any presidential hopeful, the 
announcement for minor party candidates functions to commence the political rituals common in 
the campaign. Second, the announcement also functions to introduce the personal style of the 
minor party candidate, even though that style is more polarizing and less formal than that of 
major party candidates. Third, the announcement still functions to articulate the goals and policy 
positions of the minor party candidate, but these usually focus on just a few important issues that 
the two major parties have somehow neglected. Finally, minor party announcements function to 
influence the decisions of other candidates campaigning, or considering a campaign, for the same 
office. Rather than trying to dissuade others from running, though, minor party candidates 
frequently use their announcements to set the agenda for the other candidates. That is, they 
present the issues for which they stand, and provide the two major parties an opportunity to 
address their cause in an effort to head off a third party uprising. 
 Third party announcements also have three unique functions. First, they function to 
convince the news media that the candidate poses a serious threat to one of the two major parties. 
In order to dramatize the campaign and to receive press coverage in the later stages of the race, 
minor party candidates use their announcements to outline for the first time which party they 
intend to target. Second, minor party announcements function to convince the public that the 
candidate will not only syphon votes from one of the major party candidates, but that they have 
the staying power to remain a threat throughout the entire campaign. Finally, minor party 
announcements also function to use polarizing rhetoric to appeal for the first time to voters who 
are inclined to feel alienated from the system. Without voter alienation, voters do not support 
third party tickets. However, the alienation felt by voters who support third party tickets is often 
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the result of the polarizing rhetoric of the candidate that for some reason appeals to that 
particular group of citizens. Announcements, then, are the first chance for the candidate to 
rationalize the public’s discontent, and to build a strong base of grassroots supporters.  
 Because they fulfill different functions than announcements by mainstream candidates, 
third party announcements also tend to differ in their substantive characteristics. It is unnecessary 
for minor party candidates to inspire potential supporters with the hope that the campaign will 
win on Election Day, because most understand that this is highly unlikely. Additionally, minor 
party announcements tend not to be positive in tone, since they function to demonize the two-
party system and polarize the electorate. Overall, third party announcements exhibit six 
important formal characteristics. 
 First, as with any campaign announcement, minor party announcements contain some 
statement indicating that the candidate is launching a presidential campaign. Because serious 
candidates often see themselves as leaders of movements rather than heads of parties, though, 
announcements are frequently ambiguous and tentative at first. Candidates announce that they 
are willing to be nominated if there is nobody else willing to lead the political movement. And 
unlike the case for mainstream candidates, this is rarely a pose since so few candidates are 
willing to take over the mantle for a party bound to lose. Norman Thomas, for instance, after 
having been the Socialist Party’s nominee five times, tentatively announced in 1948 that he “may 
have to accept [the] nomination if the convention goes as I think it will.”392 Thomas later 
admitted to accepting the nomination that year only because nobody with name recognition had 
stepped forward. Addressing the reality that his party faced, Thomas announced, “I have been 
compelled to agree with my friends that, under present circumstances, with the difficulty that 
exists in getting on the ballot in many states, it is imperative that the party should nominate one 
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who is already well known by the public, rather than someone who must be built up in public 
knowledge and esteem.”393 Announcing one’s candidacy as the result of being drafted by a 
political movement is fairly common among third party campaigns. The same happened to 
former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T. Coleman Andrews who was recruited by the 
National States Rights Party in 1952 for his opposition to Federal tax policy and his popularity 
with right-wing voters.394 In 1971, Benjamin Spock co-founded the People’s Party in preparation 
for the 1972 race, and expressed interest in finding a high-caliber candidate to head the ticket. 
When Eugene McCarthy, Shirley Chisholm, and Ralph Nader passed on the offer, Spock was 
forced to step in.395 In 1980, Barry Commoner announced that he had “no personal ambitions 
other than doing my scientific work,” but that he would be “engaging in politics in my spare 
time” to be a place holder for the nomination of the Citizens Party.396 John Anderson 
ambiguously announced under the same conditions in 1984, though he abandoned the effort 
when he was unable to make it onto many state ballots.397  
 Other third party presidential candidates have avoided ambiguity in announcing their 
campaigns.398 Independent John Anderson, for example, formally announced that he was 
abandoning his quest for the Republican nomination in 1980 to run as an independent. Anderson 
stated, “I have chosen, after careful deliberation, to pursue an independent course toward the 
Presidency of the United States.”399 Libertarian Harry Browne’s declaration was just as clear in 
2000, stating, “I hereby formally announce my candidacy for president as a Libertarian,”400 and 
Ralph Nader in the same election spoke with similar transparency, saying, “I am seeking the 
Green Party’s nomination for President.”401  
 The second formal characteristic of third party announcements is an acknowledgment 
that winning is unlikely, with a corresponding statement about the candidate’s alternative goals. 
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Some candidates, usually those who were once active members of the two-party system, are 
reluctant to wave the white flag in the first official speech of the campaign. For instance, John 
Anderson in 1980 proclaimed in his announcement that polls indicated that he could receive 
about 20 percent of the popular vote, and that reaching out to the 50 percent of the electorate that 
rarely votes was “where my campaign will succeed.”402 During a press conference announcing 
his campaign in 1988, Consumer Party candidate Eugene McCarthy was rather adamant that he 
could be elected, stating, “I don’t expect to lose.”403 Similarly, Libertarian Bob Barr tried to 
avoid suggesting that he would lose by noting, “I am a competitor. The American people are 
competitors. For far too long, they have been treated as serfs, not competitors, not peers, not 
equals.” “We aim to change this,” Barr stated, declaring, “we intend to succeed so that in 
November America will have and see a president who will then be sworn into office” and 
represent their interests.404 This optimism is hardly reflective of these candidates’ understanding 
of their electoral destiny. As Libertarian L. Neil Smith wrote in his announcement in 1999, “I 
don’t expect to be president, but campaigns, like a novel or a movie, require willing suspension 
of disbelief, engendered by attention to detail by the author.”405  
 Most third party candidates are not as willing to “suspend disbelief,” and instead openly 
admit that they are likely to lose. Populist Party candidate Bob Richards, a two-time Olympic 
gold medalist and the long-time face of Wheaties, admitted in the opening days of his campaign 
in 1984 that he was “sure to lose.”406 The Socialist Equality Party in announcing Bill van 
Auken’s campaign in 2004 claimed to be “completely realistic,” in that “our candidates will, in 
the present situation, win only a limited number of votes.”407 Even Bob Barr, who attempted in 
his announcement to portray himself as a “competitor” had a moment of honesty, telling his 
audience that “the point of announcing a candidacy is not to win an election.”408 
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 Minor party candidates in their announcements, though, replace the purpose of winning 
with some larger purpose for their campaign. These include representing neglected issues to set 
the agenda for the campaign, and offering a choice to alienated or apathetic voters. Announcing 
his independent campaign in 1980, John Anderson said that his candidacy was “an effort to 
broaden the choice available to millions of potential voters who simply do not participate in 
party primaries and caucuses.” An independent campaign, he declared, “would vastly increase 
the likelihood that a thorough, dispassionate discussion of the host of complex issues confronting 
the nation will take place.”409 Sonia Johnson of the Citizens Party stated in her announcement, 
according to one journalist, that her bid was “part of the grand tradition of third party candidacies 
throughout American history – the pesky pest who shakes up the status quo and raises issues that 
the mainstream political parties can’t or won’t talk about.”410 Similarly, Howard Phillips of the 
U.S. Taxpayers Party contended that although he would not win an election, his campaign would 
“provide him the chance to air his views.”411 Ralph Nader, too, was a vocal advocate for 
providing more choice in elections, and stressed that his role was to highlight the issue of 
corporate corruption. In his announcement in 2000, for instance, Nader confessed, “It is easy and 
true to say that this deep democracy campaign will be an uphill one.” However, he noted, “The 
scope of the campaign is . . . to engage as many volunteers as possible to help overcome ballot 
barriers and to get the vote out. In addition it is designed to leave a momentum after the election 
day for the various causes that committed people have worked so hard to further.”412 
 A third formal characteristic of minor party announcements is a detailed rationale for 
why the candidate is running. Third party candidates focus on the few issues that they hope to 
force other campaigns to discuss throughout the election. Conservative candidates often defend 
their campaigns by addressing what they see as a growing moral or economic crisis in the 
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country. Constitution Party candidate Michael Peroutka in 2004 claimed that he wanted to “call 
this country back to its original, Godly Constitutional greatness.”413 In addition to creating a 
Christian state, Peroutka focused more narrowly on the issues of abortion, same-sex marriage, 
and immigration. Fiscal conservatives like Libertarians Bob Barr and Harry Browne sought to 
defend the power of the private sector, to balance the budget, and to prevent wars that ravage the 
economy.414 Other conservatives such as Strom Thurmond, George Wallace, and David Duke, 
demonized the Federal government for civil rights policy. Candidates on the Left have frequently 
made corporate power in America their biggest concern. Citizens Party candidate Barry 
Commoner in his announcement identified “the dominance of the big corporation” as the 
“fundamental issue” in his race, as have other leftist candidates such as Bill van Auken of the 
Socialist Equality Party, Gloria La Riva of the Party for Socialism and Liberation, and Ralph 
Nader.  
 Fourth, third party announcements contain a statement about the strengths of the 
campaign, and how it might threaten the two-party system. Without the potential to throw the 
election, minor party candidates are not newsworthy. There are many ways that candidates 
illustrate that their campaign is a legitimate force in the election. Most often, candidates usually 
address how many states they expect to target; appearing in more states increases the likelihood 
that the press will take the campaign seriously. In his announcement in 1968, George Wallace 
reported that he would campaign actively in all 50 states.415 In his less formal announcements 
before the winter of 1968, Wallace described his strategy in greater detail, clarifying that he 
could win in many states even without a majority. “If I got that 34 per cent in Wisconsin again 
and the Democratic candidate got 33 per cent and the Republican candidate 33 per cent, I’d win. 
All you need is a plurality.” Inspired by this thought, Wallace predicted that he would “do much 
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better than you expect” with potential wins in Southern and border-states and in a handful of 
states in the Midwest.416 Other candidates, though, have considered targeting fewer states to be a 
more effective use of their resources. Launching the Citizens Party’s campaign, Barry 
Commoner said that his movement was organizing in 40 states.417  
 Minor party candidates also address the strength of their campaigns by disclosing the 
financial and organizational resources that distinguish them from other third party tickets. In 
early versions of his announcement, George Wallace reported that he received over $396,000 in 
voluntary donations to run in the Democratic primary in 1964, and suggested the same would 
happen for his third party bid in 1968. During one campaign stop on his announcement tour, 
Wallace contended, “People came up to me in this very auditorium to ask: ‘Where do I send 
money?’”418 Following Barry Commoner’s announcement for the Citizens Party, Katherine 
Ellison of The Washington Post noted that “party workers have already collected about $25,000 
from individual donations, and are confident they can muster the $3 million to $5 million dollars 
they estimate will be necessary for a presidential campaign.”419 John Anderson in his early 
announcement rhetoric in 1984 pointed out that he was eligible for $5.8 million in public election 
funds, and that he “had mailed letters to some 40,000 people who worked for or gave money to 
him in 1980” in order to build a grassroots organization for his campaign.420 Harry Browne, in 
announcing his 2000 campaign, boasted, “we have assembled the largest campaign organization 
in Libertarian history, and we’re raising money faster than any previous Libertarian 
campaign.”421 
 Fifth, announcements by serious third party presidential candidates contain a response to 
audience concerns about the campaign only playing the role of a spoiler. Accusing a candidate of 
spoiling an election is equivalent to questioning that candidate’s integrity. Many candidates have 
   92 
openly embraced the label of spoiler, seeing it as their duty to punish the major parties for 
ignoring the interests of the people. George Wallace, for instance, stated in his early 
announcement rhetoric, “If the politicians get in the way of this people’s movement, they’re 
going to get run over.”422 Wallace seemed amused that his chance of spoiling had caused so 
much debate, stating, “Usually they would just ignore talk about a third party.”423 Barry 
Commoner also embraced the title, claiming that he was “fine” if the impact of his campaign was 
damaging the Democrats’ chances of winning in 1980.424 Eugene McCarthy in 1988 also 
embraced the criticism of his campaign, noting “I don’t mind tilting at windmills. They said it in 
’68 and I said, yeah, I guess we did, but when it was over there were a lot of beaten-up 
windmills.”425 Others, however, have denied that the term “spoiler” fit their campaign. John 
Anderson in 1980 argued in his announcement, “I strongly disagree with those who claim that 
my intended action to run an independent candidacy places me in the role of a so-called spoiler. 
It does not ‘spoil’ the political process when I seek to involve in that process young people and 
others who in the past, and even now, consider our democratic system irrelevant to their 
lives.”426 Ralph Nader made the same point in all of his announcements. For example, in 2004, 
he told Tim Russert on Meet the Press, “A spoiler is a contemptuous term, as if anybody who 
dares to challenge the two-party system and corrupt politics and broken politics and corporate 
power is a spoiler.”427 Similarly, he stated in launching his 2008 campaign, “This bit of, of 
spoiler is really very astonishing. These are the two parties who’ve spoiled our electoral system, 
money, they can’t even count the votes, they steal – the Republicans steal the votes, and the 
Democrats knock third party candidates off the ballot.”428  
 Sixth, and finally, minor party announcements make strong attacks, often in a polarizing 
style, and portray the major parties as a monolithic opposition acting against the interests of the 
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people. As John Anderson stated briefly in his early announcement rhetoric in 1984, “The two 
old parties are barriers to change and progress.”429 Benjamin Spock of the People’s Party stated 
in his early announcement rhetoric that “the Republican and Democratic parties have proved 
themselves almost totally incompetent. The war hasn’t ended, poor people get poorer, education 
deteriorates and everything is getting worse.”430 Tying both parties to corporate influence, 
Socialist David McReynolds said in his announcement in 2000, “Anyone seeking the nomination 
for President on the Democratic or Republican ticket must raise so much money that the real 
question is not the drugs used in the past, but, to put it bluntly, which corporate forces have 
bought and paid for the candidate.”431 In his announcement rhetoric before the 1984 election, 
John Anderson similarly suggested, “the two old parties are simply too tied in to a vast and 
intricate web of interests to which they are already in debt for money and support to ever deliver 
on a promise for example to do something about tax reform.”432 Ralph Nader’s announcements, 
too, have repeatedly made this point. Announcing in 2004, Nader suggested, “The corporate 
lobbyists are still swarming over Congress. Money is still poring in from corporate interests. 
Washington is corporate occupied territory and the two parties are ferociously competing to see 
who’s going to go to the White House and take orders from their corporate pay masters.”433  In 
short, the polarizing rhetoric of minor party candidates cited in the previous chapter is found 
frequently in their announcements. 
 As I have indicated, campaign announcements by third party candidates vary from those 
of their major party counterparts in significant ways. Although third party announcements still 
commence political campaign rituals, introduce the personal style of the candidate, and focus on 
important policy issues, they also function differently in that they appeal to those who feel 
alienated, aim to convince the media that the candidate is legitimate, and attempt to persuade the 
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public that the third party campaign can influence the outcome of the race. These functions lead 
to some formal characteristics in third party announcements that are similar to major party 
announcements, including a declaration of one’s candidacy and an explanation of why the 
candidate is running. However, unlike major party announcements, the third party candidate 
explains their campaign goals as something other than winning, identifies the strength of their 
campaign and how they will threaten the outcome for the two major parties, addresses the spoiler 
charge, and uses a polarizing rhetorical style.  
Third Party Announcements: Three Case Studies 
 The formal characteristics of third party announcements are apparent in most examples of 
the genre. In this section, I trace this form in the announcements of three prominent third party 
candidates since 1948, including Progressive Henry Wallace, Independent Eugene McCarthy, 
and Pat Buchanan of the Reform Party. Although the execution of the campaign announcement 
was slightly different for each of these candidates, the substantive characteristics of their 
statements contained little to no variation from the generic norm.  
The Announcement Rhetoric of Henry Agard Wallace (1948) 
 The 1948 presidential election was unique in that two powerful splinter parties, one 
liberal and the other conservative, challenged the Democratic Party for the support of its 
followers. While the conservative Dixiecrats were represented by South Carolina Governor J. 
Strom Thurmond, the new Progressive Party was led by Henry A. Wallace. Unlike many third 
party candidates, Wallace had a long and successful career in the two-party system, having 
served as Secretary of Agriculture and Vice President under Franklin D. Roosevelt, and as 
Secretary of Commerce under Roosevelt and then Harry Truman. Wallace’s relationship with 
Truman quickly soured, though, and he was ousted from the cabinet following a series of 
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speeches in which he attacked the president’s Cold War foreign policy. Wallace set out on major 
speaking tours in Europe and the United States throughout 1947, drawing large audiences as he 
railed against the Truman administration for embracing “imperialism.” By the end of the year, a 
coalition of left-wing groups urged Wallace to run for office, and he announced his candidacy in 
a radio address on December 29, 1947, and printed an expanded announcement in The New 
Republic on January 5, 1948 upon resigning as the magazine’s editor.434 
 Wallace’s announcement rhetoric contained an unambiguous statement declaring his 
candidacy. Wallace ended his radio address, for instance, by calling for a “new political 
alignment in America which requires the organization of a new political party.” Continuing, 
Wallace stated, “To that end I announce tonight that I shall run as an independent candidate for 
President of the United States in 1948.”435 Similarly, in his statement in The New Republic 
Wallace said, “I am convinced the time has come for an independent presidential candidacy.”436 
Describing his timing, Wallace wrote, “Election laws in key states make delay impossible if 
there is to be an effective independent candidacy.”437 
 Announcing his campaign, Wallace acknowledged the likelihood that he would lose. Of 
course, he was hopeful at times, comparing his new party with the unlikely victors of the past. In 
his radio announcement, for example, Wallace stated, “When the old parties rot, the people have 
a right to be heard through a new party.” Suggesting this is what happened for the Jacksonian 
Democrats and the Republican Party, Wallace declared, “The people must again have an 
opportunity to speak out with their votes in 1948.”438 Wallace’s optimism, however, was 
somewhat tempered. At the end of his announcement in The New Republic, Wallace admitted, 
“There is talk that an independent candidacy is doomed to failure because of financing. It is said 
that many millions of dollars will be required for such a campaign.” Claiming to be realistic 
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“about the opposition and the big-money press,” Wallace still expressed “confidence in 
democracy” but it was evident that he did not expect to win.439 
 Acknowledging the likelihood that he would not be elected, Wallace identified the 
alternative goals of his campaign. Above all, he sought to provide voters a choice in the election. 
To the readers of The New Republic, Wallace wrote, “My reason in striking out for independent 
action is to give these Americans their democratic right to choose.”440 Additionally, Wallace 
expressed a desire to raise awareness of the public’s support for peace with the Soviet Union. 
Asking supporters to send a message to the rest of the world, Wallace stated, “The bigger the 
peace vote in 1948, the more definitely the world will know that the United States is not behind 
the bipartisan reactionary war policy which is dividing the world into two armed camps and 
making inevitable the day when American soldiers will be lying in their Arctic suits in the 
Russian snow.”441 Although Wallace did not address accusations of acting as a spoiler, his call 
for a large “peace vote” implied that he wanted to send a message to those in the two-party 
system. Finally, Wallace also explained that he was running to draw attention to other 
progressive candidates. Resigning from The New Republic, Wallace claimed, “There are many 
excellent progressives within the Democratic Party – a few members of Congress and hundreds 
of local and state offices. I believe that the surest way of getting them reelected is to supplement 
their efforts with a hard-hitting campaign based on principle, not on political expediency.”442 
 Wallace supported his campaign with two basic themes that he repeated throughout his 
announcement rhetoric. Claiming that “peace” and “abundance” were always important to him as 
a political leader, Wallace reminded his radio audience that he previously argued “If the 
Democratic party continues to be a party of war and depression, I will see to it that the people 
have a chance to vote for prosperity and peace.”443 In his radio address, Wallace focused on the 
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issues of the power and profits of monopoly, how the Truman Doctrine was leading the country 
to war with the Soviet Union, unjust racism in the South, and short-sighted arms sales to Greece, 
Turkey, and China. These issues were identified in Wallace’s announcement in The New 
Republic as well. 
 Emphasizing the strength of his campaign, Wallace used parts of his announcements to 
describe his level of support, and address his fundraising expectations. Wallace claimed in two 
places throughout his radio address that he had plenty of supporters. For instance, he began his 
address by depicting the popular demand to hear him speak, stating, “For the past fifteen months 
I have traveled up and down, and back and forth across the country. I have talked with half a 
million people in public meetings and with thousands in private gatherings.” He ended the radio 
address, by contending, “Thousands of people all over the United States have asked me to 
engage in this great fight. The people are on the march.” Describing his own supporters, Wallace 
noted, “We have assembled a Gideon’s army – small in number, powerful in conviction, ready 
for action.”444 This army, Wallace suggested, was ready to help him raise enough funds to 
remain competitive. “I am not worried about money,” he wrote in The New Republic, “because I 
know that we shall get millions of dollars donated by housewives, stenographers, professional 
people, workers and shop stewards, and others who will work with a devotion big money can’t 
buy.”445 
 Most striking in Wallace’s announcements, though, was his use of polarizing rhetoric. He 
described the major parties as a monolithic opposition. In The New Republic, for example, 
Wallace wrote, “Today we live under a one-party rule. No scrapping over spoils, no 
disagreement over strategy and timing, no amount of fine-sounding speeches and gestures for 
liberal support can obscure this fundamental fact.” In further elaboration, Wallace noted, “on the 
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basic foreign and domestic issues that affect the lives of all Americans, we are denied any 
opportunity to choose.” Although the war was long over, he told his audience, “a bipartisan bloc 
governs us in the name of an undeclared emergency. In peacetime one-party rule is a real threat 
to our democracy.”446 There was obviously no hope in the Republican Party, Wallace told his 
radio audience, but even worse, he added, was that “the leadership of the Democratic party 
would deprive the American people of their rightful opportunity to choose between progress and 
reaction in 1948.”447 
 Beyond depicting the two-party system as a monolithic bloc, Wallace described his 
opponents as sinister and corrupt. He regarded voting for a president as being forced to pick the 
lesser of two evils. In his radio address, Wallace told listeners, “Stop saying, ‘I don’t like it but I 
am going to vote for the lesser of two evils.’ Rather than accept either evil, come out boldly, 
stand upright as men and women and say so loudly all the world can hear . . . ‘We are voting 
peace and security for ourselves and our children’s children.’”448 In The New Republic, Wallace 
added, “It is thus admitted that our choice is between two degrees of evil. Personally, I have yet 
to be convinced that the welfare of the American people can be served by voting for any degree 
of evil.”449 Wallace characterized the “two-party bloc” as taking “the first decisive step on the 
road toward fascism” due to plans for universal military training.450 Such strong devil terms 
could be found elsewhere in his remarks. For instance, Wallace dismissed critics who called him 
a Communist by claiming they resorted to “Hitlerite methods” of political persuasion.451 More 
importantly, though, Wallace argued that Democrats and Republicans served monopoly 
capitalists. In his radio address, Wallace contended, that the America of old was “betrayed after 
World War I by forces which found their origin in monopoly capitalism.”452 He wrote in The 
New Republic, “The fundamental fact is that the directing of this country of ours does not at 
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present belong to the people, but to a relative handful of wealthy men. The foundation of the 
government, as presently constituted, is not the general welfare, but the special of industrial and 
financial giants.” The giants “control both parties,” he noted, and “both major parties serve 
faithfully the few who own so much at the expense of so many.” Republicans and Democrats 
were complicit in this conspiracy to rob the people, Wallace contended, “for the primary concern 
of both parties is for the profits of monopoly.”453 
 The populist nature of the “we/they” distinction in Wallace’s rhetoric could not have 
been any clearer. The two-party bloc was evil for it resorted to manipulation, and worked 
exclusively for the wealthiest Americans. At the end of his radio address, Wallace maintained 
that he wanted to “usher in the century of the common man.”454 The “people,” he implied, were 
the heirs of the country’s populist founders. Writing in The New Republic, Wallace noted, “We 
are speaking once again in the American tongue, fighting monopoly as our fathers have fought it 
from the time of Jefferson to that of Franklin Roosevelt.” The only way for the populist revolt to 
succeed, he exclaimed, was when “the American people regain control of their own destiny.”455  
 Ultimately, Henry Wallace’s campaign announcement stood out from announcements by 
mainstream candidates because he tempered expectations that he could win, identified alternative 
goals such as providing voters choice and sending a message about the support for peace with the 
Soviet Union, and lashed out at his opponents with a polarizing style. His announcement, then, 
was light on hope, and defensive in ways that one would not expect from a presidential 
contender.  
The Announcement Rhetoric of Eugene McCarthy (1976) 
 Eugene McCarthy is best known as the hero of the anti-war movement whose success in 
the 1968 Democratic primary helped pressure incumbent Lyndon Johnson to drop out of the 
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race. McCarthy, who served multiple terms in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate 
until leaving in 1971, returned to the political scene ahead of the 1976 election when he 
announced an interest in running for president as an independent. McCarthy’s formal 
announcement was delivered in Madison, Wisconsin on January 13, 1975 to an audience 
estimated between 400 to 1,200 young adults.456 In reality, though, McCarthy’s announcement 
was delivered and re-delivered in the span of at least five months dating back to August 1974 
when he was introduced as the honorary chairman of the Committee for a Constitutional 
Presidency. McCarthy continued to “announce” his campaign well into July 1975, declaring at 
another stop in Madison, “I have to keep announcing my candidacy because people seem to 
forget, or the press does, but we’ll keep on doing it until October or November of 1976 at which 
point we’ll have to be taken more seriously.”457 
 It was clear early on that McCarthy was a presidential contender. At a news conference 
on August 25, 1974, attorney Patrick Crowley introduced the Committee for a Constitutional 
Presidency and announced, “Late next year, or early in 1976, it is planned to propose a slate of 
President and Vice President who will appear on the ballot as Independent candidates, through 
petitions that have to be filled in the various states. If the Committee decides to ask Senator 
McCarthy to be the presidential candidate, he has agreed to run.”458 In his own statement to the 
Committee for a Constitutional Presidency that same day, McCarthy said, “I am pleased to do 
what little I can by letting you use my person and whatever reputation I have, either as a 
candidate or in support of some other who may become the candidate, so that that goal at least in 
some measure may be achieved in 1976.”459 When asked by the press why he was only vaguely 
committing to the race, McCarthy stated, “I might just be John the Baptist. You know, he did a 
good job. If no one else had shown up, he might have gone ahead with the movement. So that is 
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sort of our function now.”460 Despite his attempt at ambiguity, the message was clear. As George 
Will noted about McCarthy’s reference to John the Baptist, “The statement tells you who will 
have to show up to cause McCarthy to step aside.”461 McCarthy’s announcement became clearer 
in the months that followed. During an appearance on CBS Morning News on October 29, 1974, 
McCarthy admitted, “Well, I am serious, and I’m a presidential candidate, yes, for 1976.” 
Furthermore, he said, “I’ve not said I was the, necessarily the ultimate candidate for the 
committee that we’ve organized, but that, if, when we got to ’76 and they hadn’t found someone 
better, that I would be the candidate, so I suppose that’s sort of a commitment.”462 By January 
13, 1975, months before the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency had planned to select its 
nominee, McCarthy revealed during his official announcement in Madison, “The committee 
asked if I would be its candidate, and I answered in the affirmative.”463 
 Perhaps because McCarthy was once from the two-party system and had some success 
before while facing tremendous odds, he was reluctant to surrender so early in the campaign. 
When asked if he expected to win, for example, McCarthy after his official announcement in 
Wisconsin responded, “They won in 1776, didn’t they?”464 Yet in other statements, McCarthy 
seemed to embrace the reality that he would not win. Appearing for the first time with the 
Committee for a Constitutional Presidency, for instance, McCarthy mentioned nothing about 
winning in 1976, and instead portrayed the campaign as important in “[educating] the public not 
only about the abuses of the presidency, but the process by which presidential candidates are 
selected.”465 More generally, like other third party candidates, McCarthy identified his goal as 
providing choice in the election. “In 1964, there was not choice for many moderate and liberal 
Republicans in the Goldwater-Johnson election,” McCarthy stated. Moreover, “In ’68 Humphrey 
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and Nixon surely gave no choice for persons against the war. And in ’72 there was no realistic 
choice or Nixon wouldn’t have won by such a landslide.”466  
 In his announcement rhetoric, McCarthy supported his campaign by focusing on many of 
the same issues that were at the heart of his campaign in 1968. Comparing the two elections, he 
noted, “The basic challenges and the basic problem remain the same.”467 McCarthy stated, “So 
we will first talk about the operation of the presidency itself and at the same time talk about the 
political process.” In McCarthy’s view, presidents had been violating the constitution for years, 
including Johnson who committed America to fighting in Vietnam, and Nixon who used 
government agencies for political purposes.468  
 McCarthy also made effort to demonstrate the strength of his campaign. In the 
Committee for a Constitutional Presidency’s first major press conference, its financial officer 
Patrick Crowley described the committee as “a new political movement” with “a staff already 
functioning with an office in Washington.”469 More importantly, McCarthy added during the 
press conference, “we have enough money to see us through the next several months.”470 The 
committee revealed its financial backers during its first press conference as “William Clay Ford, 
owner of the Detroit Lions football team; Suzannah B. Happ, of New Hampshire and 
Washington; Karl Gruhn, president of Tonka Mills, St. Bonifacius, Minn.; and Patrick F. 
Crowley, Chicago attorney.”471 With wealthy backers and a committed organization, McCarthy’s 
camp announced that it hoped to put the independent candidate on the ballot in all 50 states.472 
 Although McCarthy did not directly discuss being a spoiler until after his formal 
announcement in January 1975, his remarks communicated that he embraced the role. In his 
announcement in Madison, for example, McCarthy explained that he decided to run as an 
independent because of the Democratic Party’s “retreat from responsibility” and its tendency to 
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“hedge and compromise” on major issues.473 This point became clearer as the campaign 
advanced toward the summer, with McCarthy telling a crowd at Oregon State University that he 
was targeting the Democrats in the race because they “are much more to be faulted, since they 
claim to be the party of initiative, of experimentation, and of courage. And in a way, they have 
been until recently.” Unfortunately, McCarthy remarked, “They have now begun to talk about 
moving to the center.”474 McCarthy’s campaign, then, functioned to disrupt the election and 
move the Democrats back to the Left. 
 In fulfilling the final characteristic of third party announcements, McCarthy’s rhetoric 
contained exaggerated arguments about the problems with the two major parties. McCarthy 
portrayed the two-party system as a monolithic bloc by claiming that Democrats and 
Republicans were working together, and against the wishes of the Founding Fathers and the 
Constitution, to consolidate power and further marginalize third parties. Discussing “proposed 
legislation for federal funding of campaigns, equal time provisions and candidate-imposed limits 
on campaign contributions,” McCarthy implied that this was all aimed at further entrenching the 
two-party system.475 Furthermore, McCarthy stated, most presidents had violated the 
Constitution. “I do not think that we have had anything close to a constitutional presidency since 
that of Harry Truman,” McCarthy argued.476 Elaborating, he noted, “the constitutional 
relationships have been eroded – in part, as I said, in the Eisenhower administration and in part 
in the Kennedy administration and to some degree in the Johnson administration and then even 
more clearly in the Nixon administration.”477 Presidents were ignoring the limitations of their 
Constitutional power, according to McCarthy, because the two major parties has “deified the 
President.” Portraying the Democrats as being no better than the Republicans on this matter, 
McCarthy contended, “the Democrats seem to have fallen into the same state of mind; they begin 
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to talk about how they have to get a candidate, instead of talking about processes and procedures 
and substantive issues.”478 According to this reasoning, then, the majority of Republicans and 
Democrats had turned their back on the Constitution and given the president too much power, 
and Eugene McCarthy was the only politician capable of returning the government to the way 
the founders had designed it. 
 As Henry Wallace did in his announcement, McCarthy exhibited the basic characteristics 
of a third party announcement. He made his intentions clear, he at least half-heartedly admitted 
that he could not win and instead committed his campaign to challenging the systemic 
oppression of minor parties, and implied that he was proud to play the role of spoiler even 
though he refused to embrace the label. Moreover, McCarthy indicated that he had enough 
financial backing and popular support to seriously threaten the two major parties. 
The Announcement Rhetoric of Patrick Buchanan (2000) 
 Pat Buchanan was another political figure with years of experience in the two-party 
system who eventually became a third party candidate. An ardent conservative, Buchanan was a 
top adviser to Republican Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan. He was 
also a well-known news commentator, appearing regularly on The McLaughlin Group and 
Crossfire. Buchanan embraced the role of the outsider in the 1992 and 1996 campaigns, 
challenging incumbent George H. W. Bush for the Republican nomination and winning a 
surprising 38 percent of the vote in the New Hampshire primary in 1992. In October 1999, well 
ahead of the 2000 election, Buchanan announced from Falls Church, Virginia that he was 
resigning from the Republican Party to seek the nomination of the Reform Party, which was 
created by Ross Perot for the 1996 election. His speech reflects the tradition of third party 
announcements.  
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 Buchanan left little mystery about his intentions. In the first lines of his speech, he 
declared, “Today, I am ending my lifelong membership in the Republican Party, and my 
campaign for its nomination; and I am declaring my intention to seek the nomination of the 
Reform Party for the presidency of the United States.”479 With that statement, he became the 
biggest opponent to many other conservatives rumored to be seeking the Reform Party 
nomination, including Jesse Ventura, Donald Trump, and John Hagelin.  
 As with other minor party candidates who have emerged from the two-party system, 
Buchanan seemed somewhat reluctant to admit that winning was impossible. He never 
mentioned losing in his announcement, but he also avoided mentioning that he had any chance of 
beating his opponents. The closest he came to such a statement about his odds of winning was 
discussion of how an insurgent campaign within the parties was impossible. “Never again,” he 
stated, “will our political establishment permit a dissident to come as close to capturing a 
nomination as we did in 1996.” Instead, Buchanan set alternative goals that are often found in 
third party campaign rhetoric. He explained that his campaign was about providing conservative 
voters with greater choice in November. “Only the Reform Party,” Buchanan argued, “offers the 
hope of a real debate and a true choice of destinies for our country.” The problem with the two 
major parties, he suggested, was that they too frequently agreed on issues that needed more 
debate. “On foreign and trade policy, open borders and centralized power,” Buchanan argued, 
“our Beltway parties have become identical twins.” He claimed this was true for several issues, 
including the country’s participation in NAFTA and the WTO, the war in Serbia, and the 
development of close relations with China.  
Additionally, Buchanan explained that his campaign was about providing a voice for 
social conservatives. “With our miraculous advances in medicine, science, and technology, none 
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of us would want to go back to yesterday,” Buchanan stated. However, he added, “But 
something good has been lost from those years as well: The old patriotism . . . the idea that we 
Americans are a people who sacrifice and suffer together, and go forward together, the mutual 
respect, the sense of limits, the good manners; all are gone.” Buchanan spoke of the election 
being the “last chance to save our republic,” and argued that he was providing a voice for the 
conservative movement when few other candidates were willing to do so. Rather than 
committing to winning, then, Buchanan was clearly dedicated to raising awareness of right-wing 
discontent in order to pressure the Republican Party. 
 Creating a wedge between his campaign and the Republicans, Buchanan developed 
strong positions on a few contentious issues. In response to conservative concerns about the war 
in Bosnia, Buchanan stated, “I pledge to you: I will never send an American army to fight in a 
foreign war, unless our country is attacked or our vital interests are imperiled.” He also proposed 
cutting ties to the IMF, claiming, “We Americans are a good and generous people . . . But IMF 
bailouts of deadbeat dictators must end; and we must phase out foreign aid and start looking out 
for the forgotten Americans right here in the U.S.A.” There was something more important than 
all of this, though, Buchanan contended. “But of all the needs of this nation,” he suggested, 
“none is greater for our peace and happiness than racial reconciliation.” Distinguishing himself 
as more radical than most conservatives in the election, Buchanan deemed mulit-culturalism the 
biggest problem in the country, suggesting that “the backsliding toward hyphenated-
Americanism must end.” 
 Buchanan made few references to the strength of his movement. At most, he alluded to 
being drafted by his supporters, who he said would wage a fierce campaign. Early in his 
announcement, Buchanan stated, “‘If we don’t go now, Pat,’ I have been told by loyalists all 
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across America, ‘every cause for which we fought for seven years will die.’” Contending that he 
would not let this happen without a fight, Buchanan declared, “So let me say to the money boys 
and the Beltway elites who think that, at long last, they have pulled up their drawbridge and 
locked us out forever: You don’t know this peasant army. We have not yet begun to fight.” Yet, 
this was the extent of Buchanan’s proof that he had the strength to carry on throughout the race. 
His failure in this respect might partially explain, in addition to his fringe positions, why the 
Reform Party broke into factions and endorsed two separate candidates. 
 Buchanan refrained from calling himself a spoiler in his announcement, much as Ralph 
Nader did in each of his presidential campaigns. In fact, when asked about whether he would 
spoil the election for Republican George W. Bush, “Buchanan bristled at the thought,” stating 
that he did not accept that “anybody else who runs is a thief taking it away from those two 
parties that are entitled to the presidency.”480 According to Buchanan, he could not be seen as a 
spoiler if the two-party system itself was already spoiled. He remembered fondly his years as a 
Republican, starting his speech by admitting, “I will forever cherish the memory of having been 
perhaps the only Goldwaterite in the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University in 
1961.” Continuing, he added, “Nor will I ever regret my nine years of service to Richard Nixon.” 
Stating that he was thankful to serve with Reagan, too, and that “the Republican party has been 
good to me,” Buchanan then declared, “Sometimes party loyalty asks too much. And today it 
asks too much of us.” The two-party system, he concluded, is a “snare and a delusion, a fraud 
upon the nation.” In that sense, there was nothing left to spoil. 
 The polarizing nature of Buchanan’s announcement was its most distinguishing 
characteristic, and reporters quickly noted that “the message was vintage Buchanan: angry,” and 
that his “wonderful theater” embraced rage instead of “practical solutions to long-ignored 
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problems.”481 Buchanan portrayed both parties as the same throughout his remarks, stating for 
instance, “Our two parties have become nothing but two wings of the same bird of prey.” Both 
parties, he further insisted, were corrupt and representing the interests of the corporate elite. 
“Neither party speaks for the forgotten Americans whose jobs were sent overseas,” he argued, 
and “Both parties are addicted to soft money.” Explaining the system’s ties to “monied 
interests,” Buchanan stated, “Both write laws with lobbyists looking over their shoulders. Both 
embrace the unprincipled politics of triangulation.” Candidates from both parties were simply 
vessels for the special interests, Buchanan claimed. “Candidates of ideas need not apply, as both 
parties seek out the hollow men, the malleable men, willing to read from teleprompters speeches 
scripted by consultants and pollsters for whom the latest print-out from the Focus Group is 
sacred text.” Even worse, Buchanan suggested, both parties conspired to weed out challengers. 
“They have rearranged the primary schedule,” he noted, “and rigged the game to protect the 
party favorites.” 
 Buchanan’s announcement was also polarizing due to its use of devil terms and 
exaggeration. In conspiratorial language, Buchanan warned his audience that the election was 
their “last chance to save our republic, before she disappears into the godless New World Order 
that our elites are constructing in a betrayal of everything for which our Founding Fathers lived, 
fought, and died.” American democracy had crumbled, he maintained, stating, “I cannot think of 
a time since Watergate, so poisoned with rancor and hostility, and I don’t know if any president 
can change that.” The election was also portrayed as an opportunity to stand up to the “tyranny 
of judges” who governed the country. Exaggerating the state of affairs, Buchanan claimed that 
“today America is among the most over-taxed, over-regulated, and over-governed societies in 
history. Our Federal Government collects a fifth of all wealth we produce and controls perhaps 
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half of it.” Buchanan’s remarks were filled with hyperbole. As with the examples from Henry 
Wallace and Eugene McCarthy, his announcement was everything that a traditional major party 
announcement was not, but quite clearly fit the genre of third party announcements. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have suggested that third party presidential candidates violate public 
expectations of political discourse from the very beginning of the campaign. The traditional 
norms of announcement rhetoric do not apply to minor party hopefuls, who as a group face 
daunting barriers ranging from a lack of public visibility, little to no campaign funding, exclusion 
from public debates and forums with the mainstream candidates, and a widespread belief that 
voting for their party would be a wasted ballot. Conceding the race before it even begins, these 
candidates tend to embrace their positions as movement leaders, and disrupt the race in order to 
raise awareness of various issues and influence the agenda for the remainder of the election. 
Their announcements are akin to the attack ads usually run in the late stages of campaigns, 
proving to be shockingly negative and polarizing. 
 The description of the form and function of third party announcements applies to almost 
every type of serious third party candidate, whether they are from “true minor parties” or “short-
lived parties” or even “non-national significant other parties.” Even though the case studies in 
this chapter focused on the somewhat high-profile campaigns of Henry Wallace, Eugene 
McCarthy, and Patrick Buchanan, the framework applies just as clearly to the announcements of 
lesser-known candidates like Socialist David McReynolds, Libertarian Harry Browne, and 
Constitution Party nominee Michael Peroutka.  
Admittedly, there are some exceptions to the generic norms that I identified. Announcing 
his candidacy during an appearance on Larry King Live in February 1992, for instance, Ross 
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Perot expressed a sincere belief that he could win the election if he was on the ballot in all 50 
states, and mentioned nothing about being a spoiler or any other goal commonly embraced by 
third party candidates. However, because the billionaire Perot promised to pay for his own 
campaign, it was clear that he had the resources that immediately made him a more serious 
contender in the eyes of the news media. Although he was still unusually polarizing for a 
challenger, a third party rhetorical style was not as important to his campaign. Precisely because 
Perot had the resources to compete and his polling indicated the potential for support, his 
announcement falls into a gray area between announcements of major party candidates and those 
of third parties. In most ways it was like a major party announcement, but the nature of Perot’s 
appeal was tied to his idiosyncratic personal style, which meant that in stylistic terms his 
announcement was similar to that of third party candidates. 
 In the following two chapters, I demonstrate how third party rhetorical style changes 
other major genres of campaign discourse for minor party candidates. As the election evolves, 
and minor party candidates continue to agitate for change, significant campaign moments like the 
nomination acceptance speech and the concession are similarly utilized to accomplish their 
unique goals.    
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Chapter 4 
Unconventional: The Variant of Third Party Nomination Acceptance Addresses 
 
 Nomination acceptance speeches are often bland and predictable, Kurt Ritter argued, but 
they “continue to be regarded as vitally important events in presidential campaigns” to the point 
that they have “become a type of ritual – a ceremony expected and even demanded by the 
audience.”482 Political communication and rhetoric scholars have studied the address perhaps 
more than any other genre of campaign discourse.483 Nevertheless, these scholars have said very 
little – in fact, almost nothing – about the nomination acceptance addresses of minor party 
candidates. It cannot be because these candidates do not give such speeches; for the 2008 
election alone, there were at least seven acceptance addresses delivered by third party nominees. 
And it is not the case that these speeches are irrelevant to the outcome of the election. Of the 
seven addresses available from 2008, four involved candidates with extensive experience in the 
two-party system or who had run as potential spoilers in previous presidential races. These 
speeches were also far from being bland or predictable, as Ritter suggested, and actually stood 
out for their differences from the traditional acceptance address. 
 Indeed, those viewing the minor party nomination acceptance addresses in 2008 would 
have been shocked, if not entertained, by the tendency for candidates to violate generic norms for 
major party addresses. For example, Green Party nominee Cynthia McKinney demonstrated 
blatant paranoia throughout her remarks. Notably, she thanked her friend John Judge for sharing 
top secret documents with her about “the murders of Malcolm X, John Kennedy, Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Bobby Kennedy, COINTELPRO, other government covert operations directed at 
certain U.S. citizens, and what really happened on 9/11.” McKinney also referred to President 
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George W. Bush as “an international climate change villain for not signing onto the Kyoto 
Protocol,” and chastised both parties for “voting to spend 720 million dollars a day on war and 
occupation, war crimes, and crimes against peace.”484 The rhetoric of right wing candidates was 
equally extreme, often influenced by fundamentalism. Alan Keyes, who accepted the nomination 
of the American Independent Party, argued for a “restoration of the very best aspiration with 
which this country was founded,” the understanding and recognition of God’s will in a 
constitutional democracy.485 Similarly, Constitution Party nominee Chuck Baldwin embraced 
Christianity in his acceptance, telling the convention audience, “I am here because I think God 
has led me to this place.” His mission was obvious, he stated: to return the country back to its 
status as “One nation under God.”486  
 The extreme nature of third party nomination acceptance addresses raises an interesting 
question: Do speeches like those from the 2008 election cycle violate the norms of the genre, or 
do they simply represent a different set of norms altogether? In this chapter, I argue that third 
party nomination acceptance addresses are a variant of the genre of nomination acceptances, and 
that they differ in both function and form due to the recurring situational barriers and perceived 
strategic constraints for minor party campaigns. I develop this argument in several sections. First, 
in order to contextualize the genre, I examine how the acceptance address has evolved to its 
modern form, and how it fits the design of party conventions. Additionally, I describe both the 
form and function of traditional nomination acceptance addresses. Second, based on my analysis 
of over 50 nomination acceptance statements by minor party candidates dating from 1948 to 
2008, I describe the function and form of this variant of the genre. Third, in order to better 
illustrate the elements of third party nomination acceptance addresses, I provide three case 
studies including the statements of Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond in 1948, Reform Party nominee 
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Patrick Buchanan in 2000, and Green Party nominee Ralph Nader in 2000. Finally, I end with a 
brief discussion of the implications that this analysis has for the understanding of third party 
campaign rhetoric. 
Traditional Nomination Acceptance Addresses 
 The convention stage in the United States is one of the most important periods of the 
presidential election, but it has changed significantly over time. Trent and Friedenberg noted that 
at one point conventions were important because “the presidential and vice presidential nominees 
were selected, the platforms were determined, and even the tone or ‘battle posture’ for the 
general election campaigns was established.” However, conventions are now more important for 
their “symbolic or ritualistic functions,”487 due mostly to the introduction of television to the 
presidential campaign, the modern reliance on primaries for selecting delegates, and the growing 
dependence on campaign specialists responsible for candidate strategy throughout the entire 
election.488 Consequently, party conventions are now less about democratic deliberation, and 
more about “putting on the best show.”489 As political communication scholar Dan Hahn argued, 
“The purpose of the convention is now not so much to nominate a candidate as to sell the 
obvious candidate to the public and to weld together the warring factions of the party after the 
vicious primaries.”490  
As the process of nominating a candidate has been transformed, so too has the process of 
candidates accepting that nomination. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, presidential 
candidates were expected to “stand for the office in dignified silence on the basis of their public 
record and character,” rather than campaign in public.491 Consequently, the nomination 
acceptance address is primarily a modern phenomenon.492 Candidates as early as the 1830s 
responded to their nomination with letters of acceptance, communication scholar David Valley 
   114 
noted, but the statements were “short and were thought to be of little significance.” Gradually, 
acceptance letters grew longer and began providing “commentary on the platform, in which the 
nominee would amplify his interpretation of the issues and reinterpret certain planks of the 
platform.”493 The genre began shifting to an oral form, starting with Democrat Horatio Seymour 
in 1868, with the rise of post-convention nomination celebrations. Early addresses were usually 
delivered at a private residence, and were short and issue-less since deeper discussion of the 
election was saved for the formal letter. By 1892, with Grover Cleveland’s public address to 
supporters at Madison Square Garden, the oral form of the acceptance replaced the formal letter, 
and the form became a longer partisan statement focused on the major issues of the campaign.494  
The modern form of the address, though, did not begin until Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 
became the first to accept the nomination at a party convention. “The candidate-centered 
campaign certainly did not begin with Roosevelt,” Ellis argued, “but the modern candidate-
centered national convention arguably did.” Starting with Roosevelt “[the] duty of the nominee 
was not to expound upon or even interpret the party platform but rather to tell the party what it 
should stand for.”495 Candidates since Roosevelt speak with first-person pronouns more than 
ever before, and assume the leadership of both the party and the campaign with confidence and 
eagerness.496 More importantly, the audience has expanded immensely. Roosevelt’s public 
performance, Wayne Fields argued, “rested on [his] professed conviction that the general public 
could understand the most esoteric aspects of national governance and that the most desirable 
quality a presidential candidate could offer was everyday logic combined with common 
values.”497 Rather than serving the purpose of explaining the intricate details of important issues, 
then, the speech was a call for Americans to rally behind the candidate. As Ellis summarized, 
“The aim of the acceptance speech became to stir the audience rather than to set out in detail the 
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nominee’s positions on the issues.”498 This pattern became increasingly common after 1932, 
especially with the advent of the televised campaign twenty years later.499  
In its modern form, the nomination acceptance address fulfills three important 
functions.500 First, nomination acceptance addresses function to unite members of the political 
party following the tribulations of the primary battle. Trent and Friedenberg noted, “the 
convention is the time when wounds from the primary campaigns can be addressed and 
healed.”501 In other words, as Larry David Smith summarized, “a convention converts the 
individual campaign themes of the winter and spring into the party discourse of the fall.”502 
Therefore, as the most important speech of the campaign, the nomination acceptance address 
must signal once and for all that all factions of the party are working together to guarantee the 
ticket’s success in the general election.503 
Second, presidential nomination acceptance addresses function to legitimize the 
candidate as the official spokesperson of the party. Trent and Friedenberg argued, “the address is 
the means through which the candidate publicly assumes the role of a candidate/leader of the 
party.”504 In other words, the address is the defining moment in which the nominee emerges from 
the pack of candidates, receives “prestige and respect,” and as Trent and Friedenberg stated, 
becomes “something of an American icon.”505 
Finally, the traditional nomination acceptance address highlights campaign themes. 
Election after election, Trent and Friedenberg noted, “the acceptance speeches of the nominees 
have frequently signaled the issues on which they plan to campaign and/or have announced an 
overall campaign style/plan they intend to follow.”506 Because the opposition at this point has 
changed for the candidate, and the audience has switched from primary voters to the general 
electorate, many of the campaign’s themes and policy positions are designed to prepare for a 
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different kind of clash.507 With new slogans and perhaps a more detailed discussion of public 
policy, the candidate must ultimately “establish contrasting visions of the American Dream that 
frame the general election campaign.”508 It is with this web of themes and issue positions, David 
Timmerman and Larry Smith argued, that the candidate begins to “generate the story lines that 
provide motives for the partisan action which shall be the campaign.”509 
Because of the situational constraints and the long established norms of the occasion, 
those accepting their party’s nomination tend to deliver an address with a consistent rhetorical 
form. Commenting on the similarity between most of these speeches, Ritter argued that they 
“rarely include original or enduring public discourse.” The addresses, which he argued constitute 
the most scripted moment in the campaign,510 “do not present new themes, as they typically 
include stock phrases and appeals which the candidate found successful on the stump during the 
primary campaign.”511 Although scholars have disagreed about the precise number of common 
elements in nomination acceptance addresses,512 there are five substantive characteristics in the 
genre. First, and most obviously, the candidate ritualistically accepts the party’s nomination and 
steps into the new role as party leader. Second, the nominee calls for unity in order to secure 
victory in the general election. This may be accomplished by thanking other candidates for the 
contributions that they made to a national dialogue during the campaign, or simply for their years 
of service. Additionally, unity is discussed in terms of common goals for all segments of the 
party, and in relation to political partnerships that have started to blossom. As Trent and 
Friedenberg noted, “Calls of this sort may be exceptionally important if the nomination has been 
bitterly contested.”513 
A third feature of traditional nomination acceptance addresses is the presentation of a 
clear vision for America that distinguishes the nominee from his or her opponents. In other 
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words, nomination acceptance speeches develop reasons for why the nominee and their party are 
the best choice in the general election. In this regard, Trent and Friedenberg contended, the 
speaker presents a partisan worldview “suggesting that there is no real choice in [the] election – 
that their position and party are clearly right and their opponents are clearly wrong.”514 This 
point is made in several ways, but usually through a focus on issue positions, guiding 
philosophy, and personal experience. In discussing policy, nominees discuss past 
accomplishments, and contrast their party’s achievements with those of the opposing party. 
Candidates tend also to weigh in, in a more general manner, on major policy debates and align 
themselves with certain solutions.  
Candidates detailing their guiding philosophy identify the values that they see as most 
important to the American way of life.515 Explicitly linking these values to the American Dream, 
the worldviews proposed by each party are steeped in opposing ideologies. As rhetoric scholar 
Ray D. Dearin suggested, “One of the sharpest demarcations between the ideologies of the two 
parties has been the emphasis placed by the Republicans on individualism and private initiative, 
while the Democrats have stressed the idea of community and the building of a just humane 
society.”516 In Ronald Reagan’s acceptance speech in 1980, Henry Scheele argued for example, 
the nominee based his campaign on the values of family, work, neighborhood, peace, and 
freedom.517  
The tendency for nominees to use details from their biography to demonstrate their 
fitness for office, but more importantly their ability to carry out the vision they describe, is a 
more recent development in the genre. Once the conventions were televised and viewed by a 
mass audience, Trent and Friedenberg noted, candidates began “[comparing] themselves with 
their opponents to a greater degree than ever before” and their own biography played a more 
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important role.518 As Trent and Friedenberg remarked, “Often, the biographical sections of their 
acceptance addresses are used to contrast themselves with their opponents, and hence to make 
implicit, if not explicit, attacks on their foes.”519  
 A fourth substantive characteristic of nomination acceptance addresses is a ceremonial 
style. With the whole country watching, the nominee utilizes language that fits the formal 
occasion. William Benoit argued, for example, that the speeches often feature diction that is 
“distinctive and figurative through the use of metaphor and allegory,” and the composition 
resorts frequently to inverted word order.520 Theodore Sheckels added that nominees typically 
use “extended schemes more dramatically . . . to seem more eloquent” to the audience.521 While 
still present, this ceremonial style in nomination acceptance addresses seems to be slightly 
declining. Since Harry Truman’s nomination speech, Fields contended, there have been more 
candidates willing to address their audience with a vernacular that sounds at times more like 
“what regular folks might say among themselves.”522 
Finally, traditional nomination acceptance addresses usually contain an overall positive 
tone. Nominees still use “harsh and uncompromisingly partisan language” to “suggest that there 
is no real choice in [the] election – that their position and party are clearly right and their 
opponents are clearly wrong.”523 However, the overall tone of acceptance speeches has become 
more positive over time, with the candidate using surrogates to function as the “attack dog.”524 
This shift in the genre came when conventions began being televised. As Hahn argued, “It soon 
became evident that while positive repetition might sell cigarettes, negative repetition is not an 
acceptable method for selling politicians.”525 This has been confirmed by various scholars who 
have discovered that negative attacks in nomination acceptance addresses are present yet 
minimal.526  
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The Genre of Third Party Nomination Acceptance Addresses 
 Although the nomination acceptance speech has been perceived as a genre with a 
consistent form and function, several communication scholars have recognized that the content 
of the address may vary slightly depending on the context and the candidate giving the speech. 
After discussing the formal elements of the genre, for instance, Trent and Friedenberg wrote, 
“Which of these . . . strategies will dominate an acceptance address is largely a function of the 
specific situation in which that address is being delivered.”527 Furthermore, Benoit found that the 
strategies would likely differ depending on whether the candidate was an incumbent or 
challenger, leading him to conclude that “a single generic description of acceptance addresses” 
would be inappropriate” because it would ignore “important and interesting factors.”528 
Extending these arguments, I propose that whether the nominee comes from the two-party 
system or a third party will shape the formal characteristics of the nomination acceptance 
address. Because third party candidates have very different rhetorical constraints than their major 
party counter-parts, I argue that both the function and form of the genre are different as well. 
 Before understanding the minor party nomination acceptance address as a variant of the 
genre, it is necessary to realize that the speech is not as important for third party candidates as it 
is for their major party counterparts. Ritter noted that “it would be unthinkable for a political 
convention to eliminate the acceptance speech, despite the circumstance that the candidate’s 
nomination is as predictable as his address.”529 However, there are many reasons why the speech 
is not as important for third parties. The most obvious reason is that the candidate could be 
running as an Independent, rather than as a party’s nominee. Thus, prominent Independent 
candidates like Eugene McCarthy in 1976, John Anderson in 1980, and Ross Perot in 1992 had 
no party conventions. Second, high-profile minor party candidates sometimes decide against 
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holding conventions because the party was created solely for their candidacy and they fear that 
they might lose control to a rival faction if they convene. Such was the case for George Wallace 
who created the American Independent Party ahead of the 1968 election as a vehicle for his own 
campaign. Eventually deciding against holding the convention that he had once promised, 
Wallace explained, “You get a big bunch of folks together like that, there’ll always be a few 
who’ll try to take the thing over.”530 Finally, some candidates do not give formal acceptance 
speeches because their parties have so few supporters and such a small budget that a major 
convention is not worth the burden. For example, although the Prohibition Party continued to 
convene long after its cause was lost, its convention in 2004 nominated perennial candidate Earl 
Dodge in his living room, where he simply thanked the few people in attendance but said little 
more. Ultimately, nomination acceptance speeches are most common among serious splinter 
party candidates and those from true minor parties like the Green Party, Libertarian Party, and 
the Reform Party. Those who do not campaign or work in an organized party structure have no 
need for the genre. 
  For those minor party candidates who deliver a nomination acceptance address, the 
speech serves four important functions. Above all, the speech introduces the third party 
movement to the public in one of the few moments in the campaign that the news media may 
cover one of its events. The voting public knows very little about third party candidates, as I 
argued in the first chapter, because the parties receive little attention in the news media and 
usually lack the campaign resources to buy advertising time. Third parties are also ephemeral in 
that they tend to disappear after a few election cycles. Even parties that have run candidates in 
many consecutive elections, however, need to reintroduce themselves because they are often re-
organized from scratch and committed to a different purpose depending on which candidate 
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assumes leadership of the movement. For instance, the Reform Party led by Ross Perot, who 
focused on fiscal issues in 1996, was not the same party when social conservative Patrick 
Buchanan took its reins in 2000. A second function is that the minor party nomination 
acceptance address highlights the important policy issues and themes of the ticket. This is the 
same purpose for major party acceptance speeches, yet the issue positions are more radical and 
the policy proposals are sometimes designed to create a public spectacle. Third, because the 
success of minor party candidates often hinges on grassroots support and their ability to appeal to 
voters fed up with the two-party system, their convention speech should try to polarize the 
audience in order to persuade them to join the movement as activists. Fourth, in order to 
encourage the media to cover their campaign throughout the election, minor party candidates 
often use the speech to indicate how they are a serious threat to the two-party horse race. 
 Since nomination acceptance addresses serve a different purpose for minor party 
candidates than for their major party opponents, and because their campaigns must overcome 
different situational constraints, third party nomination acceptance speeches contain a rhetorical 
form that is both similar to and different from the ritualistic acceptances of their opponents. In 
specific, third party candidates: accept their nomination, offer a vision of America that is more 
extreme than that proposed by their major party counterparts, justify their campaign by 
describing it in some way as a continuation of the mission of the country’s founders, and address 
the electorate’s concerns that voting for a third party is a wasted ballot, all while using a 
polarizing style to appeal to those likely to feel alienated by the two-party system. 
   First, minor party candidates responding to their party’s nomination accept their new 
role. The acceptance is sometimes implied, but most serious candidates are more direct. 
Appearing at the Progressive Party’s National Convention in 1948, Henry Wallace stated, “I tell 
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you frankly that in obtaining the nomination of the Progressive Party, a nomination I accept with 
pride, I have made commitments.” At the end of his speech, Wallace concluded, “and I am 
committed to accept and do accept the support of those who favor the program for peace I have 
outlined here; the support of all those who truly believe in democracy.”531 In the same year, 
Prohibition Party nominee Claude Watson announced at his party’s convention in Winona Lake, 
Indiana, “It is with deep appreciation and a spirit of humility that I come before you today to 
accept the nomination of the Prohibition Party as its Presidential candidate.”532 More recently, in 
2004, Constitution Party nominee Michael Peroutka stated in his convention speech, “I am proud 
and honored and humbled to accept the nomination of the Constitution Party for the Office of 
President of the United States.”533  
 The second characteristic of minor party nomination acceptance speeches is a vision for 
America based on public policy positions and values that tend to be more extreme than those of 
the Democrats and Republicans. For right-wing third parties, this vision is often grounded in a 
Christian faith. Prohibition Party nominee Claude Watson in 1948, for example, swore that he 
would “strive with all my might in behalf of the Christian endeavor in which I am proud to be a 
part.” Regarding God as his guiding light, Watson expressed appreciation for being able “to 
carry the banner of this glorious cause and this fight for righteousness, justice, and Christian 
democracy.”534 A commitment to Christianity led Constitution Party nominee Howard Phillips in 
2000 to call for ending the legal practice of abortion,535 while Constitution Party nominee 
Michael Peroutka in 2004 embraced policies linked to God, Family, and the Republic.536 
Right-wing candidates who consider themselves fiscal conservatives have grounded their 
vision for America in the individualistic version of the American Dream. Reform Party nominee 
Ross Perot in 1996, for example, argued that he wanted “to make sure that some other kid who’s 
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a nobody from nowhere has [the] same opportunity” that he had to live the American Dream by 
moving to the top of corporate America.537 The pursuit of happiness, these candidates have 
routinely declared, requires smaller government and lower taxes. Charles Jay of the Boston Tea 
Party in 2008 stated a commitment to “decreasing the size, scope and power of an all-too 
powerful government and increasing liberty and freedom for all Americans.”538 The same themes 
are common in most Libertarian rhetoric. In 1980, Libertarian Ed Clark spoke of fighting 
inflation, protecting individual liberty, and improving energy policy in America, but proposed “a 
massive tax cut program.”539 In a similar vein, Harry Browne accepted his party’s nomination in 
2000 and stated that he “promised every individual the freedom to pursue his own dreams.” 
Furthermore, he argued, “No one will stick a number on you. No one will extort a percentage of 
your income as the price of getting a job. You will be free to pursue the life you’ve always 
dreamed of.”540 As such, Browne lobbied for abolishing the income tax and Social Security, 
ending the War on Drugs, and protecting gun owners’ rights in all conditions. 
Candidates from the far left have been equally committed to an ideological view of the 
world, maintaining an agenda of peace and social justice. Henry Wallace, for example, spoke 
longingly about how when Franklin Roosevelt was president “everyone of us held a dream.” 
Elaborating, Wallace suggested, “everyone of us dreamed of a time when the sound of peace 
would come back to the land, and there would be no more fear, and men would begin to build 
again.”541 This commitment to peace led to his promise of dropping “get tough” policy toward 
the Soviet Government in favor of negotiations, strengthening the United Nations, improving 
work conditions, pursuing desegregation, and breaking up corporate monopolies. Other 
progressive minor party candidates like Vincent Hallinan, Ralph Nader, and Cynthia McKinney 
have stated similarly idealistic liberal worldviews. 
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 Third, minor party candidates often justify their role as outsiders, thus making a case for 
the seriousness of their campaign, by describing their political movements as a continuation of 
the efforts of America’s Founding Fathers. At the Progressive Party convention in 1948, 
nominee Henry Wallace told his audience that they were convening to “[talk] to the people of the 
United States and the world on behalf of the everlasting principles of the founding fathers of the 
country.” It had been 150 years, Wallace noted, since Thomas Jefferson was attacked in 
Philadelphia “because he spoke courageously for the peaceful settlement of alleged differences 
between the United States and France.”542 Wallace’s plea for peace with the Soviet Union was 
treated as an extension of Jefferson’s righteous mission.543 Prohibition Party nominee Claude 
Watson in 1948 drew parallels between his religious conviction and the intention of America’s 
forefathers. Quoting the reference to the Creator in the Declaration of Independence, Watson told 
his audience, “[you] and I believe in God and in the principles upon which the Declaration of 
Independence was founded. And we reject now and forever the materialistic conception that 
denies God and the spirituality of mankind.” In voting for him, Watson concluded, the electorate 
would be following the example of America’s religious founders.544  
An explicit comparison between one’s third party movement and the Founding Fathers is 
extremely common in minor party enactments of the genre. Libertarian Roger MacBride told his 
party’s convention in 1976 that they would “wage a presidential campaign the likes of which the 
nation hasn’t seen since Thomas Jefferson carried the day for libertarian ideas in 1800.”545 Even 
clearer, Libertarian Ed Clark told those at his convention in 1980 that his campaign was standing 
on the shoulders of “Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams, of Patrick Henry, of Thomas 
Jefferson and Tom Paine.” Moreover, he argued, “As our nation enters the last decades of the 
twentieth century, we are the keepers of their ideas. And we hold a great responsibility, because I 
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believe – in all honesty – that we are their only heirs today.”546 Constitution Party nominee 
Howard Phillips referenced many of the same historical figures in his acceptance speech in 2000, 
stating, “We are the party of George Washington, of Thomas Jefferson, of John Adams and 
James Madison – of George Mason and of Patrick Henry. We are the only party which offers the 
American people the opportunity in the year 2000 to reaffirm the principles of the Declaration of 
Independence and the strictures of the Constitution of the United States.”547 Speaking of the 
Founders’ commitment to Christianity, Phillips added, “My prayer is that Almighty God will 
bless our launch of this campaign just as He blessed the inauguration of the Presidency of 
George Washington so that we may, indeed, be instruments of His will at the end of the 20th 
Century, just as was George Washington at the end of the 18th Century.”548  
Fourth, minor party nomination acceptance addresses contain a justification for voting for 
the candidate, especially to counter the belief that it would be a wasted ballot. Claude Watson 
told convention goers in 1948 that voting for the Prohibition Party was “the most powerful 
weapon any Christian has in a democracy.” Elaborating on this point, Watson added, “you do not 
lose your vote simply because you vote for someone who may not be elected to office. You lose 
your vote when you do not vote your God-given convictions as to what this country would be if 
all the other voters voted just like you.”549 Addressing voters concerned that he would not win in 
1952, Progressive Party nominee Vincent Hallinan argued, “We can win if we get enough votes 
to instruct whichever party is elected that the American people want peace. If you want an end to 
the war in Korea and an enduring peace . . . vote your convictions . . . and you may win.” 
Explaining the alternative, Hallinan noted, “But, if you vote for Eisenhower or Stevenson – then, 
no matter which one is elected, you can’t win.”550 Voting for principle rather than voting 
pragmatically is the argument that many of these candidates make in response to the “wasted 
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ballot” belief. Howard Phillips of the Constitution Party told his supporters in 2000, “[if you] fail 
to vote for what you believe to be right . . . then you can no longer blame the professional 
politicians, the well-heeled lobbyists, or the Left-wing media for a policy outcome which you 
fervently oppose.”551 
 Finally, minor party nomination acceptance addresses feature a polarizing and frank style 
that far exceeds the partisanship in similar speeches by major party candidates. In 1948, 
Progressive Henry Wallace labeled the Truman administration a “great betrayal” of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s legacy, because “Into the Government came the ghosts of the great depression, the 
banking house boys and the oil well diplomats.” Wallace insisted that the two-party system was 
contaminated, by declaring, “We ally ourselves to stand against the kings of privilege who own 
the old parties – the corrupted parties.”552 The demonization of the major parties was also clear 
in Prohibition Party nominee Claude Watson’s acceptance, delivered during the same summer. 
Watson told supporters at his convention, “The time has come for the Christian people of the 
United States to join in a crusade to restore moral, Christian leadership to this nation and to 
overthrow the evil, antisocial forces that have been too long in control.”553 Constitution Party 
nominee Michael Peroutka in 2004 made a similar attack on the two-party system, chastising 
Democrats and Republicans for sending “mothers and Daughters and wives and sisters to fight 
and bleed and die [in] its foreign . . . undeclared wars.” Furthermore, Peroutka attacked the major 
parties for supporting “sodomites,” torturing and executing “more than one million of [the 
country’s] unborn every year,” and backing public policies that “come straight from the 
Communist Manifesto.”554 In a slew of negative attacks, Green Party nominee Cynthia 
McKinney stated in her acceptance speech that the two parties were running a “racket.” 
Clarifying her criticism, McKinney stated, “the racket is about war crimes, torture, crimes 
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against the peace; the racket is about crimes against the Constitution, crimes against the 
American people, and crimes against the global community.”555 Rather than leave the harsh 
attacks against opponents to surrogates, third party candidates embrace vitriolic political rhetoric 
in their own addresses.  
 Encountering different situational and perceived strategic constraints, serious third party 
candidates often use their nomination acceptance speeches to introduce their party and the 
themes of their campaign, while reaching out to alienated voters and persuading the news media 
that they are worthy of coverage. Their addresses resemble those of their major party opponents 
in that they accept the nomination and offer a vision for the country, but the similarities stop 
there. Third party candidates accepting their party’s nomination often propose extreme solutions 
to political problems, justify their campaign by comparing its goals to the aims of the Founding 
Fathers, explain why they should receive support despite an inevitable loss, all while speaking in 
a polarizing style that can potentially move certain sympathizers to become their foot soldiers. 
Third Party Nomination Acceptance Speeches: Three Case Studies 
 The substantive characteristics of minor party nomination acceptance addresses are 
present in most examples of the genre. In this section, I trace this form in the acceptance 
speeches of three minor party candidates: National States’ Rights Party nominee Strom 
Thurmond in 1948, Reform Party nominee Patrick Buchanan in 2000, and Green Party nominee 
Ralph Nader in 2000. Each of the candidates enacted the genre perhaps as closely as one ever 
could. 
The Nomination Acceptance Address of Strom Thurmond (1948) 
 President Harry Truman’s advocacy for civil rights legislation in 1948 to address 
lynching, poll taxes, and segregation drew the ire of many Southern politicians. By the beginning 
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of February that year, Truman was given an ultimatum by the Conference of Southern Governors 
to “cease attacks on white supremacy” within 40 days or else risk a political revolt.556  
Convening after the 40 days passed, the association pledged to oppose Truman in the 1948 
presidential election. Several Southern governors asked Democratic state conventions to instruct 
national convention delegates to walk out of the Philadelphia gathering if a civil rights plank 
were added to the Democratic Party’s platform. When this happened, the Dixie Democrats 
created the National States’ Rights Party and nominated a ticket headed by South Carolina 
Governor Strom Thurmond. At first, Thurmond claimed that he expected to win, and would run 
in every state.557 By the time that he accepted his nomination at the new party’s national 
convention, it became apparent that his candidacy would simply be regional.558 His acceptance 
speech exhibits all of the characteristics of third party acceptance addresses.  
 Thurmond’s address featured several statements in which he accepted the role as the new 
party’s leader. He expressed a “great honor and a great responsibility” in being chosen to “lead 
in this fight to preserve the freedom secured by our forefathers.”559 At the end of his remarks, 
Thurmond clearly stated, “With humility, with the knowledge that the greatness of the cause 
must overshadow all its servants, I accept the nomination for President, and promise an utter 
dedication to the limit of all power that is within me.” In this way, his acceptance was like any 
other delivered by a nominee from the two-party system. 
 Identifying the important issues of the campaign, Thurmond made it clear that the States’ 
Rights Party existed to revolt against the Federal Government’s plans for civil rights legislation. 
Thurmond declared, “The preservation of the prerogatives of the people of a sovereign state, to 
deal exclusively with domestic problems . . . [is] just as vital as, and more intimately [affects] the 
welfare of every man, woman and child in America than . . . all other serious questions which we 
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face today.” Thurmond then applied this position to several policy debates related to civil rights. 
The Federal Anti-Poll Tax Bill, he contended, allowed Congress to invade “the power of the 
states to elect their own officials and would control elections within the states by taking this 
power from the people.” In reference to anti-lynching legislation, he suggested, “the Reds, the 
Pinks, and the Subversives are making use of the horror which the American people hold for this 
form of murder to try to change our system of government.” Thurmond also addressed Truman’s 
desire for desegregation, arguing ultimately that “The people in a local community have the right 
to use the means and the methods that will best promote harmonious racial relations.” Regarding 
the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), which made discrimination in matters of 
employment illegal, Thurmond used the same argument he used elsewhere in the speech. He 
explained that local businesses should be able to make decisions that relate to their own 
establishments, without the interference of government. 
 Like other third party candidates accepting a nomination, Thurmond placed the 
movement in the context of the Founding Fathers. The South, he claimed, “stands at a cross-
roads in American history.” Given the choice between “greater centralization of political power 
in the Federal Government” and the preservation of states’ rights, he argued, “We favor the latter 
road, and sound a call for the preservation of constitutional government in America.” By 
selecting this path, Thurmond claimed, his party was choosing to follow “Washington, Jefferson, 
Madison, Monroe and Jackson,” who “were great presidents” who “championed states rights and 
stood immovable for constitutional government.” According to Thurmond, protecting states’ 
rights was the best way to protect the constitution, and defend “the American way of life” 
established by the country’s forefathers.  
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 With it becoming increasingly clear that his party would only be a factor in the South, 
Thurmond explained why his candidacy still mattered, suggesting that his party provided a voice 
for ignored voters. “There are millions of Americans who subscribe to the principles we are 
fighting for,” Thurmond argued. Continuing, he suggested, “The voice of these people must be 
heard. We want them heard through the Democratic organizations in each state, if those 
organizations will make it possible for them to be heard.” In other words, Thurmond considered 
his candidacy as the only way to send the two-party system a powerful message. The governor 
exclaimed, “Dewey offers no hope to a voter who believes in States Rights and constitutional 
government. Truman offers you no hope.” Even worse, he concluded, “Wallace has destroyed 
any hope of his doing anything but following the communist party line.”  
 Finally, Thurmond’s nomination acceptance address contained a polarizing rhetorical 
style that drew attention from the news media and his southern target audience. By describing the 
election as a battle between those who favor “greater centralization of political power in the 
Federal Government” and those who favor the Constitutional “division of governmental 
sovereignty between the states and the Federal Government,” Thurmond framed his speech with 
an artificial dichotomy. The Democratic Party had turned its back on the Constitution, he 
claimed, by adopting “a program of mis-named Civil Rights, calling for all of the fundamentals 
of a police state in this country.” Disparaging the motives of Truman, Dewey, and Wallace, 
Thurmond described their choice to advocate for civil rights as a commitment “to make a 
shambles of constitutional government in America in exchange for a block of disgruntled votes.”  
 Thurmond’s polarizing style went beyond over-simplifying the ideas of his political 
opponents as he described them repeatedly with the use of obvious devil terms. Democrats and 
Republicans in favor of civil rights legislation were simply dictators, the nominee argued. The 
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National States’ Rights Party was described as fighting the “absolute and unqualified denial of a 
totalitarian state in the United States.” In other words, Thurmond suggested, violating states’ 
rights was akin to throwing “overboard the compass that has guided us to the port of greatness,” 
a decision that would mean the country was “headed for the rocks of totalitarianism and the 
persecution and cruelties of a totalitarian state.” This argument was foregrounded throughout the 
entire address. The Truman administration’s claim to be protecting “human rights,” Thurmond 
contended, resembled the efforts of European fascists. He stated, for instance, “Hitler offered the 
people of Germany a shortcut to human progress. He gained power by advocating human rights 
for minority groups.” Because the result was horrifying, he argued, “We oppose these disciples 
of political expediency who today emulate Hitler and who offer the ill-fated European 
experiment.” Drawing comparisons to another totalitarian regime, the governor suggested it was 
no coincidence that “Russia is ruled from Moscow” and that America’s “federal police state [is] 
directed from Washington.” For anyone missing the point, Thurmond made himself clear. The 
FEPA, he stated, “was patterned after a Russian law written by Joseph Stalin about 1920.” 
 The rhetorical patterns in third party nomination acceptance speeches were clearly 
present in Strom Thurmond’s address. He accepted the nomination and thanked those who 
supported him as the party’s new leader. Secondly, he identified violations of states’ rights as the 
main issue in his campaign, and applied it to several proposals coming out of the two-party 
system. After likening his movement of southerners to America’s revolutionary leaders, he 
explained that his party’s potential to win was not as important as being heard by Democrats and 
Republicans. Thurmond’s style was polarizing and demonstrated that he did not have the 
temperance to be America’s leader.  
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The Nomination Acceptance Address of Patrick Buchanan (2000) 
  Pat Buchanan’s road to winning the nomination of the Reform Party was not as easy as 
he might have expected. Seeking the party’s $12 million in campaign funds secured by Perot’s 
success in 1996, Buchanan was challenged by physicist-turned-politician John Hagelin of the 
Natural Law Party for the nomination. The party eventually split into two factions, but Buchanan 
won a ruling from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) that gave him both Perot’s money 
and the ballot line for the Reform Party. However, Buchanan was only polling between one and 
two percent nationally. His address, then, served an important function in re-introducing his 
message. Buchanan’s acceptance address, a few weeks before the decision by the FEC, was what 
Helen Kennedy of the New York Daily News called a “fire-and-brimstone speech,”560 and as such 
a classic example of a third party nomination acceptance address. 
 Beginning his speech with a simple acceptance, Buchanan then identified the central 
themes of his campaign. He asked: “Where are we going? How are we Americans using all this 
wealth, power, and freedom? Are we still God’s country? What about the forgotten Americans of 
Philadelphia?”561  In answering these questions, and providing solutions to what he perceived to 
be America’s greatest problems, Buchanan took positions that were isolationist and both fiscally 
and socially conservative. Regarding America’s military involvement in Kosovo, Buchanan 
stated, “Friends, I am called many names. Isolationist is one of the sweeter ones.” Under his 
leadership, Buchanan argued, “we will not longer squander the blood of our soldiers fighting 
other countries’ wars or the wealth of our people paying other countries’ bills. The Cold War is 
over; it is time to bring America’s troops home.” Recounting a story about a Serb-American 
complaining about her parents’ deaths as the result of American bombing, Buchanan asked, 
“Why did we do this? Why did we bomb this little country for 78 days when it never threatened 
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or attacked the United States?” Buchanan added, “We will reclaim every lost ounce of American 
sovereignty.” Elaborating further, he stated, “We will lead this country out of the WTO, our of 
the IMF, and I will personally tell Kofi Annan: Your U.N. lease has run out; you will be moving 
out of the United States.” 
 Buchanan’s preference for a simplistic, emotionally-driven response extended to major 
social issues as well. On the issue of civil rights, he stated, “I knew the old leaders of that 
movement, and while I did not always agree with their tactics, I respected them.” However, he 
argued, “today’s agenda has nothing to do with civil rights, and everything to do with special 
privileges. No discrimination means to me: no discrimination; not against anyone because of 
color or creed.” As most social conservatives of his era, Buchanan also stated his position on 
abortion. He stated, “When Supreme Court vacancies open up, only constitutionalists who 
respect the inalienable right of life of all Americans and our religious heritage will be 
nominated.” In essence, Buchanan took a far-right position on every issue. As the major parties 
nominated two candidates who appeared to be centrists, his identity as the arch-conservative 
clearly gave him more ground to convert disenchanted Republicans. 
 As with most third party acceptance speeches, Buchanan’s statement contained a clear 
comparison between the Reform Party and the Founding Fathers in order to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of his movement. Complaining about America’s direction, Buchanan stated, “Friends, 
I am ashamed to say it, but we have begun to behave like the haughty British empire our fathers 
rose up against and threw out of this country.” Connecting the dots, Buchanan continued, “That, 
then, is what our party, our campaign, and our cause are all about. We are Americans who say 
with our fathers: To hell with empire; we want our country back.” 
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 With the polls suggesting that Buchanan would have little influence on the election, it 
was crucial that he explain why a vote for his ticket was not a wasted ballot. He argued that the 
Reform Party was a place for alienated conservatives to go in order to send a message to the 
Republican Party. “For years,” Buchanan stated, “we have all heard that familiar taunt: Don’t 
worry about them; they have nowhere else to go.” Continuing this point he remarked, “Well, 
guess what? We have somewhere else to go. At long last, we have a home of our own.” The 
Reform Party was depicted as being more than just a place of refuge, though. According to 
Buchanan, voting for his ticket would force the Republican Party to clean up its act. Explaining 
his intentions, Buchanan stated that he decided to accept the nomination of the Reform Party 
“Because there has to be one party that has not sold its soul for soft money. There has to be one 
party that will stand up for our sovereignty and stand by our workers who are being sacrificed on 
the altar of the global economy.” In other words, Buchanan was providing voters an opportunity 
to not only vote their conscience, but to remain pure by refusing to vote for the corrupt major 
parties.  
 Finally, Pat Buchanan’s acceptance speech exhibited a polarizing rhetorical style that was 
well adapted to a sound-bite obsessed news media. At times, he labeled George W. Bush as a 
political clown. Recounting one of Bush’s more embarrassing moments on the campaign trail, 
Buchanan repeated the Texas governor’s statement about education, “Is our children learning?” 
Poking fun again at perceptions of Bush being unintelligent, Buchanan stated, “Bill Clinton 
understands this issue of sovereignty. Al Gore, he understands it. George W., he doesn’t 
understand it; but, don’t worry, he is still being home-schooled by Condoleeza Rice.” Buchanan 
also embraced a polarizing style by labeling his political opponents as ungodly. He was the only 
candidate, he suggested, willing to rescue “America’s unborn children, another million of whom 
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will die this year without ever seeing the light of day.” His old party was doing nothing, he 
suggested. “Republicans may be running away from life,” he argued, “but as long as there is life 
left in me, I will never run away – because their cause is my cause, and their cause is God’s 
cause.” Instead, he argued, his opponents supported policies that murdered innocent humans. 
Buchanan attacked the major parties for selling the country “down the river into some godless 
New World Order.” Where was all of this heartless policy taking the country? According to 
Buchanan, too many innocent people were being sacrificed and America had lost what made it 
great. 
  Satisfying all of the characteristics of the genre of third party acceptance addresses, 
Buchanan’s speech contained an acceptance of his party’s nomination, followed by a radically 
conservative vision of where the country needed to be heading. Just like any third party 
candidate trying to combat perceptions that their campaign was extreme, Buchanan compared the 
Reform Party to America’s revolutionaries and insisted that his ticket was worth a vote because 
it would steer the country back to its constitutional foundations. His polarizing style was a part of 
his public persona, but it simultaneously satisfied the requirement of ignored third parties to turn 
heads with shocking language.    
The Nomination Acceptance Address of Ralph Nader (2000) 
 Following a minimalist campaign in 1996, Ralph Nader had gained popularity by the 
time he accepted the nomination of the Green Party on June 25, 2000. At this point, Nader was 
receiving upwards of 6 percent of the public’s support according to some national polls,562 and 
his message was resonating with enough voters that Green Party members were confident he 
could change their reputation as a fringe party.563 Although it was clear that Nader would not win 
the general election, he was quickly becoming an important factor in the race. Phil Jones of CBS 
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Evening News, for instance, stated, “Now polls show Nader drawing enough votes to possibly 
kill Al Gore’s chances of winning.”564 With the news media following his campaign at least to 
some extent, and with voters growing increasingly curious about his message, Nader delivered a 
speech that contained all of the main elements of a typical third party nomination acceptance 
address. 
 First, Nader unequivocally accepted his nomination. Addressing “all Americans who seek 
a new direction, who yearn for a new birth of freedom to build the just society” and “who wish to 
build a deep democracy by working hard for a regenerative, progressive politics,” Nader 
announced, “I welcome and am honored to accept your nomination for president of the United 
States.”565  
 With the Green Party being somewhat new to the political scene, Nader spent a good deal 
of time in his acceptance address describing his campaign’s vision for America. Arguing that 
Americans once had succeeded in battling corporate power, Nader said “that the shift of power is 
extremely critical to a democratic society.” Quoting Louis Brandise, Nader said, “We can have a 
democratic society, or we can have the concentration of great wealth in the hands of the few.” In 
a line he repeated throughout his campaign, Nader stated, “The Green Party stands for a nation 
and a world that consciously advances the practice of this deep democracy, a deep democracy 
that facilitates people’s best efforts to achieve social justice; a sustainable and bountiful 
environment; and an end to systematic bigotry and discrimination against people just because 
they’re different.” In other words, “Green goals place community, and community and self-
reliance, over dependency on even larger and more absentee giant corporations.” The Nader 
campaign was really about allowing peoples’ “right to participate in power, to shape their own 
communities, countries, world.” Unfortunately, he added in more cynical terms, “Because our 
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democracy is underdeveloped, there is little accountability. The corporate commercialization of 
our country, our government, our universities, our schools, our youngsters, our very expectation 
levels.”   
 Defending his third party movement by tying it to the Founding Fathers, Nader explicitly 
discussed his outsider campaign in terms of the American Revolution. “In the past,” he declared, 
“citizens who had participated in this country’s social justice movements faced deep 
concentration of . . . of power and overcame them.” Clarifying, Nader stated, “The sources of 
civic motivation come very often from the heroics of our forebearers.” The Green Party’s 
example went all the way back in American history. “Common themes occur,” he suggested, 
“from the revolution of 1776 against King George III’s empire; to the anti-slavery drives and the 
women suffrage movements of the 19th century; to the farmer’s revolt against the big banks and 
the big insurance companies and big railroads that began in the late 19th century.” All of these 
acts of protest, Nader pointed out, “took on excessive power, pressed for relinquishment or 
sharing of this power, despite vigorous opposition by elements of the dominant business 
community.” Suggesting that his campaign would was necessary, from a historic perspective, 
Nader added, “When citizens and Torie merchants in the Revolutionary War lost – when citizens 
won and content slave-holders lost, and corporations were compelled to share that power with 
the people they oppressed or excluded, America was a better place as a result.” Clearly, Nader 
linked his campaign to important movements dating back to the Founders. 
 Confronted with the problem that his campaign was unlikely to win, and that potential 
supporters could view his ticket as a wasted ballot, Nader explained the significance of his 
candidacy in terms of providing choice where none existed. More importantly, for Nader the 
campaign was about building a new movement against corporate power to strengthen local 
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communities across America. “The people of this country have options,” Nader argued. 
Continuing, he added, “There are more citizen organizations and individuals knocking on the 
doors of their governments than a government responding. This means we must persist until we 
prevail.” Activists were organizing for a dream, he explained, stating, “This campaign is about 
strengthening our Republic with ‘liberty and justice for all’ so that freedom is defined as 
participation in power: power to solve our problems and diminish our injustices that cause such 
pain and stultify so many Americans and their children.” Support for the Green Party was 
described as sending a powerful message, and continuing a “progressive political movement” 
that liberates “wisdom, judgment, experience, creativity and idealism.” As Nader explained in 
ending his speech, “By debating, phoning, e-mailing, and marching during the next four months, 
we the people will grow a new political start, a green planet pushing up between the two fossil 
parties.” Thus, according to Nader, the election was just a beginning rather than an end.  
 Finally, Nader’s speech contained the same polarizing style common in third party 
nomination acceptance addresses. Throughout his comments, Nader created a dichotomy 
between community and corporate power, between “the people” and “Big Business.” 
Corporations, he explained, had stripped many social movements of political power over the last 
several decades. “Over the past 20 years,” he noted, “after having to give up a little in the 1960s 
and 70s to the various populous movements,” big business “has generated its own brand of 
wreckage, propaganda, and ultimatums on American labor, consumerists, taxpayers, and most 
generically, American voters.” As a result, he remarked, “Big business has been colliding with 
American democracy, and American democracy has been losing on all too many fronts.” By 
positioning the two-party system against the interests of “the people” and in favor of this 
dangerous “corporate power,” Nader described Democrats and Republicans as a monolithic 
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opposition. “Over the next four and one half months,” he suggested, “this campaign must 
challenge the campaigns of the Bush and Gore duopoly in every locality by running with the 
people.” By reducing corporations and the major political parties to one single entity and 
depicting its actions as ultimately oppressive, Nader sought not only to identify with those 
feeling alienated from traditional politics, but to provide them with a clear choice in the 2000 
election. 
 Nader’s speech illustrates that the characteristics of third party nomination acceptance 
addresses are as present in the remarks of a candidate on the far-left as they are in similar 
statements by candidates on the far-right. Just like Strom Thurmond in 1948 and Pat Buchanan in 
2000, Nader accepted his nomination in a ceremonial fashion, offered a vision of America that 
was far more extreme than that of his opponents in the two-party system, all while defending his 
campaign as a natural extension of the efforts of the country’s Founding Fathers. Also like the 
other candidates, Nader recognized that losing was inevitable, and sought to motivate voters by 
identifying alternative goals and offering such a polarized view of the election that any 
sympathizer would think twice before casting a ballot for the Democrat or Republican nominees. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that third party presidential candidates encounter a series of 
situational and perceived strategic constraints that shape their nomination acceptance addresses. 
Consequently, the speeches are utilized to agitate for change, and follow a recurring form in 
which the candidate accepts the nomination, offers an extreme vision of America, grounds their 
cause in the efforts of the country’s founders, and addresses concerns that they will not win, all 
while using the polarizing style characteristic of their rhetoric in general.  
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 Overall, this chapter demonstrates that conventional wisdom about the communication 
practices of political candidates does not hold up for those on the fringes. Generic norms based 
on the analysis of major party candidates fail to apply to the different circumstances and goals 
for the minor party candidates. In the next chapter, I demonstrate further how third party 
rhetorical style changes another significant genre of campaign discourse, the concession 
statement.  
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Chapter 5 
Triumph in Defeat: The Genre of Third Party Presidential Concessions 
 
 Celebration over the historic outcome of America’s 2008 election overshadowed perhaps 
one of the most awkward moments in the final hours of a presidential campaign. As the results of 
exit polls began being reported, four-time presidential candidate Ralph Nader appeared in an 
interview with Shepard Smith from Fox News to concede the race and address the victory of 
Democrat Barrack Obama. Smith, however, started the interview by playing a clip from Nader’s 
concession rhetoric earlier in the day where he stated, “To put it very simply, he is our first 
African-American president, or he will be. And we wish him well. But his choice is whether he’s 
to be Uncle Sam for the people of this country or Uncle Tom for the giant corporations.” Smith 
was horrified by what he saw as a racist tone in Nader’s comment and after asking the candidate 
if he regretted the statement was told that Obama “turned his back on 100 million poor people in 
this country, African-Americans, and Latinos, and poor whites.” Continuing, Nader defiantly 
maintained, “And we’re going to hold him to a higher standard.”566 Although this was the most 
polarizing comment in his concession rhetoric, the rebellious Nader, who received just over one-
half of one percent of the popular vote, made other statements indicating that he refused to bow 
out gracefully. For instance, in a message to his supporters the day after the election, Nader’s 
campaign team posted a message stating, “Against all odds . . . We prevailed.” The election was 
a success, Team Nader contended, because the ticket campaigned with less than “what Obama 
raised in one day,” it “overcame ballot access obstacles” to appear on 45 state ballots,” and in the 
process “exposed Obama and Biden for the corporate politicians they are.”567   
 The defiant nature of Nader’s concession rhetoric is not abnormal for minor party 
candidates. Journalists observing the election night gatherings of third party presidential 
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candidates and their supporters have long remarked that the events seem odd. For example, 
Washington Post reporter Christopher Shay attended the Libertarian election night gathering in 
1980, and asked, “Huh? Ed Clark didn’t win? The Libertarian victory party at the Planet Café . . . 
went on anyway.” Shay looked on as one of Clark’s supporters noted, “Four years ago we would 
have had 10 people in this room. Now, look.” Gesturing to the 100 or so people in attendance, 
the supporter stated, “That’s why we’re calling it a victory party. The Libertarians are the party 
of the future.” Shay was also amused when he heard one supporter gasp in glee, “1 percent!” to 
the news that Clark would win that much of the popular vote in Virginia.568 Similarly, eight years 
earlier in 1972, Los Angeles Times reporter Jack Boettner attended the rally for American 
Independent Party nominee, and former U.S. Congressman, John G. Schmitz, and described 
how, “There was a strong undercurrent of hope for their party and their candidate for the days 
ahead.” After a 14-piece band started playing classics from Glenn Miller and Schmitz entered the 
room, Boettner wrote that “It looked more like a victory celebration,” especially with “A 
blackboard to the right of the speaker’s platform [which] read: ‘The Journey Has Begun!” 
Schmitz “conceded” with the same optimism of his supporters, claiming, “This is just the 
beginning. We got one million votes . . . enough to strike fear in some of the hearts in the 
country.” As the candidate concluded, “Maybe you have noticed that this is not a typical 
concession speech.”569 One could say the same of most other concessions from third party 
candidates. 
 In this chapter, I argue that concessions from candidates like Ralph Nader and John 
Schmitz belong to a variant of the genre of concessions and are shaped by the third party 
rhetorical style demanded by the situational constraints that third party candidates almost always 
encounter. In other words, concessions from minor party candidates are rarely graceful rituals of 
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accepting defeat and praising the democratic process. Rather they are final calls from those who 
perceive themselves as heads of movements to encourage their supporters to continue digging 
the trenches and go on with the fight. I develop this argument in several sections. First, after 
providing a brief history of how the concession speech developed as a political ritual, I identify 
the function and outline the form of traditional concessions involving candidates from the two-
party system. Second, after identifying what previous scholars have suggested are the conditions 
that lead to occasional violations of these generic norms, I suggest that the norms are rarely ever 
followed by candidates from third parties. I then describe the function and form of third party 
concessions, based on an analysis of over thirty such statements dating from 1948 to 2008. Third, 
in order to better illustrate the essential elements of third party concession rhetoric, I provide 
three case studies of the genre including statements by Independent Eugene McCarthy in 1976, 
Green Party nominee Ralph Nader in 2000, and Libertarian Harry Browne in 2000. Finally, I end 
with a brief discussion of the implications that this analysis has for understanding third party 
rhetoric. 
Traditional Presidential Concessions  
 The concession statement is a genre of campaign communication that has received 
increased scholarly attention in recent years.570 Concessions mark an end to the electoral battle 
and appear to follow basic procedural conventions that are the same for almost every race and 
every candidate. As communication scholar Ruth Ann Weaver described in her crucial essay on 
the subject, modern electoral losers are supposed to concede so that victors may deliver their 
victory statements. This usually occurs in the form of personal communication followed by a 
public statement acknowledging the results of the race. Conceding in front of the public, losing 
candidates usually appear “personally, surrounded by family, to a group of supporters.”571 
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Concession statements are so ritualistic that scholars have argued that they are quite formulaic. 
Political communication scholar Paul Corcoran has stated that concessions are “rituals with little 
scope for complex or expansive rhetorical aims,” and political scientist John Vile noted that the 
same “elements pop up in nearly all speeches.”572 So consistent seems the genre that Weaver 
argued, “when these [conventions] are violated disruption in the transition process occurs.”573  
The Historical Development of the Concession Genre 
 Although most studies of concession rhetoric analyze speeches from 1952 to the present 
day, the genre has a much longer history. In perhaps the only work that discusses the origins of 
the concession, Vile contended that the genre developed along with communication technology. 
Before such technology, “voters nationwide did not cast their votes for president on the same 
day, and there was no telegraph, telephone, or other electronic media to produce instant 
analyses.”574 Concessions still existed in some form, but they mostly consisted of interpersonal 
interactions between candidates and personal letters between the losing candidate and his 
acquaintances.575 Concessions from candidates were also never really public before advanced 
communication technology, Vile stated, because “With a few notable exceptions . . . nineteenth-
century candidates did not actively campaign.”576 However, all this changed when Democrat 
William Jennings Bryant sent a telegram conceding to William McKinley shortly after losing the 
presidential election in 1896. Vile suggested, “Bryan’s telegram started a new tradition.”577 From 
that point forward, losing candidates began conceding privately with a telegram, and later with a 
telephone call, and following those short talks with longer speeches directed to the public and the 
campaign’s supporters.578 
 The rise of television has had the most influence in shaping the modern concession genre. 
“Since 1952,” Vile stated, “almost every winning or losing presidential candidate has delivered a 
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brief television address, usually on election night.”579 This is not a matter of choice. “Before 
television,” political scientist Reed Welch noted, “the victory and concession process was not a 
public spectacle.” However, he concluded, “Today . . . there is an unwritten rule, enforced by the 
news media and the public’s expectations that the victory and concession process be carried out 
on national television.”580 Responding to the dramatistic sensibilities of the news media and the 
public’s demand for closure, Corcoran contended, “the loser’s concession converts loss into 
honor: a heroic sacrifice, not to fate but to the popular will.” The concession in the modern age 
of mass media thus “ritually condones a victory to the winning candidate as a noble act in a great 
epic of Democracy and nationhood.”581  
Function and Form of Traditional Concession Rhetoric 
 Because presidential concession statements come at the end of a lengthy and often nasty 
battle for the executive office, they function primarily to put the electorate at ease, and to assist 
in the transition of power by calling for unity behind the newly elected leader. For this reason, 
Corcoran argued, “The concession speech is an institutionalized public speech act integral to 
democratic life and the legitimacy of authority.”582 Losing candidates often transcend defeat “by 
translating the meaning of the campaign from the language of genuine combat into metaphors of 
chivalry and sport.”583 In the concession, the losing candidate “forgives the depredations of his 
private and public honor by journalists, comedians, media experts, the general public, and the 
party process as a whole.”584 In response, journalists, parties, political adversaries, and even 
voters “recant their scorn, drollery, fear, prejudice, professional self-interest, and hatred,” and 
portray the failed candidate as graceful, committed to a righteous cause, and worthy of 
leadership.585  
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 Concession statements fulfill minor functions as well. Using analogies to other genres, 
Vile contended that concessions, like farewell addresses and eulogies, function as an opportunity 
for the losing candidates to transition to another role. Some commit to becoming a private citizen 
again, while others may resume a leadership role in an opposition movement.586 Second, because 
campaign discourse is much like war rhetoric the concession functions as one of the last public 
opportunities for candidates to reach out to their troops. According to Vile, “Individuals who 
surrender are typically expected to act with grace, to forswear future conflict, and to assure their 
troops that they fought bravely for a noble cause.”587    
 Given the pressure that losing candidates receive from news media and the American 
audience to follow these norms, the characteristics of traditional concession statements tend to be 
fairly consistent in the context of the two-party system. While these speeches often “retain a 
spontaneous quality and are a direct extension of the excitement of election night,”588 scholars 
have described concessions as having seven basic formal characteristics.589 First, the losing 
candidate formally declares defeat. This occurs normally when those who have lost congratulate 
the victor for their success, and acknowledge that they have fallen short of the support necessary 
to become president. Second, the candidate calls for national unity to support the victor. This is 
especially important after contentious elections. Third, the candidate pays tribute to American 
democracy. Corcoran, for instance, argued, “The paean to Democracy implicitly exonerates and 
legitimizes the losing campaign.”590 Fourth, the losing candidate argues for the importance of his 
or her own campaign, despite the failure to win, usually through a discussion of the causes for 
which they fought. Fifth, they articulate their goals for the immediate future and indicate their 
willingness to transition from a fulltime candidate and adversary to some other kind of role. 
Sixth, concessions usually contain a call to continue the fight. As Corcoran suggested, “A plea to 
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continue the fight converts defeat into a trooping of colors for the just cause and the future 
victory.”591 Finally, candidates dedicate a substantial portion of their concession to thanking their 
supporters. Importantly, as Ritter and Howell noted, every concession speech does not 
necessarily contain each of these elements, but “it is unusual for a candidate to omit very 
many.”592 Whatever is emphasized, for a concession to be considered effective losing candidates 
must portray themselves as “good losers” willing to end the campaign with “a brave face and a 
kind word for [their] opponent” and with a sense of self-control “sufficient to avoid giving vent 
to [their] true feeling or breaking into uncontrollable sobs.”593 
Variables in Traditional Concession Rhetoric   
 Although presidential concessions tend to share the formal characteristics cited above, 
scholars have suggested that variations of the genre may exist depending on the context. Welch, 
for instance, argued that the rhetorical situation is not always identical for those who concede, 
concluding, “The type of campaign that was carried out, the election results, and the kind of 
candidates involved in the election in large measure explain why candidates say what they do in 
their victory and concession speeches.”594 Furthermore, Willyard and Ritter contended, “To 
ignore such factors is to ignore part of the rhetorical dynamic that creates political speeches.”595 
Overall, communication scholars have recognized a handful of conditions that may occasionally 
lead those who have lost elections to emphasize certain elements of the concession while 
downplaying others. 
 First, the degree to which an electoral loser calls for unity behind the victor, and similarly 
to what extent they urge supporters to continue to fight, depends on the margin of defeat. In her 
analysis of victory and concession speeches from 1952 to 1976, for instance, Weaver discovered, 
“There appears to be a consistent pattern over the years examined: that the greater the loss, the 
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stronger the call for ‘continued opposition,’ instead of unity.”596 Welch confirmed this hunch, 
and found that those who lose by significant margins “use their concession speeches to 
emphasize their contributions to a movement, promise to continue the battle for the principles 
and issues they have been campaigning for, or predict the eventual triumph of their cause.” 
Welch found this to be especially true for the concessions of Barry Goldwater in 1964, George 
McGovern in 1972, and Walter Mondale in 1984.597   
 Second, calls for unification or continued opposition also depend on the degree to which 
the campaign was fought on ideological grounds. Weaver wrote that violations of generic norms 
were seen in the concessions of Democrat Adlai Stevenson in 1956, Republican Barry Goldwater 
in 1964, and Democrat George McGovern in 1972, and that their overwhelming emphasis on the 
issues of their campaign made sense in light of their worldviews. According to Weaver, 
Stevenson’s world-involvement philosophy, Goldwater’s conservativism, and McGovern’s anti-
war platform made each candidate more inclined to call for a continued struggle “until the issues 
were resolved.”598 In short, ideological campaigns, especially those that lose by large margins, 
are far less likely to use adaptive rhetoric in the concession statement. 
 Scholars also have identified contextual factors that might lead candidates to emphasize 
certain elements of the concession more than others. Vile argued that candidates who lose 
unexpectedly, as Republican Thomas Dewey did in 1948, probably respond differently than most 
traditional candidates. Moreover, Vile maintained, “We might also expect candidates who 
squeaked by or lost narrowly or who lost the electoral college vote while winning the popular 
vote to have a different level of emotional response.”599 Vile’s suspicions about those who lose 
the Electoral College vote was confirmed by Ritter and Howell in their analysis of the victory 
and concession speeches of Al Gore and George W. Bush in the 2000 campaign.600 
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 In light of the conditions that lead to variations in the genre of campaign concession 
rhetoric, third party concessions would clearly differ from those of the major party candidates. 
After all, minor party campaigns have frequently lost by enormous margins, and they are almost 
always steeped in ideology or focused on a few political issues. That these speeches look 
different from major party concessions has been briefly noted by political scholars. In the 
introduction to an anthology of victory and concession speeches, Vile argued, “Because third 
party candidates are challenging the hegemony of the two dominant parties, we might expect 
these candidates to buck some of the conventions relating to concession speeches.”601 In the only 
other significant analysis of third party concessions, Welch suggested that third party candidates 
tend to “concede the election, portray their campaign as a success, discuss their own campaign 
themes, and promise to remain a force.”602 In the next section of this chapter, I extend Welch’s 
work by specifying the function and form of third party concessions based on the analysis of 
over thirty examples of the genre. 
The Genre of Third Party Concessions 
 In conceding, third party presidential candidates respond to a different rhetorical exigence 
than their major party peers. Presidential winners from the two-party system do not wait for third 
party nominees to concede the race before declaring victory.603 And outside of a few minor party 
candidates since 1948 who have significantly influenced the presidential race, these candidates 
are not sought by the media for their thoughts on the election results. They also do not concede 
to help the country transition from a heated electoral battle to a sense of normalcy, because they 
ultimately see the two-party system as corrupt and alienating. Rather, in conceding, third party 
candidates respond to the needs of their supporters to translate the meaning of the outcome of the 
election. In short, the primary function of third party concessions is to urge supporters to 
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continue the fight for the political movement, and to argue to anyone willing to listen that the 
party is growing and worthy of future support and attention. In using the final moment of the 
campaign when the mainstream media might provide them access to society at large, minor party 
presidential candidates concede in the same unconventional style they use throughout the 
campaign to raise awareness of their signature issues while emphasizing that the battle is 
ongoing.  
Because concession statements serve a different purpose for minor party candidates than 
for their major party counterparts, and since their campaigns routinely face situational constraints 
that set them apart from Democrats and Republicans, the rhetorical form of third party 
concessions is both similar to that of major party candidates and distinctive. Third party 
concession statements have five substantive features: candidates thank their supporters, 
acknowledge the election results but portray the campaign as victorious, shift the blame for the 
loss to highlight the inequalities in the race, call for the fight to continue, and speak with the 
same unconventional style used elsewhere in their campaign to increase the likelihood that their 
statements receive media attention. 
First, minor party candidates use their concessions to thank their supporters. This is the 
strongest resemblance between concessions from third party candidates and major party 
nominees. Minor party candidates usually show appreciation for the sacrifices of their friends 
and family, for the help of those on their staff, and for activists who got the third party ticket on 
state ballots and donated money and time along the way. For instance, Independent John 
Anderson stated when conceding in 1980, “there are so many people whom I should thank 
tonight and my heart is full, full of the gratitude that I feel for all of the efforts that these many 
thousands and thousands of people have made.” Anderson dedicated the most lines, though, to 
   151 
thanking his wife who he compared to Eleanor Roosevelt, for campaigning “wherever across the 
face of this great land.”604 In his first post-election interview directed to fellow Libertarians, 
Andre Marrou in 1992 thanked “certain members of the national committee who went out of 
their way to help,” “members of my campaign operating committee” who “helped out in terms of 
fund raising,” and “various people [who] did outstanding jobs.”605 In 1996, Reform Party 
candidate Ross Perot stated, “I want to thank the millions of people across this country that did 
it. Nobody does it better.” Perot continued by thanking “the staff that’s worked tirelessly on this 
for doing an incredible job,” and also his “incredibly talented team that put all those television 
shows together.”606 This is a very standard practice in concession statements, but the rest of the 
distinguishing features of third party concessions are what makes them unique.   
A second substantive characteristic of minor party concessions is an acknowledgment of 
the election’s results accompanied by a reframing of the campaign as victorious. The 
acknowledgment of an electoral loss does not come easy, and sometimes is ignored altogether, 
especially because defeat is obvious and a concession is not really required by the media or 
opposing candidates. Third party candidates rarely congratulate the victor because that would 
involve them accepting the legitimacy of the two-party system. Henry Wallace in 1948 conveyed 
this clearly when responding to advisers asking him to congratulate Harry Truman in a telegram, 
“Under no circumstances . . . will I congratulate that son of a bitch.”607  
It is not surprising that third party candidates reframe election results as indicating 
victory. Welch noted in his brief study, “Whereas a major party candidate would only be 
considered successful if he won the election, a third party or independent candidate’s success is 
not necessarily measured by winning or losing an election but by whether he was able to affect 
the campaign and shape what issues were discussed.”608 This is the agenda setting function of 
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third party campaigns, and the reason why these candidates often see themselves as agitators for 
change. George Wallace remarked that his ultimate accomplishment in 1968 was that “the 
principles and philosophy that we espoused continue to live on” in Richard Nixon and the 
Republican Party. Elaborating, Wallace suggested that the American Independent Party “is living 
because the winner of the Presidential campaign said almost identically the same things we were 
saying in the campaign.” Indicating that this was because he had successfully influenced 
Republicans, Wallace continued, “And I dare say, had this movement not been in existence, that 
would not have been the case.” After all, he argued, “the President-elect of the United States is a 
minority President as far as the popular vote is concerned, so we did well.” 609 This inspired such 
feelings of accomplishment that Wallace’s running-mate, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay stated in his 
post-election comments that he was “the most happiest man in the world, because I think I 
accomplished all the goals I had in the beginning.”610  
Third party candidates also often reference secondary goals in concession statements, 
including forcing a tie, playing the spoiler, reaching certain benchmarks to qualify for matching 
federal funds, creating a sustainable political movement, and challenging electoral norms to pave 
the way for more successful third parties in the future. Serious third party candidates conceding 
the race point out their accomplishments in respect to these benchmarks and suggest that their 
supporters should celebrate, and their opponents should be fearful because they have built 
significant support and organization for the party that they consider will eventually shift political 
power in America.611 In his election night remarks in 1948, Henry Wallace suggested, “The 
Progressive Party has opened the door. In 1950 it will walk in. In 1952 it will clean house.” 
Elaborating, Wallace noted, “Moving from a standing start it has accomplished the 
incredible.”612 Twenty years later, George Wallace argued that he considered his campaign to be 
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a success, declaring, “You just cannot underestimate a deep southern movement operating out of 
the capital of the Confederacy and getting 10 million votes.”613 In 1980, Libertarian Ed Clark 
pointed to his half a million votes as proof that he was “very, very successful,” and contended, 
“This is the beginning of the three party system in the United States.”614 Furthermore, Clark 
argued, “The primary goal of this campaign was to show the United States there was another 
choice.” He concluded, “We’ve built a national party, we’re building it for the future.”615 Ross 
Perot made similar comments in his concession in 1996, stating, “thousands of volunteers across 
the country, true patriots, did what was necessary in a heroic effort to get this party on 50 state 
ballots; 1.4 million Americans had the courage to sign a ballot to create this party; and tonight, it 
appears that somewhere in the neighborhood of six to eight million people had the integrity to 
vote their conscience.” Furthermore, Perot noted, “What we can say tonight, now that this party 
has passed the five % level and met the test, is that hence forth in America our policies and our 
governance will be dictated by a three-party system.”616 Third party candidates treat any success 
in organizing significant numbers of voters as a major victory. 
Third, although minor party candidates conceding the race reframe defeat as success, they 
blame their electoral loss on the two-party system, the news media, and sometimes even their 
own party. Minor party candidates blame their loss on the two-party system because they say that 
the democratic process in America is corrupt and rigged to ensure the defeat of all third party 
challengers. Following his loss in 1976, Eugene McCarthy complained that the Federal 
Communications Commission doctrine requiring equal time for all presidential candidates meant 
nothing in his race, especially because its decisions “about who shall talk to the people and what 
information they shall be given” were made entirely by Democrats and Republicans.617 Ralph 
Nader in his concession following the 2000 election articulated this argument about power 
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imbalance and the control of the two-party system, concluding, “The two parties raised these 
statutory barriers to get on the ballot, and they campaign with most of the money by raising 
corrupt soft money and corporate money and PAC money.”618  
Minor party candidates also blame the news media for their electoral loss due to poor 
coverage of their campaign. Progressive Party nominee Vincent Hallinan in 1952 argued in his 
concession that his party “suffered from an unparalleled radio and press blackout.”619 T. 
Coleman Andrews of the National States’ Rights Party in 1956 had a similar complaint, stating, 
“We have been treated with silent contempt by television and radio stations.”620 Eugene 
McCarthy in 1976 argued that his results would have been much better, and that he could have 
won over more voters “had he been able to reach them through mass media.”621 
Occasionally, minor party candidates even blame their own parties for their failure at the 
polls. As with farewell speeches in which presidents offer advice, minor party candidates 
sometimes identify the problems that their party needs to address before it can compete seriously 
with the major parties. In a post-election interview, Libertarian Andre Marrou told his followers, 
“We’ve had problems with Libertarians in positions of authority telling us things which were not 
true, and we relied on them and then we paid the price because what they told us was not true. I 
guess the only thing I can say about that is that I hope it doesn’t happen again.”622 Republican-
turned-Libertarian Bob Barr identified similar challenges following his campaign in 2008, and 
told one Libertarian news magazine, “There’s a lot of work that has to be done to move the party 
down the road it started on . . . into a truly professional viable political entity. There are still 
those in the Libertarian Party that do not want to go down that road,” Barr stated, “and there are 
some in the party that will have to make an important decision about that.”623 
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Fourth, minor party concessions feature a call for supporters to continue the fight, but 
notably without a call to unite behind the victor of the race. Conceding the race in 1948, Henry 
Wallace told his supporters, “Now the time of real organization comes when the Progressive 
Party in every state in the Union will organize in every Congressional district, every city, ward, 
precinct and election district.” After all, he added, “No matter what the final vote for the 
Progressive Party may prove to be, I say that the need for the Progressive Party is greater now 
than ever before.” More bluntly, Wallace declared to his supporters, “We who fight in the 
people’s cause will never stop until that cause is won.”624 Progressive Party candidate Vincent 
Hallinan, in 1952 made a similar request for supporters to take a stand against the victor of that 
election, Dwight Eisenhower. Hallinan stated, “There must now be an unparalleled mobilization 
of the people to fight for their demands to prevent reaction from converting the Eisenhower 
victory into a license for inaugurating the programs of Taft and the NAM at home, and of 
MacArthur and Dulles abroad.”625 Toward that end, Hallinan suggested, “To help develop and 
organize the Progressive Party as a vital part of the coming movement of people, I intend to 
spend my next two years, going state by state.” Clarifying that the electoral battle was far from 
over, Hallinan countered, “I consider that my candidacy was the beginning of our Party’s new 
organizational drive.”626 The call to continue resistance is all too common in third party 
rhetoric.627 In 1992, Perot urged his supporters to continue to put pressure on the government, 
stating, “As long as we’re together nationwide you have enormous voice in the country. So we 
will stay together and you will be a force for good for our country and our children.”628 He made 
the same request when conceding in 1996, noting, “We’re going to keep the pressure on on the 
major issues.” Continuing, Perot remarked, “We must set the highest ethical and moral standards 
for the people who serve in our government. And all of that has got to be changed from rules to 
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laws in the next four years, and we’re going to have to stand at the gate and keep the pressure 
on.”629  
Finally, third party concessions feature the same rhetorical style that the candidates use 
elsewhere, a style characterized by polarization, populism, authenticity, and tendency to create a 
public spectacle in order to generate press coverage and appeal to those who feel alienated from 
the two-party system. When conceding to Harry Truman, for instance, Progressive Henry 
Wallace exaggerated the harms of the Cold War, claiming that bankruptcy of the American 
economy was unavoidable if the country continued to “support reactionary regimes abroad, arm 
Western Europe, and militarize America.” This doom was inevitable, Wallace warned, unless 
Truman was willing to clean up corruption by “[removing] the military from the civilian branch 
of Government, and the bankers from the State Department.” Suggesting that “bipartisan foreign 
policy” was evil and dangerous, Wallace pushed for the “return to the Roosevelt policy of 
friendship and collaboration among all countries through the United Nations.”630 Wallace’s 
polarizing slant on foreign policy was obvious, but typical for third party candidates conceding 
the race. Progressive Vincent Hallinan in 1952 attributed Eisenhower’s success to “his 
demagogic promises about ending the Korean War.”631 Conceding in 1976, Eugene McCarthy 
also outlined the ways that the two major parties had worked together, as a monolithic 
opposition, along with the League of Women Voters, the Federal Election Committee, and the 
Federal Communications Committee, in a conspiracy to eliminate the threat of third parties.632 
Similarly, in his concession in 2004, Nader described the difficulties of his campaign as the 
product of “the two-party electoral dictatorship.”633  
In short, third party concessions are not graceful exits from elections. Rather, they serve 
the purpose of encouraging supporters to keep up the fight. Although minor party candidates 
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thank their supporters just as their major party counterparts would, they stray from the generic 
norms almost immediately by characterizing their loss as success, blame the media and the two-
party system for their inability to win, and call on supporters to continue their resistance against 
the victor. Moreover, they communicate all of this in a polarizing and unconventional style to 
maximize the chance that their message reaches a broader audience.  
Third Party Concessions: Three Case Studies 
 The substantive characteristics of third party concessions are obvious in most examples 
of the genre. In this section, I trace this form in the concessions of three minor party candidates 
since 1948: Independent Eugene McCarthy in 1976, Libertarian Harry Browne in 2000, and 
Green Party candidate Ralph Nader in 2000. While McCarthy and Nader are used to illustrate 
concessions from candidates who arguably influenced the presidential election, my analysis of 
Browne’s post election statement indicates that the characteristics are similar even for 
continuing-doctrinal party candidates who are little known and without much support. 
The Concession Rhetoric of Eugene McCarthy (1976)      
  Despite Eugene McCarthy’s early start in the 1976 race, formally declaring his 
candidacy almost two years before Election Day, he never found the level of support that made 
him a household name in the summer of 1968. Just weeks before the election it was clear that he 
would appear on only 29 ballots as a result of the Democratic Party’s effort to keep him away 
from crucial electoral votes needed to beat Republican Gerald Ford. Furthermore, his stump 
speech lacked relevance to most audiences, Newsweek’s Daniel Chu and Jane Whitmore wrote, 
since it was “in many ways an extension of the themes he played while running for the 
Democratic nomination in 1968.” And with his campaigning and fundraising restricted largely to 
college campuses, McCarthy never had a chance. A Gallup poll from October 18, 1976, 
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indicated his support was hovering around just 2 percent.634 Nevertheless, he was still considered 
a potential spoiler. As Richard Scammon, Director of the Elections Research Center, told US 
News & World Report a few weeks before Americans headed to polls, “even if McCarthy gets 1 
per cent – principally in the North – it could make the difference in a State where Carter and 
Ford are running very close.”635 But McCarthy was not a spoiler, and Democrats evaded defeat 
with McCarthy receiving just nine-tenths of one percent of the popular vote. Three days after the 
election, he formally discussed the results in a press conference at the National Press Club in 
Washington, DC.636 
 Although McCarthy spent little time thanking his supporters in his press conference, his 
reframing of the loss was impossible to miss. When given the opportunity to confess his 
disappointment, McCarthy refused. After one reporter asked if he “did as well as you had hoped 
to do,” he responded, “Well, I don’t know whether we hoped to do – We didn’t do as well as 
most of the polls said we would do.” However, he elaborated, even though he received well 
under the six percent predicted by NBC, “I didn’t take any polls. I just reported what was being 
said. I took the best one I could find.” Asked by another reporter if the campaign would have 
been more effective had he spoiled the race for Jimmy Carter, McCarthy stated, “I don’t think so. 
I think that count came out just about the way we wanted it to. I would have preferred to have 
had more votes in a quantitative number. But I think the public now knows that a third party can 
have an effect on the election even though it gets a very small percentage of the vote.” McCarthy 
listed several ways that the campaign had emerged victorious, despite the low number of votes. 
The campaign, he insisted, had many “legal accomplishments” in “challenging . . . the 
unconstitutionality of something like 20 to 25 state laws.” In addition, it succeeded in raising “in 
the Federal Communication Commission the question of equal time and also the fairness 
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doctrine,” and “we have laid, we think, the basis for a further challenge to the unconstitutionality 
of the federal elections act.” 
  Despite this optimistic statement, McCarthy used much of his post-election press 
conference to blame the two major parties and the news media for his campaign’s inability to run 
a more serious campaign. The two parties, he insisted, “have moved to establish the idea that 
politics has to be conducted in this country through the structure of the two parties – as an idea, 
first of all – and have proceeded to formalize it in law.” The Federal Election Commission was 
made up solely of Democrats and Republicans, he argued, and made “magisterial decisions about 
politics in this country.” He then characterized the Federal Communications Commission as a 
protector of the two-parties, “making decisions which leave out of any deliberation or any power 
something like 40% of the people who are independents.” Even the state courts hearing his cases 
on state ballot access laws, McCarthy complained, were made up of “Republicans and 
Democrats elected to their judicial positions.” All this, he pointed out, reflected “upon the 
question of a free and open political system in the country.” 
 The news media was also responsible for his campaign’s shortcomings, McCarthy 
remarked. For instance, he argued that his campaign received minimal attention, and that “the 
Equal Time Doctrine means nothing if it can be evaded as easily as it was this year.” In 
particular, he stated, “CBS said they thought they had met the fairness doctrine by giving me 
22.5 minutes on their news in a period of three months.” This mattered, he contended, because 
“Forty-five percent of the people didn’t vote. And I think we would have gotten more of them if 
we could have reached them.” He also criticized the “writing press” for doing “little more in this 
campaign than television commentators.” Most coverage, he argued, was “reduced to speculating 
on what would happen in the debates, reporting what was said, and then interpreting and running 
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a kind of Nielsen rating as to who won.” According to the candidate, the news media as a whole 
was too focused on the horse race and missed out on the opportunity to create a dialogue about 
the democratic process in America. 
 McCarthy’s call for his supporters to continue the fight was focused less on liberal 
politics and more on the electoral transformation that he sought throughout the race. “As to the 
future,” he suggested, “We hope, with the help of others, to pursue a number of cases in the 
states and with reference to the federal elections act and also possibly with reference to the 
Federal Communications Act.” After being asked by a reporter if he could continue the legal 
fight after the election had already been decided, McCarthy responded, “there is a basis for going 
to court. There is a possibility of any number of citizens’ lawsuits on the grounds that they have 
been denied the right to participate in the elections by unconstitutional laws and by 
discriminatory laws.” Even though he was reluctant to commit to running in future races, 
McCarthy swore that he would fight the two-party system’s tight grip on electoral politics to 
pave the way for future candidates. 
 Finally, McCarthy spoke in a polarizing, populist, and frank style aimed at gaining 
attention from the media. In essence, McCarthy spoke of America’s political process in 
exaggerated language suggesting that Democrats, Republicans, and the League of Women 
Voters were involved in a conspiracy theory to exclude alternative voices from entering the 
electoral arena. His claim that the lack of Independents serving on the Federal Election 
Committee and the Federal Communications Commission led to both organizations making 
decisions that created a two-party dictatorship. The courts were supposedly in cahoots, too. 
Without considering the basis for their decisions, McCarthy insisted that with the two-party 
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system controlling judicial appointments, “it would appear to be more than coincidental that the 
votes went as they did.”  
 McCarthy saved his harshest words, though, for the League of Women Voters, the 
organization responsible for excluding him from the presidential debates. The League, he 
suggested, maintained god-like powers over the democratic process, without any system of 
checks and balances. “I think we are in a new era of politics,” he remarked, “in which the great 
mother goddess is the President of the League of Women Voters. She decides who the candidates 
are. Then the three minor gods are the heads of the three networks.” When told to exclude certain 
candidates, McCarthy implied, “the heads of the networks . . . have a kind of instantaneous 
illumination. They all come to the same conclusion at the same moment. They don’t conspire . . . 
but instantaneously they all have the same conclusion.” Curiously, by stating that these players 
did not conspire against him, McCarthy was suggesting such a thought. According to his 
polarized worldview, those involved in making decisions leading to the exclusion of third parties 
were cooperating to preserve a two-party monopoly on political power.  
 McCarthy’s concession certainly violated the generic norms for major party candidates. 
He acknowledged that he did not win, but did not congratulate Democrat Jimmy Carter. Instead 
of accepting the results and calling for unity, McCarthy insisted that he was cheated by a corrupt 
political system that he would continue to resist. There was little grace in his defeat, and almost 
no attempt to avoid looking like a sore loser.  
The Concession Rhetoric of Ralph Nader (2000) 
 Ralph Nader received just 2.73 percent of the popular vote in the 2000 presidential 
election, but many believe that his support was just enough to spoil the election for Democrat 
Albert Gore who lost the crucial state of Florida by only 537 votes. Nader, who attracted the 
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support of some liberal Democrats, received around 97,000 votes in the state, more than enough 
to have influenced the outcome of the election.637 Regardless of the results, the 2000 campaign 
was the finest of Nader’s career. The Green Party appeared on ballots in 44 states, Nader raised 
more money than ever before, and he was endorsed by enough unions and celebrities to raise the 
profile of his candidacy. Although Nader vehemently rejected the spoiler label, his influence in 
the 2000 election was a rare display of strength for a progressive third party ticket. Thus, when 
conceding the race in the context of the goals of a minor party campaign, Nader had a lot to 
celebrate. 
 Nader thanked his supporters throughout his concession. “Let me thank all these people 
who worked on the campaign,” he stated, adding “What we know for sure is that we’re coming 
out of this election day with the third-largest party in America, replacing the Reform Party.”638 
The feat took many “people from all over the country to do that,” Nader contended, “so great 
staff, working day and night here in Washington and above all it took a commitment by people to 
no longer settle for the least of the worst or the less of two evils.”639 Besides his activists, Nader 
also thanked “people for voting for us.” Their commitment to his ticket, he argued, was “not just 
building a unifying force in civil society, but above all, building a deeper democracy. That’s 
what it’s really all about, building a deep democracy.”640  
 Although Nader alluded to the outcome of the race, he never acknowledged defeat. 
Rather, he reframed the race as a success on almost every front. As he had done before, Nader 
swore off corporate donations and considered his campaign to be better off for it. Whereas the 
two major parties “campaign with most of the money by raising corrupt soft money and 
corporate money, and PAC money,” Nader praised his campaign for rejecting these funds 
“because we wanted to set an example of what is necessary for real reform of our corrupt 
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campaign system.”641 The Green Party candidate also considered the campaign to be a success 
due to the respect that it had gained from important figures in the news media. Quoting journalist 
David Broder, who said that the Green Party ran the best campaign that year, Nader exclaimed, 
“we really performed I think all of us in a very exemplary manner.”642 Moreover, he added about 
Broder’s praise, “I think it reflects that we really practiced what we preached in order to preach 
what we practice. Not just in the way we raised our funds, but in the way we comported 
ourselves, focusing on one important issue after another.”643 The party’s commitment to 
principle was the cause of its success, Nader concluded, and “the important thing here,” he 
added, “is we’ve reached a take-off stage in the Green Party, and that this is the last time that the 
two parties in a national election will have a monopoly power to exclude significant Third Party 
members from debate.”644 The aim of Nader’s reframing was obvious. Even while shunning the 
spoiler label, his claim of success made him a candidate to fear for at least two more election 
cycles. 
 Like most third party candidates, Nader blamed his inability to offer a more competitive 
campaign on the two-party system and the news media. Democrats and Republicans were to 
blame for creating barriers to third party success. “The two parties raised these statutory barriers 
to get on the ballot,” Nader argued.”645 Additionally, he suggested, “the two parties control the 
debate commission which is really a private company. And they exclude Third Party candidates, 
so really it’s a quite amazing and varied system of rigging the election for the two major 
parties.”646 Consequently, he concluded, Democrats and Republicans “[exclude] all kings of 
competition.”647 Furthermore, the news media was to blame, Nader maintained, because “you’re 
up against (the fact that) most of the coverage on the horse race was between these two 
horses.”648 Attention to third party candidates was limited to how they might impact this two-
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horse race, he declared. Regarding the spoiler question, Nader stated, “It’d be so predictable that 
the reporters would say ‘I know you’ve been asked about this one thousand times’ – I felt like 
having a recorded announcement.” As a result, he argued, “It really didn’t give us a chance to 
raise the subject matter that the press over the years have been reporting on.”649 In other words, 
the news media’s focus on the spoiler issue neglected Nader’s more substantial contributions to 
debate about crucial issues. 
 Having described the two-party system as corrupt and impervious to change, Nader failed 
to call for unity and insisted instead that his supporters continue their fight. The news media, 
Nader claimed, “misread the distinction of this Green Party’s mobilization. They said ‘Well, it’s 
just another Green Party, and makes a valiant effort, election’s over and then it recedes, and their 
leaders go back to their business in Texas or elsewhere.’” This was nonsense, in Nader’s ideal 
world. Instead, he described, “Right after the election the Green Party moves and locks arms 
with all those neighborhood and citizen groups all over the United States who are fighting for a 
more just America.” Emphasizing his core themes, Nader elaborated, “Who are fighting for the 
environment, fighting to establish missions against poverty, and enforcing the civil rights law 
and civil liberties laws. Missions that say to the American people, that the choice is the 
sovereignty of the people, or the sovereignty of global corporations over the United States.”650 
 Finally, Nader’s concession was delivered in the same polarizing and populist style that 
entertained political commentators and made him popular with liberal voters. Nader demonized 
the two major parties as being corrupted by corporate financing of their campaigns and 
committed to excluding alternative voices by creating a “corrupt campaign system.”651 Much in 
the same way that Eugene McCarthy implied that a conspiracy kept him out of the debates, 
Nader argued that the “two parties control the debate commission” and pull strings through a 
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“rigged system” to keep themselves on center stage.652 Both parties were so guilty in this effort, 
Nader suggested, that they were essentially the same. According to Nader, “The Republican and 
Democratic parties take more money from the same source . . . [and] morph into one corporate 
party with two heads.” Political power is thus stripped from the people, Nader maintained, and 
special interests dominate government. Rather than policy being crafted by the State Department 
or Department of Commerce, he concluded, “The decisions are made by the people we trip over 
in Washington D.C. every day: 22,000 corporate lobbyists, and 9,000 political action committees 
pumping money into both Republican and Democratic coffers.”653  In the tradition of populists 
like Robert LaFollette, Nader urged “the people” to continue the fight and “come back and take 
our government back from the corporate supremacists who think that there’s nothing they can’t 
control, there’s nothing that they can’t commercialize, there’s nothing they cannot daunt.”654  
 Ralph Nader’s concession in 2000 conceded to nobody. He thanked supporters for 
keeping his campaign energized, and for turning out and making a difference in a close race. In 
his eyes, his campaign emerged victorious, especially considering the barriers that it faced in 
reaching voters. More importantly, though, he urged his supporters to continue resisting the two-
party system by participating in the grassroots movement that they built for the campaign. 
Although the forces of evil won, according to Nader’s view, continued resistance would force the 
government back into the hands of the people. It was only a matter of time. 
The Concession Rhetoric of Harry Browne (2000) 
 Ralph Nader was joined in the 2000 election by Libertarian candidate Harry Browne, 
who headed his party’s ticket for a second time. An investment adviser turned politician, Browne 
was an active member of the Libertarian intelligentsia, having written several books and 
participated on numerous speaking tours across the country. Browne’s campaign accomplished a 
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rare feat in 1996 by making it onto every state ballot, and he repeated this again in 2000. Support 
for his campaign was unimpressive, though, as he received one-half of one percent of the popular 
vote in 1996, and just two-fifths of a percent in 2000. Still, for a young party, Browne’s support 
in 1996 was the second best in its history, and 2000 was its third best performance. All this was 
achieved by a candidate who rejected federal matching funds, and who lacked the name 
recognition of some of the party’s previous candidates such as Little House on the Prairie 
producer Roger MacBride and former Republican Congressman Ron Paul. Browne’s concession 
on November 7, 2000 was still consistent with the genre of minor party concessions.655 
 Browne thanked his supporters several times throughout his speech. Toward the end of 
his remarks, he told his audience, “We appreciate the fact that you supported this campaign. We 
appreciated beyond words that I can say, all of the people you’ve been talking to over the last six 
months or a year, all the people you’ve encouraged to vote Libertarian, all the people you have 
taken by the hand.” Browne had similar praise for his supporters just before leaving the stage, 
suggesting, “You’ve seen the support that we’ve had here tonight. It has been going on all over 
America.” Listing the accomplishments of supporters, Browne stated, “People have been 
volunteering their time. People have been taking the initiative. People have not been waiting for 
instructions and orders but instead going out and finding ways to spread the word. And it’s 
paying off.” 
 In typical fashion for third party candidates, Browne did not concede to the winner. His 
statement that he had “no idea what the outcome will be tonight” may have reflected the reality 
of the election in 2000, but from the beginning of his remarks he clearly reframed his campaign’s 
results as a major victory. “Somebody just told me that we have seven percent in Nebraska,” 
Browne announced. Such news would be a nightmare for any major party candidate, but Browne 
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jovially continued, “And then after the six people picked me up and put me on my feet again, I 
was able to resume the evening.” Restating his goals for the campaign, Browne commented, “Of 
course you know I want us to get over 1 million votes. I want us to be Pat Buchanan.” Even 
though this probably was not going to happen, he claimed that his campaign was not a failure. 
“The American people have not chosen against our message,” he argued. Rather, “The American 
people have simply not heard the message.” According to Browne, who then cited a statistic 
from the 1996 election, “only four percent of the American people knew who the Libertarian 
candidate president for candidate was.” This was not a campaign problem, then, but a systemic 
problem common for all minor party challengers. The very fact that he campaigned at all, and 
that his campaign began educating the public about Libertarianism, was the true measure of 
success. 
 Browne blamed his failure to receive a greater share of votes, despite appearing on 50 
state ballots, squarely on the news media and the two-party system. He ran, he argued, because “I 
want the press to sit up and pay attention.” In short, communicating with the electorate is 
difficult if the candidate is blocked out of media coverage. Additionally, the major parties were 
responsible for the failure of third party bids, he suggested, because they created barriers to their 
success. Browne promised that “the Libertarian Party will continue to grow to the point where 
we will be able to challenge them despite the ballot access laws, despite the campaign finance 
laws, despite the taxpayer funding of the Republicans and Democrats, despite the Debate 
Commission, despite all of these things.” In other words, with proper funding and the right 
message, he contended, the party would one day overcome the constraints perpetuated by the two 
parties that made campaigning as a minor party candidate so difficult. 
   168 
 The call to continue the fight was not as militant in Browne’s concession as it was for 
McCarthy and Nader, but it was still a clear rejection of unity and a request for supporters to 
further commit to the movement. He said, “I’m not going to stop tonight and I hope you won’t 
stop either.” Emphasizing the need to continue, he stated, “We want to keep going starting 
tomorrow morning.” In a kind of moment rarely seen in concessions, Browne used the stage to 
start raising funds for a new organization to be used to run television advertisements introducing 
the Libertarian Party to America. “We want to go to those young people on MTV, on VH1 and 
Comedy Central, we want to go to the non-voters on ESPN,” Browne stated, and then added, 
“we want to go to these places where people are sitting and watching all of these other things 
cause they can’t stand politics.” Reaching out to alienated voters, he argued, was the best way to 
“build name recognition for the Libertarian label.” The effort was unconventional, as Browne 
was essentially calling for supporters to help fund the campaign long after it was over. This 
became clear by the end of his speech with his final rally call to supporters in which he asked, 
“Do you want to go on from here? Do you want to get this message before the American people? 
Will you help us do it?” 
 As someone more comfortable in a professorial role, rather than as a polarizing political 
campaigner, Browne was less inclined throughout the campaign to speak in a divisive style. Yet, 
his use of third party style was still unmistakable in his concession. According to Browne, the 
Democrats and Republicans together offered nothing good for America. Because of that, he 
exaggerated, “We are the only ones who are offering to dramatically improve people’s lives and 
that’s much stronger than anything that they can do.” In calling for a campaign free of public 
money that was also full of ideas rather than negative rhetoric, Browne characterized the two 
major parties as too willing to buy elections and “sling mud at anybody.” However, this was just 
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what he was proposing for the Libertarian Party with the creation of an independent group 
capable of running advertisements bashing the two-party system. In an especially awkward 
moment, the Libertarian candidate showed his supporters around nine minutes of political 
advertisements, many of which they had already seen. The messages were shocking, even if his 
language during the speech was not. Browne showed ads depicting the destruction of the IRS 
building to free Americans from the slavery of taxation, comparing the Federal Government to 
an abusive husband, and showing a young girl discovering her mother’s dead body after she had 
nothing to defend herself against a home intruder.    
 While less extreme in stylistic terms than Nader, Browne’s speech contained the 
characteristics of third party concessions. After thanking his supporters, he stood firm in 
declaring the election to be a victory for his party and blamed both the news media and two-party 
system for any of his shortcomings. Most importantly, Browne avoided a call to unite behind the 
actual winner of the race, and instead urged his supporters to fund a campaign designed to 
continue the fight against both major parties. 
Conclusion 
I have argued throughout this chapter that third party presidential candidates end the 
campaign just as they begin it – with a violation of public expectations of political discourse. 
Facing various barriers to their electoral success ranging from poor campaign financing, 
restrictive ballot access laws, exclusion from official debates, and a belief that supporting their 
candidacy would be a wasted vote, third party candidates resort to a confrontational and 
unconventional rhetorical practice to raise awareness about the issues they support, and to 
encourage supporters and sympathizers to continue the fight. They deny that they lost and reject 
the opportunity for a graceful exit. Depicting their opponents in polarizing fashion, their 
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concessions take the tone of a negative attack ad. In Libertarian Harry Browne’s case they go so 
far as showing such attack ads again and again in the middle of their remarks.  
Although this chapter examined the form and function of third party concessions in the 
post-election statements of Eugene McCarthy, Ralph Nader, and Harry Browne, the same 
framework applied to the concessions of most other candidates from “true minor parties,” “short-
lived parties,” and other kinds of third parties. In short, many other case studies could be offered, 
including the concessions from candidates like Norman Thomas, Henry Wallace, George 
Wallace, John Schmitz, Bob Barr, Gloria La Riva, Ross Perot and many others.   
Occasionally, but not often, third party concessions from serious candidates violate the 
generic principles I have identified. Following a contentious campaign in 1948, Dixiecrat Strom 
Thurmond conceded in a telegram telling Harry Truman, “The American people have spoken at 
the ballot box and you are entitled to the United Support of a United People.” In another 
commitment to unity, albeit a modified commitment, Thurmond stated, “You can rest assured 
that as Governor of South Carolina I shall cooperate with you and your administration in every 
constitutional endeavor.” From a candidate who had rejected the Democratic Party, the gesture 
was surprising. Further clarifying his commitment to the democratic process, Thurmond told 
supporters, “It is our duty as good Americans and true Democrats to close ranks and work 
together as a nation for peace in the world and the continued progress of the American people at 
home.”656 
Similarly, Independent John Anderson used almost half of his concession speech to thank 
his family and supporters, and unlike other third party candidates he admitted defeat rather 
clearly. “History will record that it was at 8:35 P.M.,” Anderson stated, ‘that I telephoned 
Governor Reagan in California and offered my congratulations to him, because the returns by 
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that time had clearly shown that I was not destined to be the next President of the United States.” 
More importantly, Anderson did not pretend that he won. “Well of course I’m disappointed,” he 
argued, “I’m only human. But I hope that you can tell from my remarks and from my spirit and 
from my demeanor tonight, that I am not bruised in spirit or in mind.” What kept Anderson 
happy was not the movement that he might have built, or his potential status as a spoiler in the 
race. Rather, it was the “good fortune to run with somebody like Pat Lucey.”657 Anderson, a third 
party candidate, took a graceful bow out of the race. 
Why might some minor party candidate concessions lack some of the elements of the 
genre of third party concession statements? This occurs for two kinds of candidates: the 
independently wealthy candidate who heads a candidate-oriented minor party, and the leader of a 
splinter movement with years of experience in one of the major parties who intends to return to 
the two-party system following the campaign. In the case of the candidate with deep coffers, 
continued agitation may be unnecessary because they do not see themselves as a leader of an 
ongoing movement, they have been viewed as a legitimate candidate and wish to maintain that 
respect, or perhaps because they have simply accomplished their goals. Certain splinter 
candidates, too, might be more likely to follow the norms of traditional concessions because they 
wish to be respected by a more general audience and to return to their own party. For everyone 
else, though, the form is surprisingly consistent.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
 From the day they launch their campaigns, third party presidential candidates face the 
unfortunate likelihood that they are on a path to obscurity. Unlike the Republicans and 
Democrats they oppose, they too often belong to tiny parties with little organizational strength, 
have no chance of raising enough money to remain competitive, and are excluded from the 
presidential debates and ignored by the news media. It is not surprising that most voters perceive 
supporting third parties on Election Day as a wasted ballot. However, the overall neglect that 
minor party candidates receive in the public sphere is perpetuated by the failure to understand 
their behavior. In this project, I have claimed that communication scholars in particular have 
been guilty of neglecting and misunderstanding third parties, excluding them from most studies 
concerning political communication and examining them only when an occasional high-profile 
candidate disrupts the two-party system. The tendency for third party candidates to violate the 
norms of major party campaign rhetoric may be another reason why communication scholars 
have given them little attention. However, their tendency to violate societal expectations about 
campaign rhetoric is their main communicative strategy and a norm due to the conditions that 
minor party candidates routinely face in the presidential campaign. My analysis of how this 
strategy is tied to their constraints and overall purposes, and how their role as agitators molds the 
most important rhetoric in their campaign has several important implications for the study of 
communication. 
 One of the most significant implications of this study is that it demonstrates the 
limitations of theories proposed by political communication scholars. Theories about the 
communicative strategies used in presidential campaigns – for example, in relation to debates, 
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advertisements, and speech genres – tend to be focused on candidates from the two-party system. 
This scholarship is loaded with certain assumptions that make the resulting theories incompatible 
with third party candidates. It is assumed that candidates ultimately aim to win. Political success, 
then, is measured by how the candidate fares in the election. Similarly, it is assumed that the 
communicative strategies of political candidates will be designed to help them achieve this goal 
of electoral victory. In contrast to these assumptions, third party candidates frequently admit that 
they have no chance of winning. Instead, they argue that their campaigns aim to provide voters 
greater choice in an election and to raise awareness of important political issues by playing the 
role of the agitator. This overall purpose means that their rhetoric is substantively different than 
that of their major party counter-parts. Third party campaign rhetoric purposefully violates 
societal expectations to generate media attention, reach out to sympathetic voters, and forces 
Democrats and Republicans to react. Through analysis of the available campaign rhetoric of third 
party nominees from 1948 to 2008, I demonstrated that their alternative discourse is 
characterized by polarization, populism, displays of authenticity, and an effort to create public 
spectacle. As such, I have moved beyond case studies of this discourse by identifying common 
patterns in the campaign style of minor party rhetoric.  
 In a way, this study is a call to political communication scholars to make a better effort to 
account for the rhetoric of third party presidential candidates. At the very least, this means that 
post-election essays and books frequently published in the field should include minor party 
candidates in the election narrative whenever possible. As I indicated in the opening chapter, 
Robert Denton, Jr.’s edited volumes of essays offering a communication perspective of 
presidential campaigns dating back to 1992 have almost entirely ignored third party candidates, 
with the exception of Ross Perot and a few mentions of Ralph Nader. Special election issues of 
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journals in the field have suffered from the same shortcoming. Beyond including third parties in 
the election narrative, political communication scholars could also apply their theories to minor 
party candidates. In his analysis of victory and concession addresses of presidential candidates, 
for instance, Reed. L. Welch briefly assessed how the generic framework applied to concessions 
by candidates such as George Wallace, John Anderson, and Ross Perot. Political communication 
scholar Paul E. Corcoran also evaluated Ross Perot’s concession in 1992 with the generic 
framework he described. Ray Dearin’s essay on the American Dream as depicted in the 
nomination acceptance addresses of 1996 also serves as a good example of how third parties can 
be included in analysis of major party campaign discourse.658  
 A second implication of this study is that it indicates the flaws of a purely situational 
approach to genre criticism, and the value of a revised situational approach that recognizes the 
importance of a recurring exigence and recurring situation constraints. As I explained in the first 
chapter, a situational approach to genre criticism, or what Rowland called the 
ontological/empirical approach, assumes that recurring situations lead to similar rhetorical 
responses that restrict the rhetor’s strategic choices. This approach treats genre as a constellation 
of forms warranted by recurring situations and antecedent forms. My argument in the last three 
chapters, however, has been that the genres of campaign rhetoric cannot be understood with the 
same framework if the candidates giving those addresses encounter vastly different constraints 
and thus adopt very different objectives.  
In Chapter 3, I suggested that presidential announcement addresses are different for third 
party candidates, who face daunting constraints and accept losing as a reality for their campaign, 
than for major party candidates. While their addresses function to commence political ritual, 
introduce their leadership style, articulate their goals and policy positions, and to influence the 
   175 
decisions of their opponents as in major party addresses, they also function differently by 
demonstrating the campaign’s threat to the two parties, convincing voters that they are in the race 
for the long haul, and polarizing the electorate in order to reach out to sympathetic voters. In 
light of these different functions, third party announcements still contain a statement indicating 
that the candidate has entered the race, a statement of alternative goals, a rationale for running a 
campaign based on a few key issues, an indication of the campaign’s strength, and a response to 
accusations that the candidate will spoil the election, all expressed with a polarizing style. 
Despite the appearance of a recurring situation, third party candidates announcing their 
campaigns are usually unknown and face hills far steeper than their major party opponents 
usually encounter. Consequently, their different constraints and purpose give way to a different 
rhetorical form. 
 In Chapter 4, I argued that nomination acceptance addresses for third party candidates 
differ from similar speeches by their major party opponents for the same exact reasons. The 
function for such addresses given by third party candidates is to introduce the minor party to 
America, highlight the campaign’s policy positions and themes, polarize the audience to create 
committed activists, and indicate how the ticket threatens at least one of the two major parties. 
These different functions lead to formal characteristics that are also quite different compared to 
similar speeches by major party candidates. Minor party candidates accepting their party’s 
nomination accept their new role, offer an extreme vision for America, justify their fringe 
campaign by linking it to the Founding Fathers, and respond to fears that support for their ticket 
is a wasted ballot, all while polarizing their audience in shockingly partisan language.   
Continuing to highlight the usefulness of a revised situational approach to genre 
criticism, in Chapter 5 I argued that third party concession statements were nothing like those 
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delivered by major party candidates because they almost always function as a final act of 
defiance rather than a graceful exit from the presidential race. Because they are more like leaders 
of movements than legitimate party nominees, third party candidates use the last significant 
rhetorical moment of the campaign to draw attention once again, for anyone willing to listen, to 
the cause for which they fought. This alternative purpose for the speech leads to substantive 
characteristics that are different than what is typically found in traditional concessions by 
Democrats and Republicans. In their concessions, I argued, third party candidates thank 
supporters, acknowledge the election results but claim an ultimate victory, and blame electoral 
shortcomings on the two-party system and the news media. Moreover, I contended that third 
party concessions call for the fight to continue, while using their typical rhetorical style 
characterized by polarization, populism, authenticity, and a tendency to create public spectacle.  
With my analysis in the last three chapters, I have ultimately argued that to analyze the 
most important campaign speeches of third party candidates with the traditional theories of 
announcements, nomination acceptance addresses, and concessions is to make the most basic 
mistakes in genre criticism. Analyzing such speech genres with theories derived from analysis of 
addresses by major party candidates is to treat the genre deductively, or to assume that it already 
exists and is known and defined. However, as I have illustrated, the substantive characteristics of 
third party concessions, for instance, do not resemble concessions by Republicans or Democrats. 
Additionally, relying too much on the situational approach to these genres means that many 
scholars are also failing to recognize the variations within the categories. As such, only a revised 
situational approach to genre criticism recognizes the unique constraints and purposes of third 
party candidates, and thus maximizes the explanatory and evaluative dimensions of theories 
concerning campaign speech genres. 
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 A third implication of this study is that communication scholars attempting to understand 
their discourse should not treat third party candidates as a homogeneous group. Because there are 
many types of minor parties with a variety of constraints and overall objectives, any theory about 
their communication will be inherently limited by the fact that there are obvious exceptions to 
whatever rules one recognizes. Prominent candidates with significant financial backing may be 
outsiders in theory, but their communication tends to conform more closely to the norms of the 
two-party system because they have a better chance of being taken seriously by voters. 
Additionally, prominent minor party candidates appealing primarily to centrist voters would also 
be exceptions to theories regarding the communicative practices of third party candidates.  Thus, 
rare candidates like Ross Perot and John Anderson are likely to be outliers, compared to other 
minor party candidates because they have a better chance to succeed and therefore are most 
likely to use adaptive rhetoric rather than the third party style I have identified. 
 There are important ways that the findings in this dissertation can be extended by future 
studies. First, the realization that the different objectives and constraints of third party candidates 
distinguishes their communicative practices from those of their major party opponents means 
that other conventional theories about campaign discourse should be amended. For example, 
contemporary understanding of the function and substantive strategies in presidential debates is 
one area where future scholars should compare third party candidates with Democrats and 
Republicans. This would undoubtedly require a case study approach since so few third party 
candidates have engaged in debates alongside major party nominees. While some scholars have 
made progress in this endeavor,659 very few have examined the alternative televised debates 
featuring only third party nominees. Such programs have been featured on C-SPAN, for instance, 
and are remarkable in that minor party candidates often choose to cooperate in targeting the two-
   178 
party system rather than engaging with one another. Such cooperation is unusual, and even 
impossible, in debates between major party candidates and this suggests that traditional theories 
might not explain how it is that third party candidates debate. Similarly, theories about campaign 
advertising have frequently neglected third party candidates. Because many minor party 
nominees have purchased television and radio ads in the past, and since some of those candidates 
ended up influencing their races, conventional approaches to campaign advertising should be 
tested with examples from these political outsiders. 
 Another direction for future research is to examine the genres of political discourse that 
are unique to third party candidates. For example, many prominent minor party candidates with 
experience in the two-party system formally resign from their party before starting a presidential 
bid with a third party. Candidates who did this in the past include John Schmitz, Patrick 
Buchanan, Cynthia McKinney, Alan Keyes, Bob Barr, and many others. There are some obvious 
questions about this genre that could be answered by other scholars: What are the characteristics 
of these resignations and how do they differ from political resignations in general? Additionally 
what role do resignations by eventual third party candidates play throughout the campaign? 
Obviously, because third party campaign rhetoric has been neglected in the field of 
communication, little has been written on this subject.   
 Another genre of third party campaign rhetoric that could be developed in future research 
is candidates’ apologia in response to accusations that they aim to spoil an election. As I have 
indicated throughout this project, being labeled a spoiler is akin to being called anti-American. 
Spoilers are seen as contaminating agents in democracy, and the charge stains the character of 
third party candidates who are portrayed as intentionally interfering with the will of the 
electorate. Minor party candidates have often but not always issued statements of self-defense in 
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response to this accusation. Candidates like Strom Thurmond and George Wallace embraced the 
label, while candidates such as Eugene McCarthy, Ralph Nader, and Bob Barr rejected the 
allegations while claiming to be legitimate political contenders. Despite the fact that this kind of 
apologia is common among minor party candidates, only rhetoric scholar Christine Harold, who 
analyzed Ralph Nader’s “rhetoric of purity” in 2000, has studied the genre.660 Examining the 
ways that candidates have addressed this criticism may help scholars understand why some third 
party candidates succeed in gaining electoral support while others flop. 
 This research could also be extended in the future by expanding the scope of the project 
from the period between 1948 to 2008 back to at least the beginning of the contemporary two-
party system that started after the Civil War. Comparing the rhetoric of third party presidential 
candidates in their Golden Age, which ended at the beginning of the twentieth century, with their 
more recent discourse may yield interesting findings. Some questions that could be answered by 
future studies on this subject include: Were third party candidates in the nineteenth century more 
willing to assume rhetorical leadership of their campaigns than their major party counterparts? 
Does the third party style described in this project resemble the rhetorical style of minor party 
candidates before the turn of the twentieth century? On a related note, how have third party 
speech genres changed as minor parties have lost their power in the public sphere?  
  Finally, this analysis of third party campaign rhetoric has focused entirely on presidential 
candidates. This is a common practice in political communication research. Nevertheless, future 
research could build on my findings by examining whether my observations hold true for third 
party candidates who have run for governor, the United States Senate and House of 
Representatives, as well as various state offices. It seems reasonable to believe that third party 
candidates except those with deep coffers and name recognition encounter similar challenges in 
   180 
just about every region of the country, as do their presidential counterparts, but this theory 
should be checked.  
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